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CHAPTER I 
 
EQUALITY, POLITICAL REPRESENTATION, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 
AND PARTICIPATION 
 
A number of studies have identified a crisis of representation that is undermining 
the quality of democracy in the Latin American region (Hagopian 2005; Mainwaring et al 
2006). Political systems seem to have failed to fulfill citizens’ expectations, a fact that 
has led in some cases to high and growing dissatisfaction with the main political 
institutions of representation. However, we might wonder if this failure of representation 
is affecting all groups within the population equally, regardless their level of income, or 
other socio-demographic characteristics that might position them differently in the 
political system, such as belonging to an indigenous population. In assessing the topic of 
political representation in Latin America, it is imperative that we understand the extent to 
which different subgroups are under-represented in Latin American politics and, as well, 
whether there are some institutional designs, namely with respect to the nature of and 
rules governing the electoral system, or cultural features (in particular, those of a 
participatory culture) that might lead to more equal representation outcomes than others.  
To what extent are different groups of citizens evenly represented in Latin 
America? Under what circumstances do disadvantaged groups’ interests manage to get 
represented? Government responsiveness to citizens’ preferences, where citizens are seen 
as political equals (Dahl 1971), is fundamental to democratic quality and stability 
(Rueschemeyer 2004; Morlino 2004; Luna and Zechmeister 2005). However, this ideal is 
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not always met. Latin America is the region of the world with greatest economic 
inequality, largely if not entirely a function of political inequalities, and these inequities 
diminish democratic quality and make stability tenuous.  Therefore, it is imperative that 
we understand the extent to which and the reasons why different subgroups are under-
represented in Latin American politics, and the causes and consequences of this 
imbalance. This dissertation aims to address this issue first using a comparative approach 
by looking at a subset of countries in the region, and then, by focusing on the study of the 
case of Bolivia.  
The objectives of this dissertation are to assess differences in the degree to which 
legislators represent the policy preferences of poor versus wealthy constituents across 
Latin America and, as well, to assess the degree to which certain institutional and/or 
cultural features affect that relationship. This study is novel in the sense of assessing 
political representation by looking at different subconstituencies instead of at the nation 
as a whole and also in the sense of addressing both perceptions of representation and, as 
well, substantive representation based on key policy issues in Latin America. It also 
contributes to the understanding of the role of political institutions and political 
participation when it comes to the representation of disadvantaged populations in the 
region. In order to assess these relationships I use data from two main sources. First, I use 
both elite and mass survey data to measure perceptions of legislators and their roles and 
policy stances.  The elite data come from the surveys of the Parliamentary Elites of Latin 
America (PELA) Project conducted by the University of Salamanca (Spain) in the lower 
chamber of Latin American congresses in the summer and fall of 2010. The mass survey 
data come from different waves of surveys conducted by the Latin American Public 
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Opinion Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt University between 2004 and 2012.  Second, and 
for the in-depth analysis of political representation in Bolivia, I make use of original data 
that I collected in 2011 during the course of fieldwork in this country where I conducted 
semi-structured interviews with legislators and measured their skin tone in order to 
measure descriptive representation. Furthermore, I take into account different 
institutional indicators such as the presence of leftist parties in congress, levels of 
proportionality, fragmentation, electoral district magnitude, effective number of parties, 
and levels of political participation based on the AmericasBarometer datasets. I argue that 
the presence of leftist parties, electoral features that create opportunities for keeping 
legislators accountable, and high levels of electoral turnout are related to smaller gaps in 
citizens’ perceptions between whom politicians represent and should represent and to 
closer and also to closer substantive representation between legislators and poor sectors 
of the population. Nonetheless, there are variations in the extent to which these 
relationships hold, as I will present throughout this study.  
This first chapter presents the theoretical framework on which the hypotheses and 
their empirical tests will be based. I outline the main theories on the relationship between 
inequality, political representation, political institutions and participation.  This 
introductory chapter concludes by describing the outline of the rest of the dissertation.     
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Equality as Fundamental for Democracy 
 
Defining democracy is a task that has filled numerous pages in political science, 
which expand on countless debates about the characteristics that define this key concept. 
Looking at definitions that go beyond minimalist requirements
1
, the ideal of political 
equality is presented as a core element of modern democracies (Dahl 1971; Dahl 1989; 
Diamond 1999). Political equality means that the process assigns the same weight to 
citizens’ preferences and interests ( Dahl 1971; Verba 2001) or, as Rueschemeyer 
defines, it is “a condition in which all citizens have equal influence on the collective 
decision making of a political community” (2011, 819).2 In other words, democracies are 
expected to treat citizens and their preferences as equals, with the same rights and 
opportunities to influence political decisions. Also, political inequality can refer to the 
outcome of policies, that is to say the extent to which a policy has an even effect across 
different groups of society (Ware 1981). 
Political equality occupies an important place in discussions of democracy for 
both normative and empirical reasons. On the one hand, Dahl (2006) argues that political 
equality is a fundamental democratic principle because it meets standards of morality, 
                                                 
1
 Authors such as Schumpeter (1942) and Przeworski et al. (2000) opt for minimalist definitions that evolve 
around the idea of a system in which rulers are selected in competitive elections while broader conceptions 
include other dimensions related to freedom, participation, accountability or civilian control over the 
military, among others. See Dahl (1971) for a list of core requisites of democracy.  
2
 The Working Work on Political Inequality integrated by members of the International Sociological 
Association and the International Political Science Association is concern about the lack of empirical 
studies on political inequalities, and encourage these kinds of analyses in order to understand how 
contemporary societies work. They present several definitions of political inequality such as “the extent to 
which groups are unequal in their influence over the decisions made in governance structures” or “the 
extent of the distance between those with a lot of potential influence and those with less”. Source: 
http://politicalinequality.org/2010/06/22/statement-on-the-study-of-political-inequality/ (accessed on 
6/15/2013). 
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prudence and acceptability.  On the other one, political equality is a good that provides 
citizens a sense of belonging to the polity, and thus builds bonds and cooperation among 
the members of the community, by enhancing citizen involvement in decision making 
(Verba 2001; Jacobs and Skocpol 2005). As much as political equality is valued, the 
converse – political inequality – is viewed as problematic for democracy. Thus, as Tilly 
(1998) argues, political inequality threatens democracy to “the extent that people on the 
advantaged sides of categorical divides are small in number and rich in resources, they 
combine the incentive and the capacity to buy their way out of democratic 
processes…[and] the co-presence of a very few rich people and many very poor people 
encourages the buying of candidates, votes, and election judges, as well as extra electoral 
patronage” (224).3  
In sum, political equality is a concept that has been addressed as a key value in 
democracy from a theoretical perspective. And, yet, it is rarely studied empirically (Ware 
1981). Further, and despite its desirability, it is very difficult to find political equality in 
practice. Scholars have identified different reasons why political equality is difficult to 
achieve. One of these explanations is linked to political participation, which is “at the 
heart of political equality” (Verba 2001: 1) because it is a key means by which citizens 
express their preferences and needs. From this perspective, for public officials to equally 
consider citizens’ preferences there has to be equal political activity (Verba 2001). 
However, the resources (time, money and skills) necessary to participate are not evenly 
distributed among the different groups in the population, which fuels inequalities in 
participation. Scholars have found that many citizens lack the skills to participate and the 
                                                 
3
 Tilly (1998) conceives of persistent social inequalities in terms of paired and unequal categories such as 
male/female, black/white or citizen/noncitizen.  
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more educated and knowledgeable are more likely to participate (Delli Carpini and 
Keeter 1996; Popkin 1991; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). And, when there are 
inequalities in participation, the interests of privileged groups are more likely to be taken 
in to account (Jacobs and Skocpol 2005). Other scholars focus on the existence of 
different social and economic powers that lead to the existence of dominant groups. 
Specifically, economic inequality has an impact on political equality given that the 
wealthy are more likely to influence politics due to their power to control investments 
(Rueschemeyer 2011).
4
  
In sum, modern democracies are based on the idea of principals (citizens) 
delegating the power to enact public policies to agents (public officials), in a relationship 
in which all citizens “should be equal to each other” (Powell 2004a, 274); italics added 
for emphasis). This system is built on the premise that governments enact policies that 
are congruent with the preferences of the citizenry. However, there are reasons to think 
that achieving this equality in political representation is subject to important limitations. 
In fact, it has been argued that “the disappointing performance of recently democratized 
political systems in Latin America seems largely due to a renewed weakness in the 
organized representation of subordinate interests” (Rueschemeyer 2011: 823). Therefore, 
the study of the way public officials represent the policy preferences of the electorate is 
key for the understanding of modern democratic processes.  
Representation refers to the connection between those two poles: the mass public 
and governing elites. From a principal-agent perspective, public officials are agents that 
act on behalf of citizens, responding to public demands and fulfilling citizens’ 
                                                 
4
 There are also theoretical arguments on how political equality could imply limiting freedom and 
government intervention (Dahl 2006, Verba 2001), which might impact core values of democracy.  
7 
 
expectations. The relationship between agents and principals is ruled by political 
accountability, which involves information from the former to the latter, and explanations 
and sanctions for decisions (Schmitter 2004).  In other words, voting works as a reward-
punishment mechanism; voters will take into account policy performance and will vote in 
line with their assessment (Downs 1957). Public officials, as voter seekers, will try to be 
elected by looking after their constituencies’ interests.    
Nonetheless, some of these ideal premises are not always met. As Lijphart (1997: 
1) states “inequality in representation and influence are not randomly distributed but 
systematically biased in favor of more privileged citizens- those with higher incomes, 
greater wealth, and better education-and against less advantaged citizens”. Why might 
underprivileged groups be underrepresented? Different theoretical approaches offer 
distinct explanations that lead to the same general expectation that poor citizens are 
underrepresented. Some of these perspectives, which will be expanded on below, focus 
on citizens’ position and role in the political arena, their political ability (lack of interest, 
political knowledge, sophistication), and their political engagement or participation.  
It is well known that citizens’ influence over the political system is not equally 
distributed across groups. Different theories have identified how different segments of the 
population depending on their socioeconomic, demographic and political characteristics 
are better (or worse) positioned in the political arena, which makes it easier (or more 
difficult) to be heard and have their interests represented. On the one hand, decades ago 
elitist theories emphasized the differences between elites and masses (Michels 1911; 
Mosca 1939; Pareto 1935). This classic theory argues that power is in the hands of a 
minority, a unified and coherent group, who thanks to organization, political ability or 
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personal qualities is able to keep its domination over the masses. Nonetheless, the 
transformations that would take place within the social and economic structures were 
introducing changes in the composition of the elites, changes that questioned the validity 
of this classical theory and gave way to a "democratic elitism” (Etzioni-Halevy 1993). 
This new approach focuses on competition among different groups of elites for power. As 
Dahl (1961) argues, in any system there is a plurality of groups seeking power, while 
some others do not express interest in politics. With all this variety of groups, it is has 
been said that political systems are designed so that they favor the will of business and 
professional groups, and this then limits the influence of the general public 
(Schattschneider 1960). The resources available to these groups allow them to obtain 
what they want, even if their positions are against or in opposition to general public 
opinion (Wilson 1990; Wright 1996; Domhoff 1998). Public policy is determined by 
small groups, by interest organizations, and economic elites, given that the general public 
is not well positioned compared to the well-off elite. Taking into account citizens’ 
unequal positions in the political system with respect to their ability to formulate their 
demands or to influence power, it might be expected that those with more economic 
resources are in an advantaged situation, and thus more likely to be heard by their 
representatives.  
In other words, we could think that there is an underrepresentation of the poor that 
might be explained by some characteristics attached to that situation of deprivation, such 
as having fewer resources to participate in the political process, to understand politics or 
to be informed about politics or to express their preferences and control their 
representatives (L. Bartels 2008). These ideas are in line with what the classic 
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behaviorists started pointing out five decades ago, that most citizens are unable or 
unwilling to collect, understand, and/or incorporate abstract political information into a 
constrained belief system (Converse 1964). Therefore, citizens find it difficult to control 
their representatives and intervene in the policy-making process (Delli Carpini and 
Keeter 1996). In fact, recent studies have found that politicians tend to be more 
responsive to opinion leaders, that is to say to those who know about politics and are 
engaged in politics, given that this sector of the population might be more capable to 
communicate their preferences, and they are more likely to affect the selection of 
representatives(Adams and Ezrow 2009).  
Furthermore, it is argued that citizens are incapable of holding consistent policy 
positions, which opens the door for elites to manipulate their weak views.5 To the extent 
that those who are further down on the socio-economic ladder are those likely to hold 
coherent policy perspectives, then this lends a further reason to expect the quality of 
representation to be lower among poor versus wealthy constituents.  
Latin America is one of the more economically unequal regions in the world, 
where the four poorest deciles encompass fifteen percent of the total income while the 
richest one takes one third of it (ECLAC 2010). Furthermore, this is a region 
characterized by an unequal access to education, especially to secondary education, 
which is related to socioeconomic conditions, geography and ethnic origin. As an 
example only an 8.3% of citizens between 25 and 29 years old have completed five years 
                                                 
5
 This relationship between knowledge and representation has been tested especially in the United States. 
Barabas and Wachtel (2009) find that when citizens are politically knowledgeable higher levels of 
representation are reached. In this case, citizens choose their representative by correctly knowing how their 
senator’s positions on certain issues and by their agreement with that issue position. Some other researchers 
have highlighted the importance of expertise or being knowledgeable on certain issues to be represented. In 
this regards, Jacobs and Page (2005) show how foreign policy is shaped by business elites and experts 
while public officials are not responsive to the mass public, at least in this realm.  
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of postsecondary education (ECLAC 2010). Given this situation we might assume that 
not all citizens in Latin America have the same resources to, on the one hand, express 
their preferences and, on the other one, to be informed about politics and keep their 
representatives accountable. In sum, from a theoretical perspective, there are enough 
reasons to think that certain segments of the population are underrepresented, a situation 
that in theory should be reflected in actual measures of representation and which could 
also be reflected in citizens’ perceptions.  Nonetheless, we know that citizens’ 
perceptions of their own abilities to influence politics (external efficacy) and to 
understand politics (internal efficacy) vary (Craig and Maggiotto 1982) and thus not all 
of them will be aware of political inequalities. The same factors that explain that 
underprivileged sectors are not represented might explain that they do not perceive such 
inequality.   In other words, I expect that: 
H1a.Some sectors of the population in Latin America perceive that public officials 
represent the interest of the better-off. 
H1b. More wealthy citizens’ policy preferences in Latin America are better 
represented compared to those who are less wealthy. 
Recently, scholars have started taking political inequalities beyond theory and 
addressing them from an empirical perspective following what Saward (2010) identifies 
as “renewed demands for better representation of marginalized groups” (2). While only a 
few studies focus on perceptions of political inequalities, a growing body of empirical 
research focuses on substantive representation. Regarding perceptions of inequality, 
scholars find that acceptance of inequalities varies across countries and individuals 
(Svallfors 1997; Alesina and Giuliano 2009; Rueschemeyer 2011) and is higher in 
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countries such as the United States. However, in general terms, and specially as per 
studies conducted in the United States and Europe, it is found that citizens do not 
consider that governments represent people like them (Whitefield 2006; Rohrschneider 
2005). Nonetheless, some groups, those ill informed and with fewer resources,  find it 
difficult to connect inequalities and their own interests (Bartels 2005).  Studies in Latin 
America have focused on evaluations of representative institutions (Boidi 2009) more 
than on perceptions on whom public officials represent. Chapter II will address the issue 
of perceptions of equality in representation in eleven countries in Latin America.  
Regarding the expectation presented in H1b, some empirical research in the 
United States has indeed found that policy outcomes reflect affluent citizens’ preferences 
more than poor or middle-income Americans (Gilens 2005; L. Bartels 2008) basically 
because affluent citizens support politicians’ campaigns and help them to get a seat. This 
pattern not only holds at the national/federal level but also when looking at state 
legislatures: poor citizens are worse represented by state governments than wealthier ones 
(Flavin 2012a). Though limited in quantity and focused on a single case, some research 
focused on Latin America reaches similar conclusions, though adds additional reasons for 
such unequal outcomes with respect to representation. For example, a recent study by 
Taylor-Robinson (2010) on representation in Latin America, with a special focus on 
Honduras, finds that poor citizens lack the needed resources to monitor public officials 
(e.g., education, access to information) and to punish representatives who ignore their 
interests, which constrains the possibilities for being well-represented. Apart from these 
two main factors, the author finds under-participation in politics and in associations 
undermines representation among the poor. 
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In a related vein, another theoretical approach highlights the relationship between 
participation and representation. Political participation is a key element in any definition 
of democracy (Dahl 1971). This involvement covers a wide range of activities that 
include voting, working for candidates or parties, and participating in manifestations or 
protests, among others. Participation has seen by many scholars as a way to produce 
representative decisions and legitimacy in the system (Dalton 2004). Although there is no 
agreement on the level of participation necessary for democracies to work (Huntington 
1968; Norris 2002), there is an agreement on its importance. One of the main forms of 
participation is voting. Through elections, citizens select public officials, and keep them 
accountable, which should have implications for the role of those representatives. In 
Lijphart’s words (1997, 4) “who votes, and who doesn’t has important consequences for 
who gets elected and for the content of public policies”. Furthermore, it is not new to 
argue that representatives might not be committed to pay attention to those who do not 
vote (Key 1949). If this is the case, we could expect the system to unequally 
representative those who vote (or participate actively in politics) versus those who do not 
participate. Some authors have argued that the reason why we could expect more 
congruence between voters and representatives is because the former tend to select public 
officials who hold similar or close views and preferences (Miller and Stokes 1963; 
Erikson 1990). An alternative explanation is that through voting, citizens express their 
preferences and induce public officials to be responsive (Verba 2003).  Studies have 
found a relationship between income and participation: “individuals who are below the 
median income in society are less likely to participate in elections, and those above the 
median income are more likely to do so” (Beramendi and Anderson 2008, 18). However, 
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empirical evidence on the relationship between participation and representation has 
shown mixed results. On the one hand, Ellis et al. (2006) find that in American politics, 
representatives do not respond differently to voters and nonvoters. And, further, Flavin 
(2012b) does not find that poor citizens voting in higher rates improve their chances of 
being better represented by their senators. On the other hand, Griffin and Newman (2005) 
find that senators in the United States are influenced more by voter preferences than 
nonvoter preferences. Nonetheless, in a later study, these authors find that the 
relationship between political participation and chances of being represented do not work 
the same way for all groups; specifically, they argue that voting does not increase the 
representation of blacks and Latinos in the United States (Griffin and Newman 2008). 
Despite these mixed findings, there is theoretical reason to expect that a participatory 
political culture will influence on the nature of representation in Latin America.
6
 In fact, 
in the history of this region the poor and powerless on occasion have been able to 
mobilize against the political systems (Chalmers et al. 1997) to defend their interests. 
Therefore, we could posit that a participatory culture can help to overcome the expected 
situation of underrepresentation experienced by poor citizens. If a participatory culture 
promotes even representation citizens will be less likely to perceive inequalities. Where 
citizens are active, citizens’ perceptions of their ability to influence politics increase 
(Finkel 1985) which will produce perceptions of equal representation.   
  The expectations I will test in this regard are as follows: 
H2a. Where citizens participate more actively in politics, perceptions of unequal 
representation will be relatively lower.  
                                                 
6
 It is worth noting that some institutional factors such as compulsory voting might affect levels of political 
participation. 
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H2b. Less wealthy citizens are better represented under a participatory political 
culture (than they are under a less participatory culture). 
I intend to test this cultural factor along with the institutional approach I develop 
below, in order to see what approach holds better for Latin America, that is to say, if 
institutional or cultural factors improve the situation of underrepresentation that the 
literature anticipates for poor citizens.  
So far, we have seen how both the theory and the empirical evidence leave little 
doubt about the general disadvantaged position of those citizens with fewer resources 
with which to demand and secure political representation. And, as well, I have offered 
some reason to expect that participatory tendencies at both the individual and aggregate 
levels might attenuate conditions of inequality in representation. These expectations will 
be tested in Chapters II and III. I will assess the extent to which citizens perceive that 
poor citizens are under-represented and the extent to which their preferences match those 
of representatives. Having reviewed some fundamental postulates of political inequality, 
the next section focuses on political representation in general terms.  
 
Some Postulates of Political Representation  
 
Representation is undoubtedly one of the most critical elements in any 
democracy. Many of the political decisions that affect citizens are taken by their 
representatives, which makes the analysis of the nature and characteristics of 
representation especially relevant. Representation is a concept that has been analyzed 
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from many different perspectives and that has experienced many transformations over the 
last decades (Manin 1997; Ryden 1996). 
This section presents the general framework and the main dimensions of 
representation that the literature has addressed over the last decades. As the reader will 
see, the main theoretical postulates in this extensive literature have been built considering 
advanced democracies and citizens as a whole. This research project takes into account 
these classic postulates but opts for a more nuanced approach, one that takes into account 
different segments of the population in new democracies and assesses the influence of 
electoral institutions on at least some aspects of democratic representation.  
Basically, there are two main dimensions addressed by the literature7: the role 
played by representatives and the ways in which citizens are represented. While they 
intersect and affect one another, I will introduce each here in turn.  The first dimension 
that the literature on representation addresses is the role of the representatives. The 
different kinds of roles that the representative can adopt are found in the ideas of Edmund 
Burke, who considered that “parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with 
one interest, that of the whole, where not local purposes, not local prejudices, ought to 
guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason for the whole”.8 As Eulau 
et al. (1959) point out, Burke’s position combined two notions of representation, the 
focus of representation and the style of representation, that is to say, who 
parliamentarians represent (national or local interests), and what attitude they should 
adopt (dependent or independent). 
                                                 
7
 Other scholars prefer to distinguish between studies that focus on how votes are translated into seats and 
research addressing substantive representation, that is to say the extent to which citizens and 
representatives’ issue preferences coincide (Powell 2004a). 
8
 This is an extract from one of Burke’s speeches, “Speech to the Electors of Bristol” of 1774. It can be 
found in Stanlis (1968). 
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Over time, the concept of representation has been affected by the emergence of 
political parties. Political parties gradually gained in importance, especially in Europe. 
However, as Thomassen (1994) indicates, it was difficult for theories of political 
representation to incorporate these new elements. Manin (1997) talks about party 
democracy. In this model of party government, the role of individual parliamentarians 
changed as they had to coordinate their actions and decisions with the other members of 
their same party; in part, competition changed from a competition among candidates to a 
competition among parties. Parties had to be disciplined and cohesive in order to 
implement the programs that political parties offered to the electorate. 
Today in both advanced and most newer democracies, political representation by 
parties is a central component and, arguably, a key promise of the democratic political 
process.  However, the degree to which legislators cater to their constituencies, their 
parties, or the nation as a whole in carrying out their representative duties may still vary.  
I return to this point below. 
Regarding the second dimension (the ways citizens are represented), a now-
classic perspective has been offered by Pitkin (1967), who considers that citizens are 
represented descriptively, symbolically and substantively.
9
 She concludes that political 
representation is best achieved when legislators act "in the interest of the represented, in a 
manner responsive to them" (209) rather than sharing social or demographic 
characteristics with their represented. This idea is close to what later in the literature 
would be known respectively as mandate and accountability representation.  Mandate 
                                                 
9
 Recent approaches to the study of representation talk about anticipatory (public official anticipates the 
preferences of votes trying to be responsive to them), gyroscopic (constituents find it difficult to control 
representatives)  and surrogate (represented by someone you did not elect) forms of representation 
(Mansbridge 2003). 
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representation occurs “when politicians’ and voters’ interests coincide and/or when voters 
can reasonably expect that parties will do what they propose” (Przeworski, Stokes, and 
Manin 1999, 30). And as Achen (1978) points out, if the views of representatives and 
citizens are similar, representation is improved.
10
  
In considering symbolic representation, some empirical and theoretical works 
have suggested that descriptive representation is not always evident nor always to be 
expected. As Duverger (1954) suggested, workers do not vote for workers as their 
representatives; rather, they prefer well educated candidates.  Empirical analysis based on 
parliaments in Anglo-Saxon contexts showed that representatives had very different 
socioeconomic or demographic characteristics from citizens (Quandt 1969; Putnam 1973; 
Putnam 1976; Czudnowski 1982).
11
  More specifically, as Matthews  (1985) points out, 
“almost everywhere legislators are better educated, possess higher-status occupations, 
and have more privileged backgrounds than the people they ‘represent’”(p.18).  At the 
same time, scholarly attention to descriptive representation experienced a surge in the 
1990s when many scholars looking at the United States considered that fair 
representation should allow social groups to define and defend their own interests (Young 
1990; Phillips 1995; Mansbridge 1999; Williams 2000). 
Most of the comparative empirical research on representation has focused on 
mandate representation, and has been carried out in advanced industrial democracies 
(Miller and Stokes 1963; Achen 1978; Dalton 1985; Converse and Pierce 1986). These 
                                                 
10
 An alternative perspective on substantive representation is offered by those who focus on the notion of 
“accountability representation,” which assumes that voters reward incumbents who act in their best 
interests while the latter implement policies that will lead them to reelection (Przeworski, Stokes and 
Manin 1999).  It is outside the scope of this project to examine representation in terms of output. 
11
 Decades ago Elitist Theories emphasized the differences between elites and masses (Mosca 1939, Pareto 
1935).  
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analyses try to capture the "congruence" between constituents' beliefs and the legislators' 
positions. Some other authors consider that correspondence between legislators' positions 
and constituent opinions does not have to exist on all the issues (Froman 1963; Kingdon 
1989; Arnold 1990). Rather, this representation should be based on relevant policy 
dimensions, which are usually informed by ideology. In sum, “legislators should 
resemble their constituents ideologically” (Achen 1978: 481). In this regard recent studies 
focus on ideological or programmatic linkages, mainly in Europe (Powell 2004). In these 
societies the relationship between citizens and representatives is mainly based on 
ideological or programmatic commitments. This kind of linkage is believed to fuel 
democratic accountability and responsiveness (Kitschelt 2000).  
However, in the case of Latin America, the scenario seems to be much more 
complex. Some analyses have found that in some countries the bonds between citizens 
and representatives are not driven by ideology or programmatic ties but by personalism 
or an individual candidate’s qualities. This situation has led to systems characterized by 
loose party-society bonds, and weakly institutionalized forms of political representation 
(Roberts 2002). On the other hand, some other scholars find that in some countries 
political parties are ideologically and programmatic oriented (Alcántara 2004).  Only a 
handful of studies have focused squarely on the question of how parties and 
representatives in Latin American establish their relationship with citizens (e.g., Roberts 
2002; Crisp et al. 2004; Luna and Zechmeister 2005; Levitsky 2007; Kitschelt et al. 
2010), but these mainly focus on a given country or, to the extent that they take a 
comparative perspective, focus on the nation as a whole.  
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In fact, most studies of political representation treat constituents as a whole, using 
average positions in a given district, partisans or country. This, however, is likely to 
overlook serious differences in terms of the degree to which different types of citizens are 
represented.  As Achen (1978: 480) argues: “if regression coefficients were assumed 
equal only for groups of constituents (say, social classes or ideological bedfellows), the 
specification would be more realistic, and the differences in coefficients for different 
groups would measure the failure of representativeness.”   
In this regard, the study of representation is starting to change with the emergence 
of new studies in the United States and Western Europe in the last years which examine 
unequal representation or differential responsiveness. These new studies are taking into 
account a variety of groups: voters versus non-voters (Ellis, Ura, and Ashley-Robinson 
2006), citizens sorted by income (Bartels 2008, Gilens 2005), activists, experts or opinion 
leaders versus the general public (Jacobs and Page 2005; Griffin and Newman 2005), 
party supporters and party elites (Dalton 1985), among others.  
The basic idea behind these analyses is to evaluate legislative representation by 
measuring the extent to which political equality is reached among different groups. Most 
of these studies show that some groups have an advantage at the time of influencing 
policy outcomes or having their preferences represented. For instance, in the United 
States it is found that policy outcomes reflect affluent citizens’ preferences more than 
poor or middle-income Americans (Gilens 2005, Bartels 2008). Jacobs and Page (2005) 
show that business leaders and experts have the greatest influence shaping foreign policy 
whereas the public has little or no influence.  
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However, we know little about the representation of different groups in Latin 
America. As a first contribution, then, this dissertation assesses the degree to which 
representation is unequally distributed across poor and rich groups in Latin America.  In 
addition, while the topic of representation has received increased attention in the study of 
Latin American politics, few researchers have examined the topic from the perspective of 
the legislator and the focus of his/her representation (but see Marenghi and Garcia 2008).  
Moreover, while the role of electoral systems in enhancing political instability and 
democratic politics has been discussed in numerous ways, the literature has not treated, in 
particular with respect to representation in Latin America, the question of how these 
factors might affect representation. Apart from institutional factors, scholars have 
emphasized the relationship between political participation and representation (Verba 
2003, Beramendi and Anderson 2008), and yet this has not been tested in depth in the 
case of Latin America. As additional contributions, then, this dissertation includes a 
detailed case study of the extent to which representation and legislators’ understandings 
of their roles with respect to representation in Bolivia vary by institutions and electoral 
rules. This section has covered the basic approaches that scholars have used to address 
political representation in general terms. The next section addresses the relationship 
between political institutions and political representation and the opportunities that they 
might inflict for disadvantaged groups in society to be better represented.  
 
Do Institutions Matter for Political Representation? 
 
Variation in political representation does not take place randomly. Given the 
nature of institutions, defined as “the humanly devised constraints that structure political, 
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economic and social interaction” (North 1991, 97), it is seems only natural to think that 
institutions play a systematic and important role in the process of political representation.  
Grounded in this premise, a broad literature has focused on the analysis of 
electoral rules and their effects. It is been shown that electoral rules not only translate 
votes into seats but also shape the incentives of political actors in ways that affect 
political competition, party organization and the kinds of ties between representatives and 
constituents, among other outcomes (see for instance, Duverger 1954; Rae 1967; 
Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Carey and Shugart 1995; Lijphart 1999).  
This dissertation focuses on certain electoral institutions (i.e. the proportionality 
of the electoral system, the size of electoral districts and the effective number of parties
12
) 
and their relationship to perceptions of inequalities in political representation and to the 
substantive representation of poor citizens in Latin America. One of the main questions 
that emerges from the study of electoral systems and their relationship with 
representation is based in the fact that this research that it has produced mixed results, 
with scholars sometimes finding that electoral systems do not matter in the expected way 
(Ezrow 2010).
13
 Thus, a key objective of this dissertation is to assess the extent to which, 
and when, electoral institutions matter for political equality in representation. 
Most studies of political representation that assess the influence of electoral 
systems compare proportional representation systems versus majoritarian ones or single 
member district (SMD). These studies have yielded mixed results. Traditional studies 
argued that proportional systems enhance substantive representation (Huber and Powell 
                                                 
12
 The effective number of parties is not an institution per se but an institutional feature related to 
representation. 
13
 Ezrow (2010) argues that “electoral systems matter for political representation through their influence on 
the balance between niche and mainstream party influence” (5). 
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1994, Powell 2000). However, recent scholarship finds that that relationship is unclear 
(Blais and Bodet 2006). Part of the explanation resides in the trade-off inherent in a 
choice between these systems (Powell 2000). While proportional formulas promote the 
inclusion of more groups, majoritarian formulas increase opportunities for monitoring 
public officials and for the clarity of responsibility necessary for accountability.
14
 
Therefore, on the one hand it could be expected that poor people might be better 
represented under proportional systems.  On the other hand, majoritarian formulas may 
provide opportunities for making legislators accountable to the degree that they feel 
pressured to be responsive in order not to be punished in the next election. Therefore, one 
could expect a relationship between proportional systems and unequal representation, but 
the direction is unclear; tentatively, it could be said that: 
H3a. In systems with larger degrees of proportionality, perceptions of unequal 
representation will be lower than in less proportional ones. 
H3b. The larger the proportionality of an electoral system, the smaller the 
distance in policy preferences between the poor and legislators. 
Chapters II and III will assess the extent to which rules regarding the 
proportionality of electoral systems affect both perceptions of inequalities in political 
representation and substantive representation.  
Related to proportionality is the magnitude of electoral districts. Large districts in 
proportional representative systems tend to produce more proportionality at the aggregate 
level (Benoit 2001; Taagepera and Shugart 1989). However, district magnitude not only 
                                                 
14
 Proportional representation is also believed to enhance corruption given that is more difficult to monitor 
public officials. On the contrary systems that allow citizens to vote for individuals provide more 
opportunities to identify corrupt public officials and to punish them (Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman 2005).   
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influences proportionality at the aggregate level but also legislators’ behavior. Whereas 
small districts are likely to produce disproportionality at the national level they also 
increase opportunities for enhanced accountability (Carey and Hix 2011).  Small districts 
provide more opportunities for controlling representatives and building closer ties to 
them, which enhances accountability. Therefore, I expect that the more small districts 
there are in a political system, the fewer inequalities in representation citizens will 
perceive and the better the poor’s preferences will be represented. These expectations can 
be stated as follows: 
H4a. As the proportion of small districts grows, perceptions of unequal 
representation will be lower. 
H4b. The larger the proportion of small districts, the smaller the distance in 
policy preferences between the poor and legislators. 
Another institutional feature related to representation is fragmentation of the party 
system. This can affect citizens’ views of the political system while providing the menu 
of options among which to select candidates. Whereas a large array of parties may 
provide a sense of having the possibility to have more options represented and thus more 
potential to be included in the system as well as greater the options to turn to when 
sanctioning incumbents (Taylor-Robinson 2010), a large number of parties can damage 
clarity of responsibility and bring more confusion to voters. Therefore, any a priori 
expectations on the impact of number of parties on political representation (perceptions 
and substantive representation) are unclear. Provisionally, it could be stated that: 
H5a. As the number of parties in a political system grows, perceptions of unequal 
representation decrease. 
24 
 
H5b. The larger the number of political parties, the smaller the distance in policy 
preferences between the poor and legislators. 
Finally, taking advantage of the mixed electoral system in Bolivia I will be 
assessing the impact of electoral institutions on the role that legislators assume when they 
are in office. Extant literature on the role of representation has shown that there is a wide 
variation across (Heitshusen, Young, and Wood 2005) and within countries (Stratmann 
and Baur 2002). Basically, these studies assess how legislators define the focus of their 
work, that is to say, whom they represent (mainly, national versus local interests)
15
 
(Eulau et al. 1959) and what explains that variation.  Part of the literature considers that 
legislators’ motivations are key to defining how they  characterize their roles (Searing 
1985). In this line, Fenno (1978) shows how representatives in the United States adopt a 
“home style” in order to secure their main goal of reelection. Representatives work to 
gain trust from their constituency, so that it is easy for them to explain and justify their 
decisions in Washington. This trust is gained thanks to their work within the district they 
represent. 
Regardless of the motivation, the role a legislator adopts has important impacts on 
her behavior. For instance, those focused on local interest are more likely to spend more 
time in their constituencies, and more likely to vote against their political party than those 
who adopt a broader role (Searing 1985), or more likely to spend time on local party 
work rather than national party work (Studlar and McAllister 1996).  
Apart from personal motivations, institutional features shape representational 
roles (which in turn also shape personal motivations). One of the institutions highlighted 
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 Some scholars emphasize the need for systems that allow for a balanced focused between national and 
parochial interests (Crisp 2006). 
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within the literature as having the largest impact on the role that legislators perform is the 
electoral system and, especially, the nature of districts. While multimember districts offer 
few incentives for developing a personal relationship in the district, because these imply a 
geographical overlap among several legislators (Heitshusen, Young, and Wood 2005), 
single member districts generate a series of incentives that bring representatives closer to 
their constituents. Additionally, under single member districts, the representative is 
identified as the spokesperson for the interests of the constituency (Vallès, Bosch, and 
Guardella 1997), and she might be more likely to engage in pork-barrel activities than 
representatives elected in multimember districts (Lancaster and Patterson 1990). 
Moreover, in these cases the candidate plays a fundamental role: her election depends on 
her own person more than on the political party to which she belongs. Parliamentary 
groups under these circumstances will be ill-disciplined; each member will be more 
concerned about the impact of their vote in her feud than about the instructions of the 
party (Duverger 1950).  
Finally, apart from electoral institutions, political parties are also key institutions 
that influence political representation. In fact, they are instruments or vehicles of 
representation, given that they aggregate and channel citizens’ demands, among other key 
functions (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). Leftist parties are expected to implement 
policies to redistribute wealth, and act in favor of those citizens in the lowest 
socioeconomic strata (Alvarez, Garrett, and Lange 1991). Even more, some scholars have 
argued that there are resources to overcome political inequality such as organization for 
collective action and certain institutions, as strong unions and leftist parties, which have 
reduced inequalities (Rueschemeyer 2011).  
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On the basis of the above discussion concerning the relevance of parties to 
representation and focusing in on the potential for parties of different ideological bents to 
have different impacts on representation, I posit that: 
H 6a. Where the left has a strong presence, perceptions of unequal representation 
will be lower than in countries with a weaker incidence.  
H 6b. Where leftist parties have a strong presence, the distance between policy 
preferences between the poor and legislators will be smaller than in contexts where their 
incidence is weaker. 
The relationship between the left and the representation of marginalized sectors 
has been proved especially strong in Western democracies, being in part the responsible 
of the emergence of welfare states (Huber and Stephens 2010). Focusing on the context 
of Latin America, scholars talk of a rise of the left in recent decades, boosted in part by 
the social and economic inequalities created by the neoliberal economic policies decades 
ago (Cleary 2009; Hunter, Madrid, and Weyland 2010; Levitsky and Roberts 2011). 
Nonetheless, there are important differences in these leftist parties across countries, and 
in some countries the left has not been successful despite having a potential basis of 
support. The role of the left will be tested in this dissertation by looking at the effect it 
has on perceptions of representation and the representation of policy issues.  
In sum, in this project I test two different theoretical perspectives that the 
literature has identified as relevant for representation: the nature of political institutions 
and political culture. On the one hand, I will test the influence of the electoral rules (in 
particular, contrasting those that tend to be candidate-centered versus party-centered), 
which theoretically affects the relative incentives politicians have to cater to the interest 
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of their district (as opposed to their party or the nation as a whole).  The general 
expectation is that marginalized citizens will have more chances to be included in the 
dynamics of representation under electoral systems that favor close relationships between 
citizens and their representatives such as single member districts and open lists. In theory, 
then, rules that are more candidate-centered should lead to constituent-focused 
representation; however, it is arguably an open question whether that representation will 
be based on policy or descriptive characteristics of the constituency (e.g., social class or 
skin color), or both.  Bolivia offers an exceptional case to explore these expectations in-
depth. Indigenous populations, placed in the low ends of the socioeconomic strata, have 
been marginalized in the political system for decades. The existence of a mixed electoral 
system that allows for uninominal and plurinominal representatives in each of the nine 
departments offers a great opportunity to test the effects of the electoral system on the 
representation of underprivileged groups and on the role adopted by legislators in the 
national congress.  
On the other hand, I will test the effect that an active and participant citizenry 
might have on representation. Through participation, citizens express their preferences 
and keep their representatives accountable. Therefore, we could expect that when there is 
an active citizenry and contacts between citizens and their representatives, policy 
congruence is improved. Finally, alongside these two foci - one on institutions and one on 
culture - I also examine the relevance of a strong left given that, on the one hand, these 
parties have been linked to underprivileged sectors of society, and on the other hand, 
Latin America has experienced a so called “rise of the left” in the last years. Therefore, it 
28 
 
is opportune to include a focus on these parties in this study of political inequality in the 
region.  
 
Road Map and Summary of Key Findings 
 
This final section of this introductory chapter presents the outline of the remaining 
dissertation. Chapter II focuses on perceptions of inequality in ten countries in Latin 
America. Specifically it assesses the extent to which citizens perceive that politicians 
defend the interests of well-off constituents and the gap between this perception and the 
ideal views that citizens hold on whom public officials should represent. Socioeconomic 
variables at the individual level and institutional characteristics at the national level, 
along with levels of political participation at the aggregate level are considered to test the 
extent to which they explain variations in this gap. I also examine the potential 
moderating influence of the presence of leftist parties in congress, the electoral system 
(proportionality, magnitude of the district) and the participatory culture at the national 
level (aggregate levels of voting and contacting public officials). Findings in this chapter 
suggest that there is a general perception that politicians tend to defend the interests of 
the better off and that wealth at the individual level and electoral rules matter for 
perceptions of political inequality. Specifically, being poor increases the likelihood of 
perceiving a larger gap between the actual and the ideal situation of political inequality. 
Regarding electoral rules, the results depict a clear relationship between the magnitude of 
electoral systems and perceptions of political inequalities: the larger the proportion of 
small districts in a political system, the smaller the gap in perceived political inequality. 
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Contrary to the expectation derived from the literature in Western democracies, the larger 
the number of parties in Latin America, the larger the levels of political inequality that 
citizens perceive. Also, the presence of leftist parties is related with lower levels of 
perceived political inequities in a robust way. Finally, high levels of electoral turnout are 
strongly related to lower levels of perceived political inequality.  
The next chapter (Chapter III) measures and assesses mandate representation for 
distinct socio-economic groups in eleven countries. In other words, using data from the 
Parliamentary Elites in Latin America (PELA) project and the AmericasBarometer I 
assess and compare the extent to which there is or is not policy congruence between 
specific segments of the citizenry (poor versus rich) and their representatives in the 
national legislatures. After measuring political congruence I look at the extent to which 
institutional factors and levels of participation influence it. Consistent with expectations, 
in most countries, legislators’ preferences are more closely related to the policy 
preferences of the better off than the underprivileged. However, the analyses in this 
chapter reveal that unlike in the case of perceptions, electoral institutions do not matter   
for policy representation, at least for policy representation as measured in this project. 
Only to some extent, in systems with a large number of small districts does the distance 
in the preferences between the poor and legislators decrease. Also, the larger the effective 
number of parties the larger the distance between the preferences of these two groups. 
Moreover, political participation and the presence of leftist parties seem not to be related 
to unequal representation in terms of policy preferences.  
Finally, the last part of the project is devoted to an in-depth analysis of uneven 
representation and its relationship to electoral rules, institutions and political culture with 
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respect to the case of Bolivia.  This country offers a great opportunity to examine 
different dimensions of representation in a setting characterized by large groups of poor, 
who are also indigenous. In addition to considering policy representation, I assess another 
dimension of representation, ascriptive.  The data come from the sources already noted 
here, which I enhance with a new dataset coding the skin tone of legislators in the 
Bolivian congress. Further, the Bolivian electoral system allows me to assess the impact 
that a mixed rule system and levels of political engagement might have on the 
possibilities for this underprivileged group to be represented in congress, along policy or 
ascriptive lines, or both. Interviews with legislators in Bolivia allow additional insight 
into the questions raised in the first part of the dissertation and here with respect to how 
the representation priorities of legislators vary by the process by which they were elected 
and the nature of their district. I evaluate citizens’ and legislators’ perceptions and 
opinions on political representation. In so doing, I develop answers to these questions: 
Whom do Bolivian legislators believe they represent? Does the mixed electoral system 
influence perceptions of representation? While some legislators care about the nation as 
whole, others are more interested in representing their party, and others focus on their 
constituencies’ preferences.  Using the PELA data I test the relationship between these 
preferences and the nature of the electoral process (type of seat and district) that led to the 
legislators’ election. Once again, results show a close relationship between electoral 
institutions and perceptions of representation. Single member districts impact the role 
that legislators take, such that legislators elected under this type of electoral rule tend to 
focus more on the interests or their districts (while those elected in proportional districts 
are more likely to adopt a national role). Also, citizens tend to trust SMD legislators more 
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than proportional ones. However, these electoral rules do not have significant impacts on 
policy representation nor on descriptive representation.  
In short, this dissertation aims to address the issue of uneven representation in 
Latin America. In other words, I offer answers to the following questions: to what extent 
are different groups of citizens evenly represented in Latin America? Under what 
institutional circumstances do disadvantaged groups’ interests manage to get (better) 
represented? Responses to these questions offer a new perspective on the study of 
political representation in new democracies, highlighting how electoral institutions shape 
citizens and legislators’ attitudes towards political representation as well as the role of 
leftist parties narrowing gaps in unequal representation.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
POLITICAL INEQUALITIES IN LATIN AMERICA FROM THE CITIZENS’ 
VIEW 
 
Do citizens in Latin America perceive political inequalities? What are the 
determinants of such perceptions? Despite the fact that modern democracies are based on 
the idea of political equality (Dahl 2006), extant scholarship suggests that this principle is 
difficult to achieve in practice (Verba 2003).
16
 Barriers to political equality come from 
several fronts. On the one hand, citizens are differently positioned within social, 
economic, and political hierarchies that usually go together; that is to say, money can 
purchase political power, and political power can turn into political power (Verba, Nie, 
and Kim 1978).  Thus, existing distributions of power and wealth can present important 
barriers to political equity. On the other hand, if citizens are to have equal influence, they 
require equal resources to exercise it. However, resources are not equally distributed 
among the population. Scholars have found that some citizens lack the skills to 
participate and, at least partially for this reason, the more educated and knowledgeable 
are more likely to participate (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Popkin 1991; Sniderman, 
Brody, and Tetlock 1991)  and therefore have their interests expressed and represented.   
Given these theories we could expect that citizens perceive inequalities in 
political representation. However, these perceptions might vary across citizens and 
countries. How do individual and contextual variables shape perceptions on political 
                                                 
16
 Verba (2003) also argues that achieving that political equality is desirable but also it might be too costly 
and have undesired consequences.  
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inequality in Latin America? Understanding these questions has important consequences 
for democracy. Scholars have found that perceptions on representation are related to 
system support (Muller 1970) and that perceptions of representativeness are even more 
important than perceptions of accountability when explaining satisfaction with 
democracy (Aarts and Thomassen 2008). Furthermore, these kinds of perceptions not 
only have an impact on other perceptions and/or evaluations but also on behavior. As 
Williams (2000) finds, subjective feelings of representation affect political participation, 
satisfaction with democracy and thus, political system stability.  
This chapter addresses the issue of perceptions of inequality in Latin America by 
considering socioeconomic and political variables at the individual level as well as 
institutional variables (political parties and electoral systems) at the national level. It 
proceeds as follows.  First, I review the theories that speak to political inequalities and 
present the main hypotheses. In the second and third sections, I present the survey data to 
assess those hypotheses in Latin America. Section four shows and discusses key findings 
from a set of analysis of perceptions on political inequality.  The main conclusion I reach 
is as follows: citizens are likely to perceive that politicians tend to defend the interests of 
the rich and individual levels of wealth shape these perceptions.  At the aggregate level, 
institutional features matter too; above all, a large number of small districts and a small 
number of political parties are related to small gaps in perceived political inequality. 
Also, when leftist parties hold a large share of seats in congress, and when citizens 
participate in elections, there are lower levels of perceived political inequities.  
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Perceptions of Political Inequality 
 
Societies face inequalities in multiple overlapping arenas such that social, 
economic and political inequalities are interconnected. In fact, it has been argued that 
economic inequality leads to greater political inequality, given that it damages political 
interest and political participation (Solt 2008). Scholars from different disciplines agree 
that Latin America is one of the most unequal regions in the world, not only in terms of 
income but also in “access to services, power and influence, and, in many countries, 
treatment by police and justice systems” (Ferranti et al. 2004; Gootenberg 2010). Many 
of these inequalities stem from colonial legacies, primary-goods export economies, the 
region’s disadvantaged insertion in the world market, elite control over the state and the 
culture, among other factors (Gootenberg 2010).  
 Looking at recent economic figures, we can observe that one of the main 
challenges in Latin America is the unequal distribution of income, which is concentrated 
in few hands. According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC), the 10% of the population in the region accumulates 32% of all 
income whereas the poorest 40% receives only 15% (ECLAC 2013). As Table II.1 shows 
income inequality is especially high in countries such as Brazil, Guatemala, Honduras 
and Dominican Republic, while Venezuela and Uruguay are the least unequal countries 
when comparing Gini coefficients.
17
 Nonetheless,  Latin America has experienced 
declines in economic inequalities since 2000 thanks to the decrease in earning gaps, 
transferences to the poor and higher levels of education (López-Calva and Lustig 2010).  
                                                 
17
 Gini coefficients run from 0 to 1, figures closer to 1 mean more inequality.  
35 
 
Table II. 1. Income Distribution in Latin 
America  
(Gini Coefficient), 2011 
Country  National Urban Rural 
Argentina  0.492  
Bolivia 0.508 0.450 0.524 
Brazil 0.559 0.550 0.532 
Chile 0.516 0.515 0.478 
Colombia 0.545 0.522 0.456 
Costa Rica 0.503 0.493 0.473 
Ecuador 0.460 0.434 0.437 
El Salvador 0.454 0.424 0.402 
Guatemala 0.585 0.547 0.526 
Honduras 0.567 0.492 0.560 
Mexico  0.481 0.456 0.450 
Nicaragua 0.478 0.443 0.462 
Panama 0.531 0.485 0.527 
Paraguay 0.546 0.487 0.596 
Peru 0.452 0.406 0.432 
Dominican Republic 0.558 0.565 0.512 
Uruguay 0.402 0.402 0.359 
Venezuela 0.397   
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
Data for 2011, except for El Salvador, Honduras, 
Mexico (2010), Bolivia, Nicaragua (2009) and 
Guatemala (2006).  
 
However, little we know about the extent to which these economic inequalities 
translate into perceived political inequalities. As I stated in the previous chapter, political 
equality is a key principle in modern democracies. Despite the fact that political equality 
is not always easy to achieve, it is normatively desirable that political resources be 
relatively evenly distributed among different societal groups so that no particular, 
marginalized groups face difficulties exerting political influence and/or have their 
interests represented to a comparatively limited degree (Verba 2001). Given that many of 
the political resources are related to wealth, we could expect that in a region where 
economic resources are concentrated in few hands there are gaps in political equality. 
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This view has been expressed by others, with Renno (2010, 107) for example stating: 
“rich people enjoy better resources with which to defend themselves in the judicial 
system, to influence public policy, and to assure different treatment by the police.” 
Therefore, we could expect that those in the upper positions of the income distribution in 
Latin America enjoy an advantaged situation in the political arena. But, is this portrait of 
an unequal political landscape shared by citizens? This chapter addresses this topic by 
breaking it into several more focused questions: Do citizens in Latin America perceive 
that political actors favor the better off? Do these perceptions match their preferences 
over whom politicians should defend? What factors explain these perceptions and 
preferences?  
A first step in addressing this topic is to consider what is meant by perceptions of 
inequality. Extant scholarship offers several definitions of this concept. Robinson (1983) 
posits that “perceptions of inequality refer to people’s impressions of the nature and 
extent of inequality in the opportunities available to particular social groups, in the 
treatment accorded them by other social groups and institutions, and in the conditions of 
life that they experience” (Robinson 1983, 345). In a simpler way, Adams (1965) affirms 
that “inequality exists for a person whenever he perceives that the ratio of his outcomes 
to inputs and the ratio of other’s outcomes to other’s inputs are unequal” (p. 280). 
Therefore, perceptions of inequality involve the comparison of the situation of different 
social groups regarding their opportunities in a particular situation. However, especially 
from studies on perceptions of income inequality, we know that it is important to assess 
levels of accepted inequality. In fact, there are tensions between ideal and real political 
inequality (Verba and Orren 1985). Studies on inequality compare perceptions and 
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values, with the latter capturing what an individual believes is the appropriate pattern of 
distribution in a society (Reis and Moore 2005). Briefly stated, citizens have ideas about 
how social situations are and how they should be. In other words, “there exist normative 
expectations of what constitute ‘fair’ correlations between inputs and outcomes” (Adams 
1965, 279). A good deal of research focused on the degree of acceptance of inequality 
finds that it varies across countries, individuals (Lubker 2004; Svallfors 1997; Alesina 
and Giuliano 2009),
18
 and over time (Rueschemeyer 2011). Therefore, in this chapter I 
focus on Latin American citizens’ perceptions of and preferences over political 
inequality. After presenting both data on perceived and ideal levels of political inequality 
in ten countries in Latin America, I assess how institutional (parties and electoral 
systems) and cultural (participatory culture) factors relate to these views. 
 
Do citizens Perceive Political Inequalities?  
 
The data used in this chapter come from surveys of a subset of countries in Latin 
America conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) as part of 
the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer. These surveys follow a complex design with a 
multi-staged, stratified probability sample of approximately 1,500 respondents per 
country.
19
 The data allow me to assess citizens’ views on political inequalities in their 
countries by looking at the responses to two questions about, first, whom they think 
politicians defend and, second, whom they should defend. I have data for ten countries 
                                                 
18
 For instance some of these studies find that English speaking countries accept inequality more than other 
countries in Eastern or Western Europe. Also, it has been found that Americans tend to tolerate inequalities 
in political influence (Verba and Orren 1985) 
19
 The analyses in this chapter account for the complex nature of the design.  
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(Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and 
Venezuela), in which the following two questions were asked to a split sample:
20
  
SOC12A. On this scale from 1 to10, where 1 means 
defending the rich and 10 means defending the poor, where 
are [country] politicians located?   
SOC12B. And using the same scale, where 1 means 
defending the rich and 10 means defending the poor, where 
would you like [country] politicians to be located?   
 
These two questions tap into perceptions of inequalities in the political system, 
which is to say the extent to which politicians defend the interests of well-off 
constituents. They also allow me to compare how citizens see the actual versus the ideal 
situation, and therefore, to generate a measure of this political inequality gap. I will refer 
to this measure as “Perceived versus Ideal Representation Gap” (PIRG). 
Figure II.1 shows the distribution of responses to the first question.
21
 I recoded the 
variable into three categories so that from 1 to 3 it means “defending the rich”, from 4 to 
7 “neutral” and from 8 to 10 “defending the poor”. As stated in Chapter I, following H1a 
it could be expected that “citizens in Latin America perceive that public officials 
represent the interest of the better-off”. The figure shows that perceptions vary across 
countries. In seven countries the majority of citizens consider that politicians represent 
the rich’s interest; Brazil, Guatemala and Colombia are the countries where citizens have 
                                                 
20
 This question was also asked in Canada and the United States but I am excluding these two cases from 
the analysis to focus on Latin America.  
21
 Figure 1 in the appendix shows the results displaying the mean response for each question. I recoded 
both variables so that larger values reflect perceptions of systems as biased in favor of rich citizens.  Figure 
1 shows the results for the first question. The dots represent the estimated mean for each country with the 
light gray showing the 95% confidence interval around the estimate.  In general, all countries score above 
the midpoint of 5, meaning that politicians are perceived as closer to defending the interests of the rich as 
opposed to the poor. Perceptions vary across countries, with statistically significant differences found 
between the countries at the top and countries at the bottom. 
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the greatest perceptions of biased systems, with percentages larger than 60%.
22
 At the 
other extreme, we find Uruguay and Venezuela, where only 25.9% and 18.2%, of 
citizens, respectively, consider that politicians defend the rich. Furthermore, in two 
countries, Costa Rica and Venezuela, more than 20% of the population surveyed 
considers that politicians defend the poor. In fact, those three countries where more 
citizens perceive that politicians defend the rich are the countries with the largest income 
inequalities (See Table II.1). On the contrary, Costa Rica and Uruguay have been 
traditionally known for relatively egalitarian socioeconomic structures (Gootenberg 
2010). Finally, in Venezuela the discourses appealing to the poor and the excluded by 
chavismo (Panizza 2005; Zúquete 2008) might have had an impact on perceptions on 
whom politicians defend. In fact, the correlation between the Gini index and citizens’ 
perception that politicians defend the rich is 0.274 (sig. at p<0.001): large income 
inequality is related to more people believing that the system is biased in favor of the 
better off. 
 
                                                 
22
 Looking at the means on the 1-10 scale for these three countries it can be observed that their scores are 
statistically significant different from the six countries (out of 10) at the bottom of the ranking (See Figure 
1 in Appendix). 
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Figure II. 1. Distribution of Perceptions of Whom Politicians Defend: the 
Rich vs. the Poor 
 
Figure II.1 also shows evidence of variation within countries in the perceptions of 
political inequalities in the ten countries analyzed. What explains these differing 
perceptions? Who is more likely to believe that politicians defend the better off citizens? 
One factor that likely matters is the economic situation of the respondent. As I presented 
before, there are theoretical reasons to expect that wealthy constituents are more likely to 
be represented and shape policy outcomes and, therefore, there are reasons to expect that 
that those on the high end of the economic scale will be more likely to agree with the idea 
that politicians represent them, while poor ones are more likely to feel that their interests 
are not taken into account.  
To test the relationship between wealth and perceptions of biased representation, I 
run an OLS regression with socioeconomic and demographic characteristics as 
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independent variables.
23
 The dependent variable is the original variable SOC12a recoded 
so that larger numbers on the 1-10 scale mean that citizens perceive that politicians 
represent the rich. The results are presented in Figure II.2, in which each independent 
variable is listed on the vertical (y) axis. The impact of each of those variables on the 
perception of political inequality is shown by a dot, which if falling to the right of the 
vertical “0” line implies a positive contribution and if to the left of the “0” line indicates a 
negative impact. When the confidence intervals (the horizontal lines) do not overlap the 
vertical “0” line the variable is statistically significant (at p < .05 or better). The relative 
strength of each variable is indicated by standardized coefficients. Interestingly, the 
regression results show that the only variable that is statistically significant is the 
quintiles of wealth measure and in the expected direction
24
. However, when I examine 
each quintile on its own, I find that, contrary to expectations, those in the richest quintiles 
of wealth are less likely to believe that politicians defend their interests, compared to 
those in the middle category.
25
 As a robustness check I ran a multinomial regression 
splitting the dependent variable into three categories (politicians defend the rich, the poor, 
and neutral) and the results show the same result (See Table 1 in Appendix). It appears 
that, despite the fact that most citizens in the majority of countries perceive biased 
politicians in favor of the wealthiest, being poor does not make citizens more likely to 
                                                 
23
 The variable “Size of Place of Residence,” is recoded so that 0 means “Rural Area”; 1, “Small City”; 2, 
“Medium City”; 3, “Large City”; and 4, “National Capital (Metropolitan Area).” Thus, higher values 
represent larger urban settings. The variable quintiles of wealth is an index created from a series of 
questions, R series, based on household assets such as cell phone, TV, indoor plumbing, or vehicles, among 
others . See Córdova, Abby. 2009. “Methodological Note: Measuring Relative Wealth Using Household 
Asset Indicators.” AmericasBarometer Insights 6. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion 
Project (LAPOP). The model includes country fixed effects to account for differences at the national level.  
24
 Figure 2 in Appendix shows the wealth variable without breaking the different categories of wealth.  
25
 When I run the regression using dummy variables for each quintile of wealth, those in the two wealthiest 
groups are less likely to believe that politicians defend the interest of the rich compared to those in the 
middle category. (See Figure 1 in appendix). When looking at individual countries, Argentina, Costa Rica, 
Peru and Uruguay follow the pattern found in this aggregate model.   
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perceive such bias. This finding goes in line with what other scholars have found for 
other contexts, that is to say, citizens with low levels of education and income have more 
difficulties when making accurate connections about representation and the implications 
of polices (Bartels 2005). 
These results suggest that the only effect is for those in the richest quintiles of 
wealth, who are less likely than the middle quintile to hold such perception of politicians 
defending the interest of the better off. While counter-intuitive, this result is consistent 
with the explanations that (Shapiro 2002) provides to explain why poor citizens seem to 
be tolerant to inequalities, such as the poor’s unawareness of the rich’s situation or 
considering that their situation is not that bad when compared to others or to their past 
situation.
26
   
  
                                                 
26
 Shapiro (2002) talks about an empathy gulf, framing effects, physical gulfs and anecdotal distractions 
that all act as factors influencing the attitudes of the poorest sectors towards inequality.  
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Figure II. 2. Socioeconomic and Demographic 
Determinants of the Perception that Politicians 
Defend the Rich 
 
As noted above, studies on inequalities not only address perceptions but also 
normative views that reflect values, or how things should be. As with income 
inequalities, we can expect citizens and societies to be more or less inclined to accept 
political inequalities, and the second question on this issue from the 2012 
AmericasBarometer allows us to assess the ideal levels of political inequality in these ten 
countries. As Figure II.3 shows, there are fewer differences among countries in 
perceptions of what should be, compared to perceptions of what is (Figure II.2). In all 
countries except for Costa Rica and Argentina, more than 50% of respondents consider 
that politicians should defend the poor.  The average in all of them falls between 4.3 
(Costa Rica) and 3.1 (Mexico) on the seven-point response scale.
27
 This means that 
                                                 
27
 See Figure 3 in Appendix. 
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Source: © AmericasBarometer by LAPOP
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F=25.927
N =7747
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citizens consider that politicians should be tending towards the poor but the average 
tendency is not located all that far from the mid-point on the 1-10 scale.
28
  
 
 
Figure II. 3. Citizens’ Beliefs about Whose Interests Politicians should Defend 
 
However, what is more interesting is to look at the difference between how 
citizens perceive the actual situation on representation and the ideal situation they would 
like. Subtracting individuals’ responses to both questions (whom politicians defend and 
whom politicians should defend) we can measure the distance between perceptions and 
values, which gives us a measure of the gap in political equality in the country. Studies 
on inequalities highlight the importance of perceptions, which can be understood as a set 
of cognitions, norms and values (Reis and Moore 2005).  These perceptions can influence 
other attitudes and the extent to which actors are willing to take action. If a person 
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 The appendix shows the distribution of the responses to the two questions (SOC12A and SOC12B) for 
each country. While the true midpoint is 5.5, many likely perceived “5” to be the midpoint. 
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perceives that politicians represent the rich and perceives that reality matches this ideal 
situation, then inequality in practice will not create any problem for her. On the contrary, 
if she perceives that politicians defend the interest of the rich while believing they should 
defend the interest of the poor, she might be more likely to be dissatisfied with the system 
and bring that dissatisfaction to bear on her political attitudes and behaviors.
29
 Therefore, 
it is important to examine this gap between perception and preferences, which I call 
“Perceived versus Ideal Representation Gap” (PIRG). Figure II.4 shows this gap, which 
is the absolute difference between individuals’ responses to the question on whom they 
think politicians defend and the one on whom they think politicians should defend. 
Looking at the average of this new variable, PIRG, by country we observe variation. 
Costa Rica is the country where the average difference between perceptions and values is 
the largest. In Colombia, Mexico, Brazil and Chile the distance between what citizens 
perceive and their ideal situation regarding political inequality is also relatively large. 
The mean in these countries is statistically distinct from the means in Uruguay, Argentina 
and Venezuela, where the distance between the actual situation and the ideal one is the 
lowest. These three countries with the smallest gap are the three countries where fewer 
citizens considered that politicians defend the interests of the better-off.  This suggests 
that one way to narrow the gap (as measured by PIRG) is to have politicians who are 
effective showing that they care about the interests of the poor.  
                                                 
29
 In order to test these ideas I run a regression model to explain system support and satisfaction with 
democracy. System Support is an index created from the following 5 questions B1. To what extent do you 
think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? B2. To what extent do you respect the political 
institutions of (country)?B3. To what extent do you think that citizens’ basic rights are well protected by 
the political system of (country)?B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system 
of (country)?B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)?  
(See Booth and Seligson 2009) for more information on this index). In both models the variable PIRG was 
statistically significant even controlling for wealth, education, size of place, age and gender (at p<.001). 
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Figure II. 4. Perceived versus Ideal 
Representation Gap (PIRG) by 
Country 
 
What explains citizens’ perceptions of gaps in political inequality? As before, I 
start with an expectation that one’s own economic situation plays a role in determining 
views of political inequality. In order to assess some of the determinants that might 
explain gaps in political representation, I run an OLS regression with the same 
socioeconomic and demographic variables included in the analysis shown in Figure II.2.  
The results are depicted in Figure II.5 and, once again, I find that the only statistically 
significant variable is wealth. In this case, the results are consistent with expectations 
when it comes to the way in which wealth matters: those in the lower quintiles of wealth 
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are more likely to think that there is a wider gap in political inequality than the one 
perceived by the wealthiest.
30
  
 
 
Figure II. 5. Socioeconomic and Demographic Determinants of the PIRG 
 
This relationship between wealth and the PIRG is clearly shown in Figure II.6. It 
shows the predicted values of that gap by quintile of wealth, while keeping the rest of 
variables constant at their mean. Those in the first quintile of wealth (the poorest) see that 
the difference between how politicians do defend and how they should defend is larger 
than the gap that is perceived by those in the fifth quintile (the wealthiest).
31
 Therefore, as 
expected, the poor are more likely to think that the political system and public officials 
more specifically, are biased against their own interests. On the contrary, wealthy 
                                                 
30
 The mean for those in the first quintile (the poorest) is 3.06 while for those in the fifth quintile (the 
wealthiest) is 2.77. The difference is statistically significant at .001. 
31
 When I run the same regression using dummy variables for wealth, I obtain the same results.  
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F=19.040
N =7651
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constituents do not see that that bias is that large. It is noteworthy how the role of wealth 
works differently when asking just about perceptions of political inequality than when 
looking at the PIRG. Being in the lowest quintiles of wealth has a greater impact on the 
PIRG than on mere perception of the current situation. It seems to be that when 
perceptions are taken alone they less meaningful than when contrasted with ideals or 
values.  
 
  
Figure II. 6. Wealth and PIRG 
 
This section has assessed the extent to which citizens in ten Latin American 
countries perceive that politicians tend to defend the interests of wealthy constituencies 
rather than the interest of the poor. While there is a general tendency to believe that 
politicians favor the rich, wide variation is observed among countries. Also, there is a gap 
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between what citizens see regarding representation and what they think it should be. In 
general, they would prefer more balanced systems that lean somewhat towards the poor. 
Among the socioeconomic variables used to explain these perceptions, only wealth is 
related to them, but interestingly, it has a different impact when looking at perceptions of 
the current situation than when considering the PIRG. Those in the lower quintiles of 
wealth are not more likely to perceive that politicians are biased towards the better off; 
however, when contrasting those perceptions with their ideal situation, they exhibit larger 
gaps than those in the highest quintiles of wealth. These results highlight the importance 
of comparing values to actual perceptions, given that citizens not only perceive situations 
but also have normative expectations on how things should work, in this case on how 
political representation should be distributed (Reis and Moore 2005, Adams 1965), and it 
seems that the latter is especially relevant for those in the lowest quintiles of wealth. 
However, apart from socioeconomic characteristics at the individual level, there might be 
other institutional factors affecting perceptions of representation. The next section will 
address that issue.  
 
Perceptions of Unequal Political Representation and the Role of Institutions and 
Participation 
 
As I stated in the previous chapter, one of the objectives of this dissertation is to 
assess the role of political institutions with respect to aggravating or mitigating 
perceptions of inequalities in representation. Political institutions and how firmly citizens 
are tied to them play an important role in representation (Verba et al. 1978). As Krishna 
(2008) argues “institutional links in the middle, which can facilitate information and 
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promote accountability between citizens and public officials” (155) as well as moderate 
and formalize poor citizens’ demands, help the inclusion of those sectors in the political 
system.   
 In this section, I examine the relationship between four institutional 
characteristics and the PIRG: the presence of leftist parties, the proportionality of the 
electoral system, the size of electoral districts and the effective number of parties.   As 
well, I assess the relationship between high system levels of participation and the gap.  It 
is important to recognize that this latter factor might be the result of culture, institutions 
(e.g., compulsory voting), or both; rather than adjudicate among these different 
antecedent influences, I simply examine levels of participation in order to provide a more 
comprehensive picture. My main finding can be summarized as follows: a strong 
presence of leftist parties in congress and high levels of turnout are closely related to 
lower levels of the PIRG. However, a large effective number of parties does not translate 
into lower scores of the PIRG. Rather, the only electoral institutional factor that 
(modestly) reduces the gap in political representation is small districts. The more small 
districts the smaller the distance between citizens’ perceptions of whom politicians 
represent and whom they should represent.  
A key set of institutions in any political system consists of political parties, which 
perform essential roles such as aggregating and channeling citizens’ demands and 
interests (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). In fact, many scholars have linked the 
performance of democratic regimes to the functioning of these institutions; in countries 
where political parties are responsible, accountable and respond to citizens’ preferences, 
democracies have more chances to survive even under economic crisis or corruption 
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scandals. On the contrary, where political parties are weak and do not accomplish their 
functions, anti-system leaders can emerge and jeopardize democracy (Hagopian 2005). 
As Rueschemeyer (2011: 823) puts it, “the disappointing performance of recently 
democratized political systems in Latin America seems largely due to a renewed 
weakness in the organized representation of subordinate interests.” Party systems in Latin 
America have experienced many changes in the last decades including fragmentation, 
polarization, ideological changes or the replacement of some parties by some others 
(Coppedge 2003; Sabatini 2002). More recently, scholars have focused on the rise of the 
left in the region (Cameron and Hershberg 2010; Panizza 2005; Seligson 2007; Hunter, 
Madrid, and Weyland 2010). Conventional wisdom states that left parties are closer to 
disadvantaged sectors in society, in particular the working class and those generally 
located on the lower end of the socioeconomic scale. Therefore, there are reasons to 
expect a relationship between leftist parties and inequality; in other words, “left 
institutions ought to have a more conscious commitment to political equalization and 
ought, as well, to have supporters from the lower parts of the SERL (socioeconomic 
resource level) scale that they want to mobilize” (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978: 144). Cleary 
(2006) argues that economic inequality in Latin America provides a wide support base 
for these parties, and that in countries where the left has not been successful despite 
inequality this is because they have elitist party systems and they lack an organizational 
basis for mass mobilization.  
Given the theoretical importance of political parties to democratic representation 
and given the particular role that leftist parties are expected to play in addressing issues 
of inequality and fostering greater input by those less well off, I begin with an 
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expectation that there exists a relationship between perceptions of inequality and the 
presence of leftist parties in political systems in Latin America (H6a in Chapter I). In 
order to test this, on the one hand I consider the percentage of congress that is comprised 
of members from leftist political parties (x-axis), which was calculated by taking into 
account ideological self-positions of legislators. This measure is generally accepted as a 
valid way to classify political parties in Latin America (Alcántara 2004; Saiegh 2009) . I 
consider parliamentarians in office when the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey was 
conducted. Data comes from the Project on Parliamentary Elites in Latin America 
conducted by the University of Salamanca. This measure accounts for the percentage of 
seats of those parties which ideological mean falls below 5 on the traditional 1-10 scale.
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On the other hand I consider the PIRG presented in the previous section, which is the 
mean of individual scores resulting from the absolute difference between individuals’ 
perceptions of whom politicians defend and whom ideally politicians should defend (y-
axis). Figure II.7 shows the relationship between both variables. 
 
                                                 
32
 For the case of Venezuela there are not elite data and therefore I considered the seats held by “chavistas”. 
These parties are the following: Victory Front-PJ , UCR, Socialist Party, GEN and New Encounter 
(Argentina), PT, PSDB, PSB, PDT, PCdoB, PPS, PRB (Brazil), Coalition for Democracy (Chile), 
Alternative Democratic Pole (Colombia), Citizens’ Action Party and Broad Front (Costa Rica), National 
Unity for Hope Party and LIDER (Guatemala), Democratic Revolutionary Party, Labor Party and 
Convergence Party (Mexico), Peru Wins Alliance, Possible Peru Party (Peru), Board Front and 
Independent Party (Uruguay). 
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Figure II. 7. Leftist Parties and the Gap in Political Inequality 
 
The negative slope of the regression suggests that the stronger the presence of 
leftist parties in congress, the smaller the perceived gap in political inequality. The 
correlation is quite strong, and not driven by any particular outlier. These results are in 
line with the expectation that leftist parties have a “greater equalizing impact” (Verba et 
al. 1978), at least regarding views of inequality.
33,34,35
   
 
                                                 
33
 It is noteworthy to mention that the correlation between the GINI index and the perceived gap is .657. 
The larger the income inequality the larger the PIRG at the national level.   
34
 It should be noted that, while the presence of leftist parties in the system is a significant predictor of 
lower values on the PIRG, that relationship should not translate down to the level of individual partisan 
supporters in a straightforward fashion. Rather, we should find that those who support leftist parties see a 
greater gap than others in this system. The extent to which an individual perceives a gap should provide 
motivation to support a left-leaning party. In fact, that is what I find when I run a regression analysis at the 
individual level having PIRG as the dependent variable. See results in Table 2 in Appendix. 
35
 Polarization of the political system could be another measure to capture the presence of distinct and 
extreme options. However, the relationship between that index and PIRG is -0.066. (See Zechmeister and 
Corral 2013 for more information on this index). 
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The Role of the Electoral System 
This section of this chapter addresses the influence of other institutional features 
related to the electoral system. Electoral systems translate votes into seats and introduce 
different incentives for political actors to behave in certain ways, such that electoral rules 
are commonly considered to one of the most influential institutional arrangements in the 
political system. One of the main features of an electoral system is the extent to which 
proportionality, or the extent to which the distribution of seats reflect the distribution of 
votes, is considered as a goal (Lijphart 1994). As electoral systems are more proportional 
citizens’ preferences should better represented in the legislature. Following this line of 
argument, one can expect that as proportionality increases gaps in political inequality 
decreases (H3a). That is, if citizens perceive that electoral systems reflect the positions of 
all groups in society, they will have fewer reasons to perceive inequalities. Yet, as noted 
in the prior chapter, there are reasons to expect that majoritarian systems have features 
that also promote accountability, such as bringing representatives closer to citizens to the 
degree the former become more responsive to the latter as a way to gain reelection, or 
promoting clarity of responsibility.  It is possible, then, the any effects of the different 
types of electoral rules will wash out in comparison. In order to test these expectations, I 
use Gallagher’s index of proportionality36 for each country and I cross that variable with 
the mean of the perceived gap in political inequality. Figure II.8 shows that relationship.  
  
                                                 
36
 Source: Gallagher 2013. Election indexes data set at 
http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/index.php, 
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Figure II. 8. Disproportionality of the Electoral System and 
Gap in Political Inequality 
 
The results do not indicate a clear relationship between disproportionality and the 
political inequality gap measure. Similar scores in the PIRG are found across different 
levels of proportionality. Related to proportionality is district magnitude, in other words, 
the number of representatives elected in each electoral circumscription. It has been found 
that large districts in proportional representative systems tend to produce more 
proportionality (Benoit 2001; Taagepera and Shugart 1989). However, district magnitude 
not only influences proportionality at the aggregate level but also legislators’ incentives 
to behave in certain ways. While small districts tend to produce disproportionality they 
increase accountability (Carey and Hix 2011).  Small districts provide more opportunities 
for controlling representatives and building closer ties to them, which enhances 
accountability. Therefore, I expect that the more small districts in a political system the 
smaller scores in the PIRG at the national level (H4a).  
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Figure II. 9. Size of Electoral Districts and Gap in Political Inequality 
 
In order to test the relationship between the magnitude of the districts and 
perceptions about political inequality, I calculate the percentage of small districts in each 
political system (5 or smaller).
37
 Figure II.9 shows that relationship indicating a 
statistically significant relationship between both variables. The smaller are districts in 
size, the more citizens are likely to perceive small gaps in political inequalities.  
Fragmentation of the party systems is an institutional variable that has been 
shown to have important consequences for the dynamics of politics, as it indicates the 
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 Following Nohlen (1995) I consider “small districts” those electing 5 or less legislators. If I use the 
average district magnitude I find a similar relationship with a correlation of   0.36, the larger the district 
magnitude average the bigger the perceived gap.  
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extent to which political power is dispersed or concentrated (Sartori 1976). In theory, it 
affects citizens’ views of the political system while providing the menu of options among 
to choose candidates. While the option to select among many parties can provide a sense 
of having the possibility to have more options represented and included in the system, it 
can undermine the clarity of responsibility and bring more confusion. As noted in the 
prior chapter (H5a), it is therefore difficult to establish clear a priori expectations for a 
relationship between fragmentation and political inequality. In order to test the 
relationship between the effective number of parties and perceptions of political 
inequality I calculate the measure by Laakso and Taagepera (1979) for each country and 
cross it with the mean for the perceived gap in political inequality.  
 
 
Figure II. 10. Effective Number of Parties and Gap in Political Inequality 
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Figure II.10 shows that there is a clear linear, positive relationship between both 
measures, as the effective number of parties increases the gap between the actual and the 
ideal views on political representation increases. Therefore, it seems that having more 
parties in the system does not translate into feelings of inclusion for social groups based 
on their levels of income. Rather, those systems with fewer parties are those in which the 
political inequality gap is lowest.
38
 
The Role of Participation at the Aggregate Level 
One source of political inequality in representation that scholars have focused on 
is inequality in political participation (Lijphart 1997, Verba 2001). The assumption here 
is that if political participation influences government decisions, legislation and policies, 
these will tend to reflect the interests of those who are the most active. Therefore, in those 
systems with high participation, where citizens participate in the political process in 
relatively high numbers, there might lower levels of political inequalities. As stated in 
Chapter I, the expectation is that: “Where citizens participate more actively in politics, 
perceptions of unequal representation will be relatively lower” (H2a).  
Citizens have a wide array of ways to get involved in politics; forms of political 
participation include voting in elections, participating in social and political 
organizations, working on campaigns, contacting public officials, attending political 
meetings, and being a member of a political organization (Verba and Nie 1972). These 
activities related to the electoral process are what scholars define as traditional or 
conventional forms of participation.  Along with these institutionalized ways to 
                                                 
38
 It is worth noting that fragmentation in Latin America may be a proxy for party system instability, which 
may in turn have been fueled by system discontent. In fact, contrary to what happens in Western 
democracies, fragmentation in this region does not help to create coherent understandings of ideological 
labels  (See Zechmeister and Corral 2013). 
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participate in politics we find non-conventional or non-traditional forms that include 
participating in protests, demonstrations or internet activism.  In fact, many studies in 
Western democracies have  found that while there are decreased levels of traditional 
participation (Dalton 2008; Pharr and Putnam 2000), non-traditional forms are becoming 
on the rise (Marien, Hooghe, and Quintelier 2010; Stolle and Hooghe 2011). In this 
section I will analyze the relationship between traditional forms of participation (turnout 
and index of contacting public officials) and the perception of political inequalities.  
 Undoubtedly, participating in elections is a key element in any democracy. 
Elections accomplish essential functions such as providing citizens the opportunity to 
choose public officials, to influence public policy and to control policymakers by pushing 
and rewarding them (Powell 2000). As an instrument of control, we could expect that 
where citizens are active participating at the voting booth politicians might feel they have 
to be responsible to them. In other words, where there are large levels of electoral 
participation, citizens may be more likely to perceive a shorter distance between whom 
politicians represent and whom they should. Given that I am interested in assessing the 
impact of a participatory culture I use the participation figures at the aggregate level. 
Figure II.11 shows that relationship. X-axis shows the percentage of citizens who voted 
in the last presidential election as reported in the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey.  
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Figure II. 11. Turnout and Gap in Political Inequality 
 
Results show that at the aggregate level, the larger the turnout the lower the PIRG. 
The relationship (correlation of -0.54) is quite strong. Levels of participation in elections 
might be influenced by institutional features such as a compulsory voting, a rule that 
some scholars have pointed out as an instrument to reduce political inequalities and make 
popular mandates stronger (Lijphart 1997). In Latin America there is a wide variation in 
the rules regarding compulsory voting. In the sample of countries presented in Figure 
II.10, countries with the larger percentages of turnout happen to be those with 
compulsory rules (with Costa Rica as the exception, having low levels of participation 
despite compulsory voting rules).
39
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 Although there seems to be a relationship between turnout and electoral rules at the aggregate level, 
Maldonado (2011) found that at the individual level, compulsory rules did not produce differences among 
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Scholars have pointed out that “the poor have less input to public policy than any 
other class. As a result, their interests are ignored” (Beeghley 1986, 505) and that 
political participation could help those who otherwise feel that their points of view are 
not represented to enhance their sense of political efficacy (Ikeda, Kobayashi, and 
Hoshimoto 2008). Therefore we could expect that where the poor participate more, the 
PIRG is smaller. In fact, the correlation between turnout of those in the first quintile of 
wealth and the PIRG is strong: -0.44. Therefore, there is a connection between turnout at 
the aggregate level and perceptions of representation, and this holds as well when we 
examine turnout levels among the poorest sector in the region, which supports the idea 
that participation can be a vehicle to moderate inequalities in representation, at least in 
terms of perceptions.  
Nonetheless, voting is not the only form of political participation. As I said at the 
beginning of this section there are other conventional forms of participation, such as 
contacting public officials, participating in meetings of political parties, in political 
campaigns among others. I create an index based on three questions in the 2012 
AmericasBarometer that capture the percentage of citizens who contacted any public 
officials asking for help.
40
 The same as with turnout, we could expect that where citizens 
are relatively more active in contacting pubic officials, the PIRG is smaller. Figure II.12 
shows the relationship between these two variables. In this case, I find a weak 
relationship and interestingly in the unexpected way. This relationship could reflect 
                                                                                                                                                 
citizens in the factors that influence voter choice when comparing those living in one or the other kind of 
system. 
40
 These questions are CP2 In order to solve your problems have you ever requested help or cooperation 
from a member of congress CP4. A local public official or local government for example, and NP2. Have 
you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official of the municipality within the past 
12 months? In a factor analysis these three questions fall in one factor and the alpha is .45. Other variables 
related to political participation did not fall into a single factor.   
62 
 
differential experiences with respect to the result of contacting public officials; that is, if 
there is a perception that poor individuals do not receive the same response from 
contacting public officials, then this might explain the weak and positive relationship 
between proportion of individuals who contact and size of the inequality gap. The result 
could also be driven by a general tendency for higher levels of grievances (such as 
perceptions of unfairness in the system) to translate into more contact.   
 
 
Figure II. 12. Contacting Public Officials and Gap in Political Inequality 
 
That same weakly positive relationship is found when I only consider those 
citizens in the first quintile of wealth. In this case, the correlation is 0.08.
41
 Taken as a 
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 The reader might wonder how is the relationship between non-conventional forms of participation such 
as participating in protests. The relationship is very similar to that found when taking into account the index 
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whole, the results suggest that the principal form of political participation related to the 
PIRG is electoral participation.  
Finally, the relationship between participation and perceptions of unequal 
representation can be analyzed at the individual level. In fact, one might object that 
addressing the relationship between perceptions of political inequality and participation 
or support for a leftist party at the aggregate level could result in ecological fallacy (for a 
discussion on ecological fallacy see Seligson 2002). At the individual level, there is 
reason to suspect that behavior might be related to perceptions and therefore the subject 
deserves an analysis at the individual level. The three next models in Table II.2 account 
for the role of participation and voting for leftist parties at the individual level. First, we 
could expect a relationship between linkages to the left (by self-identification and by 
voting to left parties) and perceptions of political inequality. In fact, we see in Model 1 
and 2 that both variables have a statistically significant impact on this perception. Those 
who identify themselves as leftist
42
 and those who voted for the left in the last 
presidential election are more likely to perceive a wider difference between how they see 
the actual situation on representation and the ideal situation they would like to have. 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
on contacting public officials.  The correlation between aggregate levels of participating in protests 
(PROT3) and the PIRG is 0.26. Restricting the sample to the poorest citizens yields a correlation of 0.17. 
42
 The variable ideology is based on the traditional left-right self-identification scale where 1 means left and 
10 right.  
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Table II. 2. Individual and Institutional Determinants of Perceived Political 
Inequality Gap 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coef. Std. Err Coef. Std. Err Coef. Std. Err 
Quintiles of 
Wealth 
-0.188*** 0.036 -0.170*** 0.034 -0.176*** 0.034 
Education 0.001 0.012 -0.005 0.011 -0.003 0.011 
Size of 
Place of 
Residence  
0.041 0.044 0.028 0.042 0.028 0.042 
Female -0.059 0.073 -0.034 0.064 -0.064 0.066 
Age 0.008 0.027 -0.023 0.024 -0.025 0.025 
Ideology -0.041** 0.017     
Voted for 
the Left 
  0.299** 0.899   
Participated 
in Protest 
    0.002* 0.001 
Contacting 
Public 
Officials 
    0.000 0.009 
Voted in the 
last election 
    0.002** 0.001 
Political 
Interest 
    -0.004** 0.001 
Mexico 2.075*** 0.261 2.316*** .2511 2.324*** 0.250 
Guatemala  1.219*** 0.234 1.662*** .2256 1.664*** 0.230 
Costa Rica 2.179** 0.298 2.471*** .2661 2.437*** 0.263 
Colombia 2.272*** 0.244 2.467*** .2428 2.476*** 0.242 
Peru 1.816*** 0.238 1.896*** .2257 1.842*** 0.227 
Chile  1.818*** 0.265 2.085*** .2463 2.049*** 0.250 
Uruguay 0.610*** 0.196 .7309*** .1856 0.738*** 0.189 
Brazil 1.992*** 0.251 2.062*** .2420 2.043*** 0.243 
Argentina 0.890*** 0.242 .8934*** .2244 0.851** 0.229 
Constant 3.306*** 0.283 3.038*** .2575 3.123*** 0.263 
N 6324  7651  7498  
R-squared 0.05  0.06  0.063  
Significant at ***p<0.01 **p<0.05, **p<0.10 
 
It is important to note that this relationship could go in the opposite direction, that 
is to say, that those who perceive a wider gap in political inequality are more likely to 
vote for leftist parties. We also observe that political participation in elections is not 
related to perceptions of inequality in the expected way. This finding does not support the 
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theory that suggests that through participation citizens might shrink the gap in political 
inequality. We could expect a correlation between participating in protests and perceiving 
larger gaps in the political system regarding whom public officials represent. In fact, that 
is what we find in the case of Latin America. We could also expect that being in contact 
with local officials might shape perceptions of inequalities; however, as it happened 
when analyzed at the national level such relationship does not exist. Finally, those with 
greater political interest are less likely to perceive gaps in political inequality.
43
   
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown that citizens in ten Latin American countries do not 
perceive that politicians defend the interests of the wealthy and the poor evenly. 
However, perceptions on whose interests are defended vary across countries and 
individuals. At the individual level it is noteworthy that wealth is the only 
sociodemographic factor related to perceptions of unequal representation. On the one 
hand, those in the wealthiest quintiles of wealth are less likely to consider that politicians 
defend their interests, compared to those in the middle quintile.  On the other hand, being 
poor is only related to perceiving a gap between the actual and the ideal situation of 
political inequality.  Also, at the individual level voting for leftist candidates or parties is 
related to perceiving a larger gap in political representation. Along with the fact that there 
is a correlation between presence of leftist parties in the political system and lower levels 
of perceived political inequalities, we might think that these parties shape perceptions of 
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 When we look at the inverse relationship, perceiving political inequalities is related to participation in 
protest and community involvement but not to participating in municipal meetings.  
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inequality. Citizens might see them as vehicles for shrinking the distance in the 
representation of poor versus rich constituents. Electoral institutions are key factors to 
have into account when addressing political representation. We have seen that the level of 
proportionality does not have any impact on perceptions of political inequality. The 
magnitude of electoral systems appears as a relatively significant factor, in the sense that 
as the number of small electoral districts increases the gap in political inequality 
diminishes. Small districts might be having the impact of generating tighter bonds 
between citizens and representatives where citizens see politicians as caring about them. 
In small districts public officials have more incentives to respond to their constituents as 
control and clarity of responsibility is enhanced in contrast to large districts.  Finally, one 
institutional feature that seems to have a large impact is the effective number of parties. It 
seems that a large number of parties in congress does not translate into perceptions of 
more inclusive systems. In fact, in countries with low number of parties, citizens perceive 
low levels of political inequality.  
Finally, a participatory culture, at least in terms of turnout, is strongly related to 
perceptions of political inequality. However, other forms of political engagement do not 
seem to have any relationship with perceptions of political inequality, at both the 
aggregate and individual level. Thus, overall, the analyses in this chapter support this 
primary conclusion: citizens in the majority of countries analyzed consider that 
politicians defend the interests of the wealthy and wealth at the individual level as well as 
institutional features rules matter for perceptions on political inequality, with particularly 
noteworthy results found for small districts and the presence of leftist parties. The next 
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chapter will assess the extent to which there are inequalities in substantive representation 
as well as the role of political institutions.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
POLITICAL INEQUALITIES IN LATIN AMERICA: ARE THE POORS’ 
PREFERENCES REPRESENTED IN CONGRESS?  
 
To what extent are the poor’s policy preferences represented in Latin America? 
Are legislators’ stances on important issues closer to the wealthiest citizens? What is the 
role of political institutions explaining policy congruence? These are some of the 
questions I address in this chapter. Different theoretical approaches suggest that poor 
citizens are more likely to be underrepresented than wealthier ones. On the one hand, 
there is the idea of an “elite dominance” in democracies, where a small group of people 
has the power to shape and determine political outcomes (Higley and Gunther 1992). 
Representatives usually come from a selective group of citizens characterized by higher 
levels of education and wealth than those they represent (Matthews 1985; Sullivan, 
Walsh, and Gibson 1993). On the other hand, another perspective suggest that poor 
citizens lack the resources to control and monitor their representatives (Delli Carpini 
1996), do not hold coherent policy preferences (Converse 1964) and participate less in 
politics (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995), and therefore elected officials have few 
incentives to represent them.  
While inequities in policy representation may exist, it may also be the case that 
certain institutional arrangements can introduce incentives for public officials to represent 
underprivileged citizens, especially those that make sanctioning (that is say, institutions 
that enhance citizens’ ability to reward and/or penalize representatives’ behavior keeping 
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them accountable) more feasible (Taylor-Robinson 2010). Furthermore, it may be that 
political mobilization can help poor citizens to have their voices heard and induce 
representatives to respond to their demands (Chalmers et al. 1997). As shown in the prior 
chapter, high levels of electoral turnout are strongly predictive of smaller gaps between 
individuals’ responses to the question on whom they think politicians defend and the one 
on whom they think politicians should defend. Taking into account these two 
perspectives, one emphasizing institutions and the other mobilization, this chapter 
assesses the extent to which poor citizens in fourteen Latin American countries are 
underrepresented in substantive terms and the role of political institutions and civic 
culture (participation) in the way different groups are represented. 
In the previous chapter we saw that citizens in Latin America, although with some 
variations across countries, perceive that political systems are biased against poor 
citizens. In 7 out of 11countries analyzed
44
, the majority of citizens reported that 
politicians defend the interest of the rich. However, little we know about whether this 
bias is also found when looking at more objective measures of representation. In this 
chapter I address substantive representation by analyzing the levels of congruence 
between citizens (poor versus wealthy) and legislators taking into account their 
preferences over the role of the state in the economy and their attitudes towards gay 
marriage. Before analyzing levels of congruence and the role of political institutions and 
political participation, the next section presents an overview of the group of citizens that 
are the object of study in this chapter: the poor in Latin America.  Then, I review how 
scholars have addressed different aspects of representation, such as definitions of 
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 Note that in the previous chapter, the analyses focus on ten countries, Constraints in the elite and citizens 
data sets do not allow me to focus on those same countries in this chapter.   
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congruence and responsiveness and their measurements. Finally, I present how I measure 
substantive representation and the data I use and describe the main findings. The main 
finding is that, in fact, in Latin America there are some (but not always all-encompassing) 
areas in which the preferences of the poorest and the wealthiest are statistically different, 
especially regarding the role of the state as owner of the main industries of the state and 
regarding attitudes towards gay marriage, and that legislators are closer to preferences of 
the wealthier citizens in most countries and on most issues. However, few institutional 
characteristics seem to mitigate the underrepresentation of the poorest in the region. 
 
The Poor in Latin America 
 
Studies of political representation have rarely looked at different groups within a 
given society. Only recently, and especially in the United States, have scholars really 
begun to focus on the extent to which less affluent citizens are represented (Bartels 2008; 
Rigby and Wright 2013; Flavin 2012a; Gilens 2005).
45
 In the case of Latin America, a 
rare exception is work by Taylor-Robison (2010), which assesses the extent to which the 
poor count, paying special attention to the case of Honduras. Before the emergence of 
these recent studies, discussions evolved around the idea that poor citizens and 
democracy did not go hand in hand, given a presumed lack of interest, and more 
intolerant, authoritarian and extremists positions (Lipset 1960; Barro 1996; Landa and 
Kapstein 2001). Also, studies in industrialized democracies found that poor people 
participate less than more affluent ones (Lijphart 1997; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 
                                                 
45
 Other scholars focus on other subconstituencies such as those who participate (John D. Griffin and 
Newman 2005; Martin 2003; Ellis, Ura, and Ashley-Robinson 2006), business leaders (Jacobs and Page 
2005) or opinion leaders (Adams and Ezrow 2009).  
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1995), which could affect their ability to control and keep public officials responsive to 
their demands. Running contrary to those studies, research in developing countries has 
shown that poor people value and support democracy and participate more than what 
conventional wisdom would predict (Krishna 2008). Looking at eight Latin American 
countries, Booth and Seligson (2008) find that individual wealth is not related to political 
participation, with education instead more influential across in many forms of 
involvement. Evidence about low income citizens’ support for democracy in Latin 
America yields mixed findings; for instance, while Carlin (2006) finds that income has a 
positive effect on support for democracy, recent studies do not show a clear pattern 
between wealth and support for democracy (Seligson, Smith, and Zechmeister 2012). 
Regardless of the empirical evidence, scholarship that takes on a normative perspective 
strongly endorses inclusive democracies in which all groups are represented (Dahl 2000). 
This emphasis on inclusion in politics often complements a perspective favoring 
inclusion in the economic realm; as one scholar put it, an “exclusionary style of 
development conspires against the integrative principle which is implicit in every 
definition of citizenship or democracy” (Vilas 1997).   
Poor citizens make up a large proportion of societies in Latin America. Despite 
the fact that poverty has been decreasing in the last years, 168 million were living under 
the line of poverty, which represents 29.4% of the Latin American population (ECLAC 
2012). As Table III.1 shows, poverty figures vary by country, from levels below 10% in 
countries such as Uruguay and Chile to more than half of the country population in 
countries like Guatemala, Nicaragua and Honduras. Percentages of citizens living in 
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indigence are also worrisome in some countries.
46
 Some of these high rates of poverty 
and inequality can be attributed to market reforms derived from the so-called Washington 
Consensus in the late 1980s in the region (Korzeniewicz and Smith 2000). Thus, in the 
mid-1990s, as the era of neoliberalism was on the verge of receding, more than 45% of 
the region’s population lived in poverty (ECLAC 2012). In recent years, governments 
across the region have implemented different programs, such as income transfer 
programs (i.e. non-contributory pensions), conditional transfer programs, and integrated 
anti-poverty programs, with the objective of reducing poverty and inequality (Barrientos 
and Santibáñez 2009). Despite some success of these programs, the poor still make up a 
large proportion of Latin Americans.  
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 ECLAC defines indigence as “the income necessary to meet the minimum daily caloric requirements of 
an individual. This line is based on the local cost of a basic basket of goods and is distinct for urban and 
rural areas. A poverty line is derived by assuming that a remaining portion of the income must be spent on 
essential non-food items and the total food and non-food components represent a multiple of the extreme 
poverty line. In the ECLAC case the poverty line is around 1.75 times the extreme poverty line in rural 
areas and around 2.0 times the extreme poverty line in urban areas”(ECLAC 2009, 24). 
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Table III. 1. People Living in Poverty and Indigence in Latin America, 
circa 2010 
Country  Poverty (%) Indigence (%) 
Argentina 8.6 2.8 
Bolivia 42.4 22.4 
Brazil 24.9 7.0 
Chile 11.5 3.6 
Colombia 37.3 12.3 
Costa Rica 18.5 6.8 
Ecuador 37.1 14.2 
El Salvador 46.6 16.7 
Guatemala 54.8 29.1 
Honduras 67.4 42.8 
Mexico  36.3 13.3 
Nicaragua 58.3 29.5 
Panama 25.8 12.6 
Paraguay 54.8 30.7 
Peru 31.3 9.8 
Dominican Republic 41.4 20.9 
Uruguay 8.6 1.4 
Venezuela 27.8 10.7 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
http://www.cepal.org/prensa/noticias/comunicados/9/48459/tabla-pobreza-
indigencia-en.pdf, Accessed July 2, 2013 
Data for 2010, except for Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Nicaragua (2009) and 
Guatemala (2006). Data for Argentina refers to urban areas 
 
Given the high incidence of poverty in Latin America, and its theoretical 
implications for democracy, the study of this sector of the population merits in-depth 
research. The main objective of this chapter is to assess the extent to which poor citizens’ 
policy preferences in Latin America are represented
47
 and how institutions affect that 
degree of representation. But, who are these citizens? Delimiting poor citizens is 
challenging, as measuring poverty is not an easy task. The World Bank  has defined 
poverty as “the lack of, or the inability to achieve, a socially acceptable standard of 
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 Some authors argue that poor citizens do not care about being represented in policy terms but about 
particularistic services and local infrastructure (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007).  
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living” (Bellu and Liberati 2005, 1).48 Given that many aspects can undermine the ability 
to achieve that standard of living, we are faced with a multidimensional concept that is 
difficult to measure, and that might have different meanings by country and over time 
(Bellu 2005). 
A review of extant scholarship indicates that poverty is often measured by using 
both monetary indicators (income, consumption) and non-monetary indicators (health, 
education and assess) and/or objective and subjective measures (Klugman 2002), each 
with their advantages and disadvantages.
49
 For instance, in developing countries income 
has been proven to be an imperfect measure given that in rural areas peasants provide for 
their needs without relying on the formal economy or monetary assets, and when 
monetary exchanges are present they might be seasonal (Bratton 2008).  Also, survey 
questions on income yield high rates of non-response and biased reporting. In order to 
avoid these problems, to identify the poor in Latin America I use a survey measure based 
on a combined index of household assets developed by the Latin American Public 
Opinion Project (Córdova 2009).
50
 The core focus of my study will be those citizens in 
the first quintile of such index. When we look at the characteristics of this group we see 
that for the whole sample, more than 70% of those in the first quintile declare having an 
                                                 
48
 This definition is similar to the one by Sen (1985)  who saw poverty as the inability of functioning in 
society.  
49
 In an attempt to capture all the dimensions of poverty, other scholars have created an index that combines 
objective and subjective measures (Mattes, Bratton, and Davids 2003). This index of Lived Poverty 
combines the responses to how many times people have failed to meet basic needs such as food, water, 
medicines, electricity, fuel to cook and cash.  
50
 This index is composed of a series of questions (the AmericasBarometer’s“R” series) that ask 
respondents if their household have the following items: television, refrigerator, landline, cellular phone, 
vehicle, washing machine, microwave oven, motorcycle, indoor bathroom, computer, flat panel TV, and 
internet.   
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income
51
 equivalent to less than $100 a month.
52
 Also, almost 60% of those in this lowest 
quintile have no formal or primary education.
53
  
 
Measuring Substantive Representation 
 
Responsiveness is a core element in many definitions of democracy. In theory, 
representation means that public officials respond to the needs and preferences of citizens 
who are seen as equal (Dahl 1971; Verba 1996).
54
 In fact, some scholars consider that the 
quality of a democracy can be measured by the extent to which governments are 
responsive to citizens’ policy preferences (Powell 2004b). The importance of this 
requisite is such that it affects citizens’ evaluations of the political regime (Kitschelt et al. 
1999) and therefore its legitimacy, which is especially relevant in new democracies (Luna 
and Zechmeister 2005). What is more, one of the ways in which democracies can foster 
their consolidation is by improving representation and public accountability of 
institutions of representation such legislatures (Diamond 1996). In fact, Latin American 
democracies have been defined as ‘delegative democracies,’ where pubic officials once 
in power act in an unconstrained way, with few incentives to be responsive to citizens’ 
preferences on issues (O’Donnell 1994). In recent studies of this region scholars have 
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 Using this measure I have less non-response rates than using the question on income, than in the majority 
of countries have non-response rates between 10 and 20 %.  
52
 The 2010 round of the AmericasBarometer asked respondents about their monthly income giving them 
10 response brackets ranging between 0 (no income) and 10 (more than $751). 
53
 Some authors use education as an indicator of poverty when assessing the opinions of poor citizens in 
Latin America (Taylor-Robinson 2010). 
54
 Huber and Powell (1994) highlight congruence as one of the main democratic virtues, considering that 
“congruence between the preferences of citizens and the actions of policy makers constitutes a major claim 
and goal of liberal democracy” (p.292). 
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identified a crisis of representation by looking at the growing levels of dissatisfaction 
with the institutions of representation, mainly parties and parliaments, and emphasizing 
broken linkages between citizens and public officials (UNDP 2004; Hagopian 2005; 
Mainwaring, Bejarano, and Leongómez 2006; Boidi 2008; Corral 2008; Carrillo and Petri 
2009).  However, representation has not been subjected to many systematic tests, with 
scholars pointing more often to the lack of empirical studies on representation in Latin 
America (Mainwaring, Bejarano, and Leongómez 2006). A key limitation in studies of 
representation is that “a comprehensive exploration of representation requires data from 
those who are supposed to represent and those who are to be represented” (Marsh and 
Norris 1997, 159).
55
 Likely due to the challenges of finding adequate data for such an 
undertaking, few studies in Latin America combine data from citizens and representatives 
to explore representation (Luna and Zechmeister 2005; Otero Felipe and Rodríguez 
Zepeda 2010; España Nájera and Martínez Rosón 2010; Zechmeister and Corral 2011).  
Representation is a broad concept and difficult to measure given all the different 
dimensions that it entails. One of the ways citizens can be represented is substantively, 
which relates to the extent to which their policy preferences are reflected in the political 
arena. Scholars have used different terms to capture this ideal. In their seminal work on 
representation in the United States, Miller and Stokes (1963) talk about policy 
congruence to refer to the extent to which constituents and legislators share the same 
positions on several issues. In a similar fashion, other authors talk about concurrence that 
refers to “the extent to which citizens and leaders in the community choose the same 
“agenda of community priorities” (Verba and Nie 1972, 302). Another of the terms that 
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 Converse and Pierce (1986) expressed in the same direction when affirmed that in order to study political 
representation we need to compare the preferences of citizens and political elites.  
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scholars have linked to congruence and representation in general is responsiveness. In 
Pitkin’s (1972) terms, political representation is best achieved when public officials act 
“in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them” (p.209). In this vein, 
Eulau and Karps (1977) refer to policy responsiveness as “the structure in which district 
positions on policy issues, specified as some measure of central tendency or dispersion, 
are related to the policy orientation of the representative-attitudinal or perceptual- and to 
his subsequent decision-making conduct in a given field or policy” (p.242).56 While 
concepts of congruence and concurrence imply a more static view of representation, 
responsiveness implies a dynamic process,
57
 not only focused on the extent to which the 
principal and the agent share the same preferences but on the extent to which those 
preferences change and how they are implemented through specific public policies.
58
 
This idea is close to what also in the literature is known, respectively, as mandate or 
accountability representation.  Mandate representation occurs “when politicians’ and 
voters’ interests coincide and/or when voters can reasonably expect that parties will do 
what they propose” (Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin 1999, 30).59 In addition, we find 
approaches that highlight the importance of programmatic linkages; in this case, 
“principals are represented by their agents through programmatic linkage if there is 
congruence between the policies preferred by each party´s voters and its corresponding 
                                                 
56
 They also consider service responsiveness (pursuing particulate benefits for a group), allocation 
responsiveness (providing public goods favoring potential voters) and symbolic responsiveness (appealing 
to symbols and emotions so that citizens feel represented). 
57
 See Powell (2004b) for a complete schema on the process of democratic responsiveness.  
58
 It is outside the scope of this project to examine representation in terms of output. 
59
 An alternative perspective on substantive representation is offered by those who focus on the notion of 
“accountability representation” which assumes that voters reward incumbents who act in their best interests 
while the latter implement policies which will lead them to reelection (Przeworski, Stokes and Manin 
1999).  See also (Manin 1997). 
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politicians and if there is between-party divergence such that each party appeals to a 
different subset of voters” (Kitschelt et al. 2010, 16–17).   
Finally, studies differ in terms of the object of representation. While some focus 
on dyadic representation, that is to say they consider the relationship between one’s 
representative and her constituency (Miller and Stokes 1963, Achen 1978), others assess 
collective representation (Weissberg 1978), which is to say “representation in terms of 
institutions collectively representing a people” (p.535).60 When looking at collective 
representation, a series of studies assesses the extent to which there is dynamic 
representation, which exists if representatives respond and move their positions in accord 
with public opinion (Stimson et al. 1995, Erikson et al, 2002, Wlezien 2004, Adams, 
Ezrow, and Somer-Topcu 2011).
61
 Furthermore, given the importance of parties in some 
regions, especially in Western Europe, some studies of representation take into account 
parties and voters, following the principles of the responsible party model (Dalton 1985, 
Thomassen and Schmitt 1999, Holmberg 2000, Adams, Ezrow, and Somer-Topcu 
2011)
62
. As Dalton (1985) suggests there is an interactive linkage between voters and 
parties, in which voters select the party that best represents their interests, and parties 
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 In fact, Weissberg (1978) considers that citizens are better represented by congress as a whole than by 
individual members. (Hurley 1982)finds that collective representative trumps dyadic representation when 
considering the representation of one’s preferences but not when analyzing satisfaction with policy 
outcomes.  
61
 Hill and Hurley (1999) found that public officials are not only influenced by citizens’ opinions, but also 
shape them.  
62
 Scholars have argued that the type of political party matters in the puzzle of representation (Adams et al. 
2006) (Adams et al. 2006). Specifically, niche parties might behave differently compared to mainstream 
parties. In general terms, it has been found that niche parties are more responsive to their supporters than 
mainstream parties (Kitschelt 1994). In this same line Adams et al. (2006) demonstrate that niche parties 
behave differently in that they are more concerned with keeping the loyalty of their supporters, given that 
when they moderate their positions towards the general public, they are punished in the electoral booth. 
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change to capture the interest of voters or convince their supporters to accept their 
positions.
63
 
In this chapter I focus on congruence and, in particular, with respect to the poor. 
Thus, I focus on the extent to which policy preferences of underprivileged sectors of the 
population in Latin America correspond to the preferences of their representatives in 
congress. This is a first step assessing representation in Latin America and, even though 
knowing if preferences are translated into concrete policies would be ideal, if the views 
of representatives and citizens are similar, representation is improved (Achen 1978).  
However, when we say that citizens’ and representatives’ preferences should be 
aligned, what kind of preferences are we referring to? How can we measure political 
preferences? Multiple studies in political science rely on the use of ideological 
identifications as a way of capturing political preferences. From this perspective, 
ideology is conceptualized spatially “as a matter of location on a left-right or liberal-
conservative continuum” (Knight 2006, 625). These labels constitute a summary of the 
multidimensional and complex political arena and, thus, help individuals navigate the 
political system (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990). However the use of ideological 
identifications to locate people in a policy space can be problematic since their meanings 
and significance varies across individuals and countries ( Converse 1964; Kinder and 
Sears 1985; Huber 1989). In Latin America, some have shown that left-right labels have 
different meanings for citizens and elites (Zechmeister and Corral 2011), and also, that 
the ability of citizens to locate themselves using this schema and the meanings they 
confer to these labels are influenced by contextual factors such as volatility, 
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 Some scholars have focused on governments instead of members of legislative bodies (Thomassen 1994; 
Wessels 2007) . 
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fragmentation and polarization (Zechmeister and Corral 2013).  While at the elite level, 
ideology seems to undergird political competition (Alcántara and Rivas 2007) and party 
competition (Kitschelt et al. 2010), at the citizenry level there are comparatively weak 
linkages between ideological labels and vote behavior (Zechmeister forthcoming). Taking 
into account these limitations and those mentioned by Powell (2009), such as the 
influence of local discourses when using these labels and the different meanings across 
countries, I suggest that a more accurate portrait of representation in Latin America will 
rely on other measures.
64
  
Another, though related, aspect we have to consider in the study of representation 
is how to capture the preferences of citizens and public officials. Extant literature reveals 
a wide variation of sources, each with their strengths and limitations.
65
 Thus, scholars 
differ by relying on public opinion data (Golder and Stamski 2010, Luna and Zechmeister 
2005), expert surveys (Bakker et al. 2012), elite surveys (PELA), party platforms such as 
the Party Manifesto (McDonald, et al. 2004, McDonald and Budge 2005, Ezrow 2007, 
Laver and Benoit 2006, Budge and McDonald 2007, Adams et al. 2011 ), or roll call 
votes (Clinton 2006). 
A final, and key aspect, is choosing the measure with which to capture the extent 
to which citizens’ and public officials’ preferences or positions are close to each other, or 
not. In fact, in the recent years a debate over which approach is most appropriate has 
developed, with some attributing differences across studies to differences in 
measurement. That said, while Golder and Stramski (2010) argue that part of the 
difference in results can be explained by the measure used, Powell (2009) considers that 
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 Studies on Western Europe rely more on the use of this scale when analyzing political representation 
(Huber and Powell 1994). 
65
 See Powell (2009) for a review on the different sources used to measure political representation. 
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discrepancies arise not only due to how congruence is measured but because of the time 
or period under analysis.  
In brief, measures to assess policy congruence vary across studies. Some scholars 
have relied on correlation coefficients (Miller and Stokes 1963, Weissberg 1978), 
assuming that the higher the correlation the higher the congruence. Some have criticized 
this approach given that it does not capture the distribution of preferences, which may 
lead to biased estimations (Achen 1977); instead, Achen (1978) proposes three measures 
- proximity, centrism and responsiveness- as a way to capture the relationship between 
the legislator and the mean opinion in the constituency, or how they respond to the mean 
preference. In other words, a representative’s behavior is a function of the citizens’ mean 
preference . Bartels (2008: 254) measures political equality by regressing roll call votes 
for each representative on the opinions of her constituents, divided by the number of 
respondents from her circumscription, and controlling for the party of the legislator. 
Others compare the distribution of voters’ opinions with the opinion distributions of 
representatives (Holmberg 1999). In the case of Latin America we find the use of 
variance (Luna and Zechmeister 2005) as a way to capture how far citizens and 
legislators’ positions are spread out. A more recent approach is the use of a many-to-
many measure of congruence by Golder and Stamski (2010), which captures the degree 
to which the “collective body of representatives reflects the ideological preferences of the 
citizens” (p. 10) by calculating differences in the cumulative distribution functions of 
citizens and representatives’ preferences.66   
                                                 
66
 The formula is congruence=∑ |F1(x) - F2 (x)| where F1(x) and F2(x) are the cumulative distribution 
functions. The closer to zero the larger the congruence. 
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Following Golder and Stramski’s (2010) advice on the importance of defining and 
choosing the measure based on the question and objective, I assess the distribution of 
preferences using their many-to-many measure of congruence, given that this measure 
captures the degree to which the “collective body of representatives reflects the 
ideological preferences of the citizens” (10). I am interested in the extent to which 
parliaments, the whole representative body, in Latin America reflect the positions of poor 
versus rich citizens. This way I avoid the problem of having to identify which parties 
citizens voted for (the AmericasBarometer does not ask that question and the question on 
party identification yields many non-response rates) and also the problems of using a 
central measure such as the mean or median legislator (Powell 2009).   In fact, many 
studies on representation focus on the median legislator as a way to compare her distance 
with the median citizen
67
 (Powell and Vanberg 2000; McDonald, Mendes, and Budge 
2004). The median legislator is a key actor able to determine legislative outcomes, hence 
the focus on her (Krehbiel 1998). 
One of the main concerns in the study of substantive representation is the lack of 
identical questions and scales to capture citizens’ and representatives’ preferences 
(Powell 2004a). Avoiding this problem, this study relies on both elite and mass survey 
data that contain the same question wording for the variables of interest. The data for 
representatives will come from the Parliamentary Elites of Latin America Survey (PELA) 
conducted by the University of Salamanca (Spain) in the lower chambers of 18 Latin 
American. For the purposes of this analysis 14 countries will be analyzed. The analyses 
will only include the countries sharing the same questions, which are the following: 
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 The median mandate theory poses that the purpose of elections is to “communicate where the median 
voter stands” (McDonald and Budge 2005, 12). 
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Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru and Uruguay. The data 
employed to analyze citizens’ preferences will come from the AmericasBarometer 2010 
involving face-to-face interviews conducted in all mainland Latin American countries 
carried out by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt 
University. For three countries I will use the data from the AmericasBarometer 2012 (El 
Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua) given that the elite survey data with the same 
questions were collected in 2012. See Table 1 in the appendix to see the fieldwork dates 
and sample sizes for both kinds of data sets. Citizens’ data match legislative periods at 
the time the surveys were conducted.  
As suggested above, although many studies in Western democracies rely on an 
empirical measurement of the concept of ideology, which proxies policy preferences with 
positions along a left-right or liberal-conservative continuum, I opt to analyze concrete 
questions on policy preferences. This choice comes after some studies that suggest that 
the meaning of left-right differs from country to country and between citizens and 
legislators (Zechmeister and Corral 2010; Zechmeister and Corral 2013) in Latin 
America. Some other authors consider that correspondence between legislators' positions 
and constituent opinions does not have to exist on all issues (Arnold 1990, Kingdon 1981, 
Froman 1963). Rather, this representation should be based on relevant or salient policy 
dimensions. In the case of Latin America, the more relevant issues are those preferences 
related to the continuum state-market, to the democratic regime, and to morality and 
religion (Luna 2007, Kitschelt et al. 2010). 
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Given that the role of the government in the economy is a salient issue dimension 
in Latin America, the positions of both citizens and representatives in this regard will be 
used to test policy congruence, paying special attention to underprivileged groups. As a 
secondary dimension, the project will also take into account preferences over social 
values – specifically, support for gay marriage, which is an issue that has become 
relevant in the public debate in the region (Pierceson, Piatti-Crocker, and Schulenberg 
2013). In the last few years three countries have legalized gay marriage: Argentina, 
Brazil and Brazil, along with the city of Mexico, DF. Intense debates have arisen in 
countries such as Colombia (where congress rejected a law legalizing gay marriage), 
Ecuador (where the president expressed his rejection to the idea) and Costa Rica, among 
others.
68
 
The following questions will be employed, which appear in both the mass and 
elite questionnaires: 
  
                                                 
68
 For more information see http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/actualidad/el-matrimonio-homosexual-
se-abre-paso-america-latina-articulo-438207 
http://www.elmundo.es/america/2013/05/15/brasil/1368619221.html 
http://www.elnuevoherald.com/2013/05/23/1483276/correa-rechaza-matrimonio-gay.html 
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ROS1. The (Country) government, instead of the private sector, should own the 
most important enterprises and industries of the country.  How much do you 
agree or disagree with this statement? 
ROS2. The (Country) government, more than individuals, should be primarily 
responsible for ensuring the well-being of the people. To what extent do you 
agree or disagree with this statement? 
ROS3. The (Country) government, more than the private sector, should be 
primarily responsible for creating jobs. To what extent to do you agree or 
disagree with this statement? 
ROS4. The (Country) government should implement strong policies to reduce 
income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree 
or disagree with this statement? 
ROS5. The (Country) government, more than the private sector, should be 
primarily responsible for providing retirement pensions. How much do you 
agree or disagree with this statement? 
ROS6. The (Country) government, more than the private sector should be 
primarily responsible for providing health care services. How much do you 
agree or disagree with this statement? 
 
The responses to these questions are given based on a 1-7 scale where 1 indicates 
“strongly disagree” and 7 “strongly” agree. Therefore, larger values mean a position more 
in favor of state involvement.  
In order to capture positions in regards to social values, as noted above, I assess 
attitudes towards gay marriage. The question in both questionnaires was worded as 
follows: 
D6. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of same-sex couples having 
the right to marry? 
 
Responses to this question were given on a 1-10 scale where 1 means “strongly 
disapprove” and 10 “strongly approve.” Larger scores mean greater support for the right 
of homosexuals to get married.  
Before assessing the extent to which representatives share the same preferences 
(regarding the role of the state and support for gay marriage) as two sub-constituencies 
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(the poorest and richest) in Latin America, I run a principal factor analysis for each 
country to see if these preferences can be combined into indexes in order to simplify the 
analysis of six items. When considering the six questions on the role of the state for each 
country, all variables except the one on the state as the owner of the most important 
industries load on the same factor. Table 2 in the appendix shows that this factor has high 
scale reliability in all countries for both citizens and legislators. Therefore, I combine 
them into a single additive variable that I call the Role of the State Index. Thus, I will 
focus my analysis on the study of three variables: preferences over the role of the state as 
owner of the main industries, the role of the state index, and attitudes towards gay 
marriage.   
Studies on inequalities in representation should first take into account the extent 
to which there are significant differences across groups, given that “where preferences 
are identical, there is no basis for inequality” (Soroka and Wlezien 2008). Table III. 2 
shows the countries in which the poorest and wealthiest differ in their policy preferences 
regarding the three areas of study. In order to test these differences statistically, I use the 
post-estimation lincom command to test the hypothesis that the difference between the 
means for poor and rich citizens equals 0. Table III.2 shows the mean and the linearized 
standard error using the svy command, which is used to account for the complex nature of 
the sample.  
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Table III. 2. Differences between the Policy Preferences of the Poorest and the 
Wealthiest in Latin America 
 State as Owner of main 
industries 
Role of the State Index Support for Gay 
marriage 
 Poor Rich Poor Rich Poor Rich 
Argentina 4.947(.178) 4.93(.173) 27.59(1.185) 29.77(.492)* 5.62 
(.250) 
6.60(.272)** 
Bolivia 4.92 (.088) 4.22 
(.139)*** 
27.46(.489) 26.76(.464) 3.34(.153) 3.38(1.99) 
Brazil 4.87(.213) 4.04(.180)** 29.77(.644) 28.44(.348)* 4.23(.261) 5.40(.297)** 
Chile 5.12(.134) 4.63(.140)** 31.60(.307) 29.72(.391)*** 3.90(.203) 4.94(.250)** 
Colombia 4.44(.111) 3.48(.144)*** 30.54(.361) 29.26 (.314)** 3.62 
(.190) 
4.89(.223)*** 
Costa Rica 5.19 (.130) 4.47 (.239)** 32.36(.234) 30.57(.406)** 2.50 
(.183) 
3.24(.231)** 
Dominican 
Republic 
4.721(.149) 3.92(.144)** 30.39(.349) 30.39(.319) 2.70(1.68) 3.07(.165) 
El 
Salvador 
4.58(.135) 3.85(.149)*** 24.35(.252) 23.73(.228)* 1.71(.146) 2.40(.254)** 
Guatemala 4.09(.115) 3.88(.132) 21.68(.29) 21.70(.372) 2.55(.192) 2.67(.227) 
Honduras  4.98 (.095) 4.54 (.111)** 27.37 (.459) 26.04(.468)** 2.63 
(.113) 
3.45 
(.172)*** 
Mexico 4.23 (.130) 3.42 
(.138)*** 
28.82 (.427) 28.57 (.368) 4.10 
(.206) 
5.19 
(.209)*** 
Nicaragua 4.401(.121) 3.65(.155)** 25.28(.202) 24.62(.373) 2.37(.225) 3.22(.301)** 
Peru 4.77(.130) 4.49(.135) 27.39(.435) 28.19(.416) 2.85(.199) 3.61(.168)** 
Uruguay 4.64(.147) 4.01(.186)** 32.30(.229) 29.23(.501)*** 4.68(.266) 6.5(.244)*** 
Note: * significant at p<.10  **p<.05 ***p<.001.  In parenthesis standardized Std. Error 
 
The results show some variation across countries. The dimension on which we 
find more differences between the poorest and the wealthiest citizens in Latin America is 
the one that captures preferences over the state as the owner of the main industries. In all 
countries, the underprivileged sectors of the population show, on average, a greater 
preference for a more involved state in the economy (larger values mean a stronger 
preference for the involvement of the private sector on the economy, the scale ranges 
from 1 to 7). These differences are especially significant in the cases of Bolivia, 
Colombia, El Salvador and Mexico. Only in Argentina, Guatemala and Peru are there not 
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statistically significant differences between these two subsets of the population. However, 
when we look at the index on the role of the state, differences are not as marked: on this 
measure the poorest and the richest share similar views, with both strongly inclined 
toward a state that cares about providing basic services and diminishing inequalities 
(values on the Table for this index are the product of an additive scale where larger 
values mean a more active role of the state).  Only in eight countries are there some 
differences, weak in most of them, except for Chile and Uruguay in which we find the 
most significant differences.  
The fact that poor citizens tend to prefer a larger involvement of the state goes in 
line with studies based on theories of self-interest, which state that economically 
vulnerable citizens, such as recipients or at risk of being recipients of social welfare 
programs, are more likely to support “big government” (Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989, 
Coleman 2001). The underlying argument is that citizens are not going to support 
government programs “where they do not think that they will benefit and where do not 
think the beneficiaries are legitimate” (Sanders 1988:323).  
Finally, we find statistically significant differences regarding attitudes towards 
gay marriage in most countries. As exceptions, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, and 
Guatemala do not display differences. In general, the poorest citizens hold more anti-gay 
marriage attitudes, although in some countries support for gay marriage is low for both 
groups.  
Guatemala is a noteworthy case, in that there are not differences between the 
wealthiest and the poorest citizens on any of the three policy dimensions considered. 
Guatemala is one of the most divided societies in Latin America, but these results suggest 
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that the main cleavage may be ethnicity and not wealth. In fact, when I look at the ladinos 
and indigenous’ preferences, I find statistically significant differences between those two 
groups in their preferences over the role of the state as owner of the main industries and 
in their attitudes towards gay marriage.
69
 In another two countries (Peru and Bolivia) with 
large indigenous populations, I only find only one dimension on which there are 
statistically significant differences between rich and poor citizens. When I look at the 
differences between whites and indigenous in Peru, I find statistically significant 
differences in the two dimensions related to the role of the state, with indigenous 
populations preferring a larger involvement of the state.
70
 The case of Bolivia will be in-
depth addressed in Chapter IV.  
So far, this section has identified possible areas in which there might be unequal 
representation, that is to say in most countries, the poor and the rich’s preferences over 
the role of the state in the economy are different as well as when focusing on attitudes 
towards gay marriage.  I next measure congruence using the many to many measure 
explained above as a way to test the extent to which the poor are underrepresented As 
stated in Chapter I, there are reasons to believe that poor citizens would be 
underrepresented in Latin America: 
H1b. More wealthy citizens’ policy preferences in Latin America are better 
represented compared to those who are less wealthy. 
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 On the preference over the role of the state as owner of industries, the mean for ladinos is 3.84 and 4.24 
for indigenous (the difference is statistically significant at p=0.002). Regarding attitudes towards gay 
marriage, mean for ladinos is 2.59 and 2.19 for indigenous (the difference is statistically significant at 
p=0.03). 
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 The mean for whites in the “state as owner” is 4.54 and 5.26 for indigenous being the difference 
statistically significant at p=0.014. Meanwhile, considering the index of the role of the state, the mean for 
whites is 26.93 and for indigenous 29.25, being the difference statistically significant at 0.014.  
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Table III. 3 presents the measure of congruence where there are statistically 
significant differences at p<0.05 or better.  
 
Table III. 3. Measuring Congruence by Poor versus Rich Populations in Latin 
America 
 State as Owner of 
main industries 
Role of the State Index Support for Gay 
marriage 
 Distance 
between 
the 
Poorest 
and 
Legislators 
Distance 
between 
the 
Richest 
and 
Legislators 
Distance 
between 
the 
Poorest 
and 
Legislators 
Distance 
between 
the 
Richest 
and 
Legislators 
Distance 
between 
the 
Poorest 
and 
Legislators 
Distance 
between the 
Richest and 
Legislators 
Argentina     1.334 0.463 
Bolivia 0.632 0.936     
Brazil 2.543 1.716   0.603 0.565 
Chile 1.543 1.135 7.367 5.428 0.731 1.681 
Colombia 0.9501 0.6779 6.3485 5.0914 0.6446 0.8676 
Costa Rica 2.5565 1.8414 4.7248 3.0735 0.854 0.2563 
Dominican 
Republic 1.2743 0.5726 
    
El 
Salvador 0.9776 0.3111 
  
1.6517 0.9551 
Guatemala       
Honduras  1.8068 1.3716 3.0092 1.6564 1.0981 1.9196 
Mexico 1.4495 0.6387   1.8955 0.8451 
Nicaragua 1.5525 0.8042   0.6911 0.6552 
Peru     1.0925 0.3405 
Uruguay 0.5071 0.8682 6.0374 3.056 2.1619 0.8414 
 
Table III. 3 shows the results of the many-to-many measure of congruence by 
Golder and Stramski (2010), which captures the differences in the cumulative distribution 
of preferences.  
Congruence= ∑| (F1(x)-F2(x) | 
where F1(x) and F2(x) are the cumulative distribution functions for citizens and 
representatives’ preferences (See Golder and Stramski 2010, p.96). 
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The closer to zero, the larger the congruence. Figures in bold show which 
subgroup legislators are the closest to, the poorest or the wealthiest, in their countries. For 
example, taking the case of Argentina on the issue of support for gay marriage, we see 
that legislators are closer to the wealthy, with a score of 0.46 in the many-to-many 
measure of congruence, a score that is smaller than the one we get when we compare 
legislators and those in the lowest quintile of wealth (1.334) As expected, legislators are 
closer to preferences of the wealthier citizens in most countries and on most issues. 
Regarding preferences over the role of the state as the owner of main industries, in all 
countries except for Bolivia and Uruguay, representatives are closer to those in the fifth 
quintile (the wealthiest). Distances from the poor are especially pronounced in Brazil and 
Costa Rica.  With respect to the index on the role of the state, in the five countries where 
there are statistically significant differences between the two groups of citizens, 
legislators’ preferences are closer to the wealthier ones. Finally, regarding attitudes 
towards gay marriage, only in three countries, Chile, Colombia and Honduras, are the 
poor closer to legislators than the wealthier
71
. Table 3 in the appendix shows the 
distributions graphically. What explains these differences across countries? The next 
section looks at institutional variables to answer that question.  
 
Explaining Gaps in Representation: The Role of Institutions 
 
As we have seen in the previous section, there is some evidence of 
representational inequalities in Latin America but, as well, these gaps vary across 
countries. A key goal of this project is to assess the extent to which institutions can 
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 If I use the distance between the median voter and the median legislator results do not vary.  
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effectively reduce political inequalities. Thus, in the remainder of this chapter I focus on 
features of the electoral systems that are theorized to influence representation. As in 
Chapter II, I also examine the role of leftist parties. In addition, I consider the potential 
relevance of a highly participatory culture in some countries within Latin America. The 
question examined here is as follows: do institutional arrangements and/or high degrees 
of participation (which might be related to institutions or to culture) reduce the distance 
between poor citizen’s preferences and their representatives? 
Institutions play a key role in any democracy: they affect actions, beliefs, and 
norms, and therefore influence political results (Przeworski 2004). For this reason, some 
have reasoned that institutions might influence the relationships that develop between 
citizens and representatives. However, “the institutions literature is underdeveloped with 
respect to the nature of the relationship between the elected official and the constituency” 
(Taylor-Robinson 2010). In fact, most studies focus on how institutions, especially 
electoral institutions, translate votes into seats rather than on exploring the connections 
between citizens and their representatives (Duverger 1954, Rae 1971, Taagapera and 
Shuggart 1989, Cox 1997). Some studies assess the role of electoral institutions by 
focusing on legislators alone, looking at their role or the focus of their representation 
(e.g., if they consider they represent the whole nation, or local constituencies) or their 
behavior in congress (Heitshusen, Young, and Wood 2005, Stratmann and Baur 2002; for 
Latin America, see Kerevel 2010, Montero and Marenghi 2006, Marenghi 2011).  
Studies of representation link it to accountability, and different electoral rules 
favor greater levels of accountability. Institutions introduce incentives for legislators to 
behave in different ways and there are rules that make them more accountable to citizens. 
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In this sense, Krishna (2008) argues that institutions can help poor citizens’ demands to 
be heard and “facilitate information and promote accountability  between citizens and 
public officials” (p.155). In this same line, Taylor (2010) finds that where institutions 
allow for monitoring and sanctioning legislators, the poor’s trust in legislatives is 
comparatively higher.
72
   
Following from this line of argument, this section assesses the extent to which 
certain features of the electoral system influence the distance between the poor and 
legislators. The focus is on institutions that are theorized to create incentives for 
accountability and monitoring. I will assess the effect of proportional versus single 
member districts electoral systems, the proportionality of the system, the magnitude of 
the districts, fragmentation of the legislature and the type of lists.  
The expectation for the effects of proportional versus SMD is mixed, given the 
trade-off inherent in a choice between these systems (Powell 2000). While proportional 
formulas encourage the inclusion of more groups, majoritarian formulas allow for the 
clarity of responsibility necessary for accountability. Therefore, we could think that poor 
people might be better represented under proportional systems, but at the same time 
majoritarian formulas give them more power to make legislators accountable in a way 
that these would feel pressured to be closer to them in order not to be punished in the next 
election.  
And, in fact, looking at the studies that have analyzed the relationship between 
proportional formulas and representation we find mixed evidence. While classic studies 
found a relationship between proportional representation and correspondence in the 
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 In fact, as Duverger (1951) pointed out, electoral systems have the ability of creating both mechanic and 
psychological effects.  
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opinions of representatives and citizens (Huber and Powel 1994, Powell 2000), recent 
studies do not find such a clear relationship (Blais and Bodet 2006, Golder and Stamski 
2010).  
The preliminary hypothesis laid out in Chapter I was stated as follows: 
H3b. The larger the proportionality of an electoral system, the smaller the 
distance in policy preferences between the poor and legislators. 
I measure how proportional a system is by making use of the Gallagher Index (or 
Least Squares Index). This measure captures the extent to which the percentage of votes a 
party receives is translated into the same percentage of seats in congress. Larger scores in 
this index mean that there is a high disproportion between votes and seats. The next three 
figures show the relationship between this index and the distance between the poor and 
the legislators across countries for each of the policy dimensions resulting from the 
many-to-many measure of congruence by Golder and Stramski (2010) presented in Table 
III.3 (first column). 
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Figure III. 1. Disproportionality and Distance between the Poor and 
Legislators on their Preferences over the Role of the State as Owner of 
Main Industries 
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Figure III. 2. Disproportionality and Distance between the Poor 
and Legislators on their Preferences over the Role of the State 
(Index)  
 
 
Figure III. 3. Disproportionality and Distance between the Poor and 
Legislators on their Attitudes towards Gay Marriage 
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The results do not show a strong relationship between these two variables. To put 
the finding in words: there is no evidence that in Latin America the degree of 
disproportionality influences the extent to which there exist representation gaps between 
legislators and the poor. 
Another feature theorized to create incentives for legislators to better represent 
citizens is the type of list. Open lists allow voters to choose which person they want to 
hold a seat in congress from a list of candidates. Thus, they can be used by voters to 
sanction particular legislators, while in a party list system “only people who can influence 
the composition of the party’s list can sanction legislators, so legislators have an 
incentive to represent those people who have an influence with the party leaders 
controlling nominations…and rich people have tools to influence” (Taylor-Robinson 
2010, 41). In the countries under analysis, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Dominican Republic, Honduras and Peru have some sort of open list to elect 
representatives. It could be expected that in these countries distances between the poor 
and legislators are smaller. However, when I look at how close the poor citizens are to 
legislators in these countries, the strongest relationship is found regarding attitudes 
towards gay marriage, that is to say, in systems with open list rules, distances are smallest 
(correlation 0.57).
73
 In brief, generally speaking list type does not appear to influence 
political inequality gaps between legislators and the poor in Latin America. 
In addition, some scholars have argued that the magnitude of the districts is an 
important characteristic shaping representation. District magnitude refers to the number 
of representatives elected in each electoral district. In theory, small districts have the 
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 The relationship between the type of list and the distance between the poor and legislators is weaker 
when looking at the role of the state. Correlations are -.26 in the case of the state as the owner of the main 
industries and -.06 regarding the index on the role of the state. 
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impact of increasing levels of accountability (Carey and Hix 2011). The smaller are 
districts (under five)
74
, the more opportunities for control and accountability that could 
translate in closer relationships between citizens and representatives.  
As mentioned in Chapter I, we could expect that: The larger the proportion of 
small districts, the smaller the distance in policy preferences between the poor and 
legislators (H4b). 
The following three figures show the relationship between the percent of “small” 
districts in a political system and congruence between the poor and legislators in the three 
policy areas considered in this chapter. 
 
 
Figure III. 4. Small Districts and Distance between the Poor and 
Legislators on their Preferences over the Role of the State as 
Owner of Main Industries 
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Figure III. 5. Small Districts and Distance between the Poor 
and Legislators on their Preferences over the Role of the 
State (Index) 
 
 
Figure III. 6. Small Districts and Distance between the Poor and 
Legislators on their Attitudes towards Gay Marriage 
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These results show a large relationship in the expected direction in the case of 
preferences over the role of the state as owner of the main industries and attitudes 
towards gay marriage.
75
 Thus, whereas disproportionality did not help explain gaps in 
political representation across legislators and poor in Latin America, district magnitude 
does. 
As in the previous chapter I also consider fragmentation, which in theory affects 
citizens’ ability to sanction legislators. As the number of parties increases, citizens have 
more “choices of parties and politicians with a reasonable chance of winning a seat in the 
legislature. This enhances opportunities to sanction an incumbent” (Taylor 2010, 42). We 
could therefore expect that as the number of parties increases the distance between the 
poor and legislators would decrease (H5b). Figures III.7, III.8 and III.9 show the 
relationship between the effective number of parties and the distance between poor 
citizens’ preferences and legislators on the three policy arenas addressed in this chapter. 
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 If I use the average district magnitude the relationship is less clear: State as owner =0.252, Role of the 
State index -0.840, Attitudes towards gay marriage 0.333. 
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Figure III. 7. ENP and Distance between the Poor and 
Legislators on their Preferences over the Role of the State as 
Owner of Main Industries 
 
 
Figure III. 8. ENP and Distance between the Poor and Legislators on 
their Preferences over the Role of the State (Index) 
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Figure III. 9. ENP and Distance between the Poor and Legislators on 
their Attitudes towards Gay Marriage 
 
Interestingly, the results show an unexpected relationship between the number of 
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expected relationship that literature has found in western democracies. It could be 
thought that fragmentation in Latin America produces a feeling of instability in the 
system. Finally, another institutional feature that could have an impact on the 
representation of the poor is the presence of leftist parties in congress. These parties are 
traditionally in favor of issues that concern underprivileged citizens. Luna and 
Zechmeister (2005) show how at the aggregate level, representation is positively 
correlated with the strength of leftish parties. And, as shown in the prior chapter, I find 
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that the presence of leftist parties is an important indicator of reduced gaps in political 
inequalities.  
The expectation, as stated in Chapter I is that “Where leftist parties have a strong 
presence, the distance between policy preferences between the poor and legislators will 
be smaller than in contexts where their incidence is weaker” (H 6 b). 
Figures III.10, III.11 and III.12 present the extent to which we can confirm 
“equalizing impact” of leftist parties (Verba et al. 1978) when measuring substantive 
representation. The x-axis shows the percentage of left political parties in the congresses 
calculated by taking into account ideological self-positions of legislators (see Chapter 
III). 
 
 
Figure III. 10. Percentage of Leftist Parties and Distance 
between the Poor and Legislators on their Preferences 
over the Role of the State as Owner of Main Industries 
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Figure III. 11. Percentage of Leftist Parties and Distance between 
the Poor and Legislators on their Preferences over the Role of the 
State (Index) 
 
 
Figure III. 12. Percentage of Leftist Parties and Distance between 
the Poor and Legislators on their Attitudes towards Gay Marriage 
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From these three figures it can be said that there is a weak relationship between 
the presence of leftist parties and substantive representation. The relationship goes in the 
expected direction in Figure III.10, that is to say the more leftist parties in congress the 
more congruence between the poor and legislators, but correlation is weak. 
  
The Role of Participation in Reducing the Political Representation Gap 
 
Apart from institutional factors, scholars have emphasized the relationship 
between political participation and representation (Verba 2003, Beramendi and Anderson 
2008). High levels of participation can be a product of institutions, culture, or both. As 
noted in earlier chapters, disentangling these complex antecedents is outside the scope of 
this project; instead, the focus here is on whether high levels of participation have the 
favorable effects on representation that have been suggested in extant works but which 
have not been tested for in depth in the case of Latin America. The objective of this last 
section, then, is to assess the extent to which the representation of the poorest in the 
region varies by different levels of political participation. The main finding is that there is 
a weak relationship between participation and levels of congruence between the poor and 
legislators.  
Some empirical research in the United States has indeed found that policy 
outcomes reflect affluent citizens’ preferences more than poor or middle-income 
Americans (Gilens 2005, Bartels 2008). Affluent citizens support politicians’ campaigns 
and help them to get a seat and, therefore, legislators are disproportionally responsive to 
the wealthy.  Though limited in quantity and focused on a single case, some research 
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focused on Latin America reaches similar conclusions, though adds additional reasons for 
such unequal outcomes with respect to representation. For example, a recent study by 
Taylor-Robinson (2010) on representation in Latin America, with a special focus on 
Honduras, finds that poor citizens lack the needed resources to monitor public officials 
(e.g., education, access to information) and to punish representatives who ignore their 
interests, which constrain the possibilities for being well-represented. Apart from these 
two main factors, the author finds that a lack of participation and reduced tendencies to 
form or participate in associations can undermine representation among the poor. 
In this same vein, another theoretical approach highlights the relationship between 
participation and representation. Political participation is a key element in any definition 
of democracy (Dahl 1971). This involvement covers a wide range of activities that 
include voting, working for candidates or parties, and participating in manifestations or 
protests, among others. Participation has been seen by many scholars as a way to produce 
representative decisions and legitimacy in the system (Dalton 2004). Although there is no 
agreement on the level of participation necessary for democracies to work (Norris 2002, 
Huntington 1968), there is an agreement on its importance. As noted in the previous 
chapter, one of the main forms of participation is voting. Through elections, citizens 
select public officials, and keep them accountable, which might have some consequences 
for the role of those representatives. Furthermore, the choice of voting or not has also 
consequences for the kind of enacted policies (Lijphart 1997). Furthermore, it is not new 
to argue that representatives might not be committed to pay attention to those who do not 
vote (Key 1949). If this is the case, we could expect representation levels to be unequal 
across those who vote (or participate actively in politics) and those who do not 
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participate. Some authors have argued that the reason why we could expect more 
congruence between voters and representatives is because the former tend to select public 
officials who hold similar or close views and preferences (Erikson 1990, Miller and 
Stokes 1963). An alternative explanation is that through voting, citizens express their 
preferences and induce public officials to be responsive (Verba 2003).  Recent studies 
have found a relationship between income and participation: “individuals who are below 
the median income in society are less likely to participate in elections, and those above 
the median income are more likely to do so” (Beramendi and Anderson 2008:18). 
However, empirical evidence on the relationship between participation and representation 
has shown mixed results. On the one hand, Ellis et al. (2006) find that in American 
politics, representatives do not respond differently to voters and nonvoters. On the other 
hand, Griffin and Newman (2005) find that Senators in the United States are influenced 
by voter preferences rather than nonvoter preferences. In short, there are theoretical 
reasons to expect that that political participation will affect representation, but the 
empirical evidence to date is mixed and, in the Latin American case, quite limited.  
To establish a baseline expectation to assess, I posit that a participatory culture 
could generate the incentives for the representatives to respond to citizens’ interests (see 
H2b and discussion in Chapter I). In the history of Latin America, the poor and powerless 
have been able to mobilize against the political systems (Chalmers et al 1997) to defend 
their interest. Therefore, it is possible that a participatory culture in this region helps to 
overcome the expected situation of underrepresentation enjoyed by poor citizens.   
To assess this expectation, I take into account the same variables regarding 
participation I assessed in the previous chapter at the aggregate level, that is to say 
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electoral turnout and an index of contacting public officials. Figure III.13, III.14 and 
III.15 show the relationship between electoral participation and congruence regarding the 
role of the state as owner of the main industries, the index of the role of the state and 
attitudes towards gay marriage, respectively. X-axes show the percentage of citizens who 
voted in the last presidential election.  
 
 
Figure III. 13. Electoral Participation and Distance between the 
Poor and Legislators on their Preferences over the Role of the State 
as Owner of Main Industries 
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Figure III. 14. Electoral Participation and Distance between the 
Poor and Legislators on their Preferences over the Role of the State 
(Index) 
 
Figure III. 15. Electoral Participation and Distance between the Poor and 
Legislators on their Attitudes towards Gay Marriage 
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From those three figures it can be stated that in general terms there is a weak 
relationship between large levels of turnout in the elections and substantive congruence. 
Although the relationship goes in the expected direction, that is to say, the more people 
participate in elections, the small the distance between legislators and the poor, the 
correlations are relatively weak.  The same pattern is found when I restrict the sample to 
the electoral participation of citizens in the first quintile (the poorest).
76
  
As I explained in the previous chapter I have created an index of contacting public 
officials, capturing the percentage of citizens who asked help by contacting members of 
congress and/or local public officials (See Chapter II). It can be expected that where 
citizens are more active contacting public officials, political congruence is larger.  
 
Figure III. 16. Contacting Public Officials and Distance between the Poor 
and Legislators on their Preferences over the Role of the State as Owner of 
Main Industries 
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 The correlations are -.378, 0.70, and 0.164 respectively, none of which is statistically significant.  
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Figure III. 17. Contacting Public Officials and Distance between the Poor 
and Legislators on their Preferences over the Role of the State (Index) 
 
 
Figure III. 18. Contacting Public Officials and Distance between the 
Poor and Legislators on their Attitudes towards Gay Marriage 
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As with electoral participation, Figures III.16, III.17 and III.18 show that there is 
a weak relationship between contacting public officials and substantive political 
congruence. This weak relationship can be also observed when looking at levels of poor 
citizen contacting public officials, and when looking at levels of participation in protests 
(analyses not shown here for the sake of space). The correlations between participating in 
protests and congruence between attitudes of poor citizens and legislators are -.503, -
0.09, .27, respectively, though none of these is statistically significant. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Different theories and empirical results from studies in advanced democracies 
suggest that certain segments of the population, mainly the wealthy, are better 
represented than others (Bartels 2008, Barabas and Wachtel 2010, Jacobs and Page 
2005). Some of the explanations for this unbalance are based on some characteristics 
attached to deprivation, such as having fewer resources to participate in the political 
process, to be able to understand politics, to be informed about politics or to express their 
preferences and control their representatives (Bartels 2008). Given this situation, we 
might expect the same situation occurs in less developed countries. In fact, this chapter 
has shown that in that with the clear exceptions of Bolivia and Uruguay, in the rest of 
countries in Latin America, legislators’ preferences are closer to those of the wealthiest 
than to the poorest (at least on preferences related to the role of the state and attitudes 
towards gay marriage). Contrary to what I found in the previous chapter, few institutional 
arrangements are substantively related to higher levels of political congruence at the 
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aggregate level. The clearest relationships are found when focusing on preferences over 
the role of the state as owner of the main industries of the country. The strongest 
relationships are found between small districts and the effective number of parties. On the 
one hand, the more small districts in a system the closer the distance between the poor 
and legislators. On the other hand, the larger the effective number of parties the larger the 
distance between them considering this kind of preference. Finally, there is a modest 
relationship between levels of turnout and congruence regarding the role of the state as 
owner of the most important industries. In any case, the relationships are not as strong as 
in the case of perceptions of representation.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
ELECTORAL RULES AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN BOLIVIA 
 
To what extent can different institutional arrangements mitigate against the 
political marginalization of historically under-represented groups? While previous 
chapters focused mostly on the poor, as a historically marginalized segment of society in 
a region that has significantly high levels of inequality, I extend this focus in this chapter 
to consider not only the poor per se, but also the indigenous. As noted in the previous 
chapters, in some countries in Latin America a key division in society is not necessarily 
between the poor en masse and the rich, but between those with indigenous identities and 
others. The chapter addresses this topic by examining, for the case of Bolivia, subjective 
perceptions of legislators’ roles and objective measures of policy and descriptive 
representation. The principal argument tested in this chapter is that electoral rules that 
incentivize a close relationship between the legislator and her constituency will cultivate 
comparatively better outcomes with respect to legislators’ representative focus and 
outcomes. 
The case of Bolivia was selected for several reasons.  First, the country’s mixed 
electoral system creates a congress comprised of legislators elected by two different sets 
of electoral rules. That is to say, 70 members of the Chamber of Deputies are elected in 
single-member constituencies using the first-past-the-post rule and 53 in multimember 
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districts through a proportional election rule.
77
 Second, Bolivia is country in which a 
large proportion of the population – the indigenous - has been located in a historically 
disadvantaged position characterized by fragmentation, cultural and political 
marginalization, and economic deprivation (Van Cott 2003). It is also an interesting 
country for a third reason: from 2006 to present day, Bolivia’s executive seat has been 
occupied by the country’s first indigenous president, Evo Morales, who was brought to 
power on the basis of a broad social movement (MAS) and whose election into office 
may have represented a sea change with respect to the representation of the indigenous in 
Bolivia. Therefore, this case allows me to assess the impact of two distinct types of 
electoral rules on the representative outcomes, in particular as they relate to a 
traditionally marginalized population that is sufficiently large and discernible for analysis 
within a critical political moment for the country. 
This dissertation is motivated by the fact that there is widespread agreement that 
political institutions matter. Political institutions provide the electoral rules by which 
governments are elected and the constitutional rules that determine the division of powers 
and the distribution of powers between central and local governments (World Bank 
2002). They also solve collective action problems, and structure preferences and policy 
choices (Schiermann and Benoit 1989). In short, institutions matter because they affect 
actions, beliefs, and norms, and therefore influence political results (Przeworski 2004). 
However, and despite agreement on the centrality of institutions in any democracy, and 
on their role in structuring and defining the rules of the game, their effects are not always 
as strong as one might expect (Kitschelt et al. 2010; see also previous chapters in this 
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 Bolivia has nine districts corresponding to the nine departments (states) in the country. There are other 
seven seats reserved for indigenous populations elected in seven special circumscriptions using majority 
rule. For more details, see Ley n 026, Ley de 30 de junio de 2010. 
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dissertation). In this chapter I focus on the potential effects of institutions on three 
dimensions of political representation: perceptions, substantive and descriptive 
representation.  
One of the institutions with the largest impact on political representation is the 
electoral system. Electoral systems not only translate votes into seats but also have 
important effects on many other elements of the political system (Cox 1997, Norris 
1997). Among other influences, they shape the relationship between citizens and 
representatives (Carey and Shugart 1995), generating incentives for close or distant bonds 
between them. This feature of the electoral rules generates the expectation that legislators 
elected through different electoral systems might have different attitudes and behaviors in 
their role as representatives. Specifically, legislators elected in single member districts 
have more incentives to represent and take into account their specific, geographically-
defined electoral circumscription rather than the nation as a whole. Assuming they adapt 
their campaign style to the peculiarities of the electoral rule through which they are 
elected, one would then expect legislators from single member districts, compared to 
those elected by the proportion of party votes received at the national level, to report 
being less attuned to broader constituencies and, at the same time, expect citizens to feel 
closer to these representatives. In the sections that follow, I first test this question: Is 
there evidence that legislators' perceptions of their roles vary according to the type of seat 
they hold? And, moreover, do citizens hold different opinions about distinct types of 
legislators? As I will show, the data return an affirmative answer to these questions, 
which in turn provides initial support to the expectation that there are important 
differences between legislators based on the process by which they are elected.  
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But do these perceptions translate into differences in objective measures of 
representation under different types of legislators? In a second set of analyses, I assess 
the degree to which legislators represent the policy preferences of poor versus rich 
constituents as well as indigenous versus non-indigenous constituents. Modern 
democracies are based on the idea of principals (citizens) delegating the power to enact 
public policies to agents (public officials), in a relationship in which all citizens “should 
be equal to each other” (Powell 2004: 274). This system is built on the premise that 
governments enact policies that are congruent with the preferences of equal citizens. 
However, different social groups are not seen as equal in most political systems; rather, 
some groups (typically those with more resources) are able to exert greater policy 
influence (Gilens 2005, Bartels 2008). And, yet, are there other circumstances in which 
the situation of the disadvantaged groups with respect to political representation is 
improved? Specifically, do institutions matter? If electoral institutions matter in the ways 
described above, then one would expect that variation in the rules by which legislators 
are elected has consequences for the representation of historically marginalized and 
underprivileged groups. As noted, single member districts generate a series of incentives 
which bring representatives closer to their constituents. It is assumed that the reduced 
geographic scope of this kind of district fosters close connections between them. 
Additionally, the representative will be more likely to feel more integrated into the 
community she represents, taking care of the demands of her constituents personally. The 
representative is often seen as the spokesperson for the interests of the constituency 
(Vallés and Bosch 1997). This line of scholarship supports the expectation that 
underprivileged groups in Bolivia will be better represented through their single-member 
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representatives.  As I will show, however, there is little evidence that institutions matter 
in this regard in Bolivia. Instead, analyses of the congruence between legislators’ policy 
stances on economic and social issues and citizens’ stances on those same issues reveal 
two important factors: first, strikingly, comparisons between the poor and the indigenous, 
on the one hand, and the rich and the non-indigenous, on the other hand reveal only slight 
differences in general policy orientations and, second, to the extent that there are 
differences, the underprivileged do not appear to be better represented by single member 
district representatives than proportional representation legislators.  
If institutions are not very consequential with respect to the ways in which policy 
preferences are represented by legislators in Bolivia, then is there perhaps another 
dimension on which we can see an effect of institutions on patterns of representation? In 
a third and final set of analyses in this chapter I examine descriptive representation (via 
skin tone) in Bolivia in order to assess whether different electoral rules predict 
differences on this particular dimension of representation. This kind of representation is 
important especially when it comes to historically marginalized groups because it fosters 
feelings of inclusion and increases levels of trust in the political system (Young 1990, 
Phillips 1995, Williams 1998, Mansbridge 1999). Most prior studies of indigenous 
populations in Latin America have focused in general terms on the incorporation of 
indigenous groups and politicians into the political systems (Birnir and Van Cott 2007, 
Van Cott 2005, Warren and Jackson 2003) and not on the role that different electoral 
rules play achieving political representation. In a manner similar to the previous 
discussion and tests, given the close connections that single member districts tend to 
generate, one could expect that representatives elected in single member districts are 
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more likely to share the skin tone of this group than those elected through proportional 
ones. As the data show, there is little evidence that the electoral rules matter in this regard 
in Bolivia.  
The data used in this chapter come from the following sources.  First, I use both 
elite and mass survey data to measure perceptions of legislators and their roles and policy 
stances.  The elite data come from the surveys of the Parliamentary Elites of Latin 
America (PELA) Project conducted by the University of Salamanca (Spain) in the lower 
chamber in the fall of 2010. Mass survey data come from different waves of surveys 
conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt 
University between 2004 and 2010 in Bolivia. Second, I make use of original data that I 
collected in 2011 during the course of fieldwork in this country that was focused on 
assessing legislators and their roles.  In the first place, I created a novel dataset by 
recording the skin tone of legislators; I map this onto the AmericasBarometer measures 
of skin tone among the mass public in order to measure descriptive representation. In 
addition, I complement the analyses in this chapter with qualitative data obtained from 
over 45 semi-structured interviews with legislators in Bolivia I carried out during the 
course of my fieldwork.  Before turning to the data and analyses, however, the next two 
sub-sections, first, provide further discussion of the notion that institutions matter (for at 
least some political outcomes) and, second, present a more thorough introduction to and 
justification of the case of Bolivia. 
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Do Institutions Matter for Political Representation? 
 
Variation in political representation does not take place randomly. As noted on 
Chapter I, institutions shape political interactions (North 1991) and therefore play a 
systematic and important role in the process of political representation. Grounded in this 
premise, a broad literature has focused on the analysis of electoral rules and their effects. 
It is been shown that electoral rules shape the incentives of political actors in ways that 
affect political competition, party organization and the kinds of ties between 
representatives and constituents, among other outcomes (see for instance, Duverger 1954, 
Rae 1971, Taagapera and Shuggart 1989, Carey and Shuggart 1995, Lijphart 1999). 
Regarding the role of representation, it is been shown that there is a wide variation across 
(Heitshusen, Young, and Wood 2005) and within countries (Stratmann and Baur 2002). 
As I mentioned in Chapter I  these studies of representation assess how legislators define 
the focus of their work, that is to say, whom they represent (mainly, national versus local 
interests) (Eulau et al 1959) and what explains that variation.  Part of the literature 
defines this kind of research as motivational, since the way politicians characterize their 
roles depends on their purposes (Searing 1985). In this line, Fenno (1978) shows how 
representatives in the United States adopt a “home style” in order to secure their main 
goal of reelection. Representatives work to gain trust from their constituency, so that it is 
easy for them to explain and justify their decisions in Washington. This trust is gained 
thanks to their work within the district they represent. 
Regardless of the motivation, the role a legislator adopts has important impacts on 
her behavior. For instance, those focused on local interest are more likely to spend more 
time in their constituencies, and more likely to vote against their political party than those 
121 
 
who adopt a broader role (Searing 1985), or to more likely to spend time on local party 
work rather than nation party work (Studlar and McAllister 1996).  
Apart from personal motivations, institutional features shape representational 
roles. One of the institutions highlighted within the literature as having the largest impact 
on the role that legislators perform is the electoral system and, especially, the nature of 
districts. While multimember districts offer few incentives for developing a personal 
relationship in the district, because these imply a geographical overlap among several 
legislators (Heitshusen, Young and Wood 2005), single member districts generate a 
series of incentives that bring representatives closer to their constituents. Additionally, 
under single member districts, the representative is identified as the spokesperson for the 
interests of the constituency (Vallés and Bosch 1997), and she might be more likely to 
engage in pork-barrel activities than representatives elected in multimember districts 
(Lancaster and Patterson 1990). Moreover, in these cases the candidate plays a 
fundamental role: her election depends on her own person more than on the political 
party to which she belongs. Parliamentary groups under these circumstances will be ill-
disciplined; each member will be more concerned about the impact of their vote in her 
district than about the instructions of the party (Duverger 1950).  
Mixed-member electoral systems are a subcategory of electoral systems that 
combine both single member districts and multinomial ones.  More specifically, they are 
electoral systems in which “seats are allocated in two (or more) overlapping sets of 
districts, such that every voter may cast one or more votes that are employed to allocate 
seats in more than one tier” (Shugart and Wattenberg 2001b, p. 10). Among the 
advantages of such electoral systems is that they generate incentives for close 
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relationships between citizens and their representatives and accountability between them 
at the single-member district, while keeping disciplined and policy consistent parties, 
with a fair representation at the national level (Colomer and Negretto 2005). Therefore, 
we could expect that this kind of electoral rule generates different incentives for both 
types of legislators and produces distinct roles. It is likely that representatives chosen 
under single member districts have more incentives to establish a close relationship with 
their voters and therefore adopt a role focused on their constituency. This electoral rule 
can also impact the way candidates conduct their campaign. It can be the case that 
candidates under the proportional list take advantage of the resources provided by the 
party while single-member candidates have to appeal their electorate directly using a 
candidate centered strategy. From the citizens’ side, it could be expected that the electoral 
rule also influences their opinions about the different kinds of legislators; if they see that 
the single member representative is closer, this can influence their trust in them.  
As some scholars have pointed out, mixed electoral systems “serve as crucial 
experiments” (Shugart, Valdini and Suominen 2005) or offer the opportunity to conduct 
controlled comparisons (Moser 2001, Moser and Scheiner 2004) studying the relationship 
between electoral institutions and legislative behavior. In other words, these kinds of 
studies allow us to hold constant institutional and cultural characteristics at the national 
level while introducing some variance at the level of electoral rules. Nonetheless, 
analyses about the effect of mixed-electoral systems on legislative behavior show 
somewhat inconclusive results.  On the one hand some scholars find in Western 
democracies that representatives elected in single member districts have more of a 
constituency focus than parliamentarians chosen in multimember districts (Heitshusen, 
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Young and Wood 2005) and that they are more likely to be members of committees that 
allow them to focus on their local constituencies (Stratmann and Baur 2002) than those 
elected through proportional representation. On the other hand, analyses in new 
democracies show a less clear impact of mixed-electoral systems on voting behavior 
(Haspel, Remington, and Smith 1998, Herron 2002, Smith and Remington 2001) or party 
discipline (Kerevel 2010). Therefore more studies on the impacts of this kind of electoral 
system on representatives are needed, especially in new democracies.  
In the case of Latin America, only few countries have mixed electoral systems: 
Mexico, Venezuela and Bolivia and few studies have addressed the effects of this kind of 
electoral system in the region. For instance, Kerevel (2010) assesses the impact of the 
mixed-member electoral system on legislators in Mexico. While she finds that PR 
legislators are more likely to have control over key leadership positions, there are few 
differences on party discipline between single member representatives and proportional 
ones. The same null effect on party discipline has found in Venezuela (Crisp 2007). This 
kind of electoral system was applied for the first time in the elections of 1997 as a 
consequence of the lack of responsiveness, accountability and confidence in the political 
system (Mayorga 2001). Nonetheless, little we know about the effects that the 
introduction of this electoral systems has had in the political system. Ardaya (2003) 
argued that SMD Bolivian legislators work harder, and get closer to voters than those 
elected in PR. A recent study by Centellas (2009) focuses on some of the impacts on the 
political system as a whole, which has aggravated the existing regional cleavages in 
Bolivia, increased the regional polarization and contributed to the instability of the party 
system. Sanchez and Rivas (2013), using interviews to legislative advisors, find that the 
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main difference between those elected in SMD and those in PR is in their relationship 
with the party, with the SMD legislators more autonomous, but both kind of legislators 
are found to care about their districts. However, despite these extant studies, we know 
very little about the relationship between the mixed-electoral system and the role of 
representatives and descriptive and substantive representation.  
As mentioned in Chapter I, apart from the role of representatives and its 
implications, scholars have focused on the way citizens are represented. As mentioned 
before, Pitkin (1972) provides an excellent typology of types of representation, in which 
she distinguishes between descriptive, symbolic and substantive representation. She 
concludes that political representation is best achieved when legislators act "in the 
interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them" (209) rather than sharing 
social or demographic characteristics with their represented. This (former) idea is close to 
what later in the literature would be known as mandate representation. Mandate 
representation occurs “when politicians’ and voters’ interests coincide and/or when voters 
can reasonably expect that parties will do what they propose” (Przeworski, Stokes and 
Manin 1999, 30). And as Achen (1978) points out, if the views of representatives and 
citizens are similar, representation is improved.
78
 From a principal-agent perspective, 
public officials are the agents who act on behalf of citizens, responding to public 
demands and fulfilling citizens’ expectations. The relationship between agents and 
principals is ruled by political accountability. This relationship involves the transmission 
of information from the former to the latter, along with explanations for making decisions 
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 An alternative perspective on substantive representation is offered by those who focus on the notion of 
“accountability representation” which assumes that voters reward incumbents who act in their best interests 
while the latter implement policies which will lead them to reelection (Przeworski, Stokes and Manin 
1999).  It is outside the scope of this project to examine representation in terms of output. 
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subject to sanctions (Schmitter 2004).  In other words, voting works as a reward-
punishment mechanism: voters will take into account policy performance and will vote in 
line with their assessment (Downs 1957). Public officials, as vote seekers, will try to be 
elected by looking after their constituencies’ interests. However, political institutions, 
especially electoral rules, shape representatives’ motivations to represent citizens’ policy 
preferences. Single member districts encourage legislators to focus on the needs of their 
constituents while proportional representation might make representatives more 
responsive to their party’s interest than to the preferences of their constituencies.  
Although some scholars highlight the importance of substantive representation, 
that is to say the extent to which citizens and representatives’ issue preferences coincide 
(Powell 2004), we cannot deny the relevance of descriptive representation. Descriptive 
representation is present when a citizen shares ascriptive characteristics such as gender, 
race, or ethnicity, among others, with her representative (Pitkin, 1972). The presence of 
this kind of representation has beneficial impacts on democracy given that it “reduces 
distrust and increases democratic legitimacy” and “furthers the substantive representation 
of interests by improving the deliberation” (Mansbridge 1999: 654). Therefore, assessing 
the extent to which descriptive representation takes place in a political system is 
important, especially in those systems where sectors of the population have been 
traditionally excluded.  Most of the studies on descriptive representation are focused on 
the United States, with many scholars advocating that fair representation should allow 
social groups to define and defend their own interests (Young 1990, Phillips 1995, 
Williams 1998).  
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As with both the roles assumed by representatives and substantive representation, 
electoral systems also theoretically ought to influence descriptive representation. In fact, 
scholars have shown a connection between proportional electoral systems and ascriptive 
representation. For example, Norris (1997) finds that proportional systems promote the 
inclusion of minority parties and minority social groups in the system and the presence of 
more women in congresses. However, little is known about the relationship between 
mixed-electoral systems and descriptive democracy. Drawing from the theoretical 
perspective offered by institutionalists and, in particular, those focused on the effects of 
differing electoral rules, one might expect that citizens have a greater opportunity to 
select representatives who look like them when they have the opportunity to select their 
single member representative.  
The next section presents some information about the case of Bolivia and expands 
the discussion of representation to take into account different disadvantaged groups in 
that society.  
 
Bolivia: Diversity and Representation 
 
 Bolivia offers a great opportunity to explore the relationship between a mixed 
electoral system and the role of representatives on the one hand, and substantive and 
descriptive representation on the other one. The diversity within the country allows us to 
assess the extent to which important subgroups of the population are being represented as 
well as the impact of the electoral rules. As I stated above, modern democracies are 
normatively based on the idea of citizens being considered as equals with respect to their 
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interests being taken into account. Therefore, the analysis of political representation in a 
country where important sectors of the population, indigenous peoples, have been 
traditionally marginalized, becomes especially meaningful.  Bolivia’s political system has 
experienced many changes over the last decades. The traditional party system created 
after 1985 was affected by a crisis of dissatisfaction during the 1990s, a decade 
characterized by economic crisis, feelings of social exclusion, inequality and structural 
poverty (Domingo 2005). The beginning of the century was accompanied by a series of 
social protests and political instability that would end years later in the restructuring of 
the political system. Traditionally excluded sectors asked for their inclusion in the 
political arena while traditionally included actors had difficulties forming a government. 
The 2002 elections reflected the exhaustion of the old system and the first signs of 
tangible political change. The Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) emerged as a major 
player channeling indigenous and other dissatisfied sectors’ demands. After years of 
political unrest and uncertainty, in 2006, Evo Morales became president of the country, 
inaugurating a new time marked by new rules that would affect the economic and 
political development of Bolivia (for a description of the transformations in the political 
system, see for instance  Araníbar 2009; Haro 2011). This new situation and context 
offers a great opportunity to assess the extent to which traditionally marginalized actors 
have been incorporated in the political system and the role of political institutions in this 
process.  
According to the 2001 census, the indigenous in Bolivia represent almost half of 
the population (49.95%) with about 4 million people.
79
  This percentage varies across the 
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 Other sources raise this percentage to 62% (The World Bank 2005, Indigenous Peoples, Poverty and 
Human Development in Latin America: 1994-2004). Recently the results of the 2012 census were released 
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nine departments into which the country is divided. As the map in Figure IV.1 shows, in 
five out of the nine departments –La Paz, Oruro, Cochabamba, Oruro, Potosí and 
Chuquisaca- more than fifty percent of the population is indigenous based on the census 
data collected in 2001. On the contrary, the departments of the so-called Media Luna (the 
so-called “half moon”, because of the geographic positioning of the departments) – 
Pando, Beni, Santa Cruz and Tarija- have less than 25% of indigenous populations in 
their territories.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
(http://www.ine.gob.bo/pdf/boletin/NP_2013_2.pdf). However, these results have generated controversy 
and will be checked by international organisms. According to these recent figures, 69% of Bolivians do not 
affirm belonging to any of the 36 indigenous peoples. The question on ethnic identity did not include the 
category mestizo (see http://www.americaeconomia.com/politica-sociedad/politica/cuestionado-censo-
2012-de-bolivia-sera-evaluado-por-organismos-internacio,  
http://www.la-razon.com/sociedad/Censo-bolivianos-pertenecer-pueblo-indigena_0_1879612128.html 
http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2013/08/06/actualidad/1375814823_694555.html) 
 
129 
 
 
Figure IV. 1. Indigenous Population by Department 
 
One of the defining characteristics of Bolivia’s indigenous populations, apart 
from their traditional exclusion from the political arena
80
, is a history of economic 
deprivation. In 2004, poverty rates were much higher among the indigenous than the non-
indigenous population (74% versus 53%), as well as extreme poverty rates (52% versus 
27%). The indigenous are afflicted not only by poverty but also by economic inequality. 
In Bolivia, 10% of the population consumes 22 times more than the poorest 10%, and 
among the poorest 50%, two thirds of them are indigenous (The Word Bank 2005). 
Thus, in Bolivia poverty and indigenous identity overlap to a considerable degree. 
Given the significant levels of economic and social inequality that characterize the 
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 However, I recognize that this topic is much more complex, and that indigenous groups had an important 
role in the 1952 Revolution. Also, in the 1980s and 1990s there were indigenous organizations with some 
presence in the political system (See Alc ntara S ez 1999). 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística de Bolivia, 
based on the 2001 Census 
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indigenous in Bolivia, it is particularly relevant to consider the extent to which such 
disparities are reflected in the political arena, specifically with respect to representation.  
As stated, the main argument tested in this chapter is that electoral rules that 
incentivize a closer relationship between the legislator and her constituency will cultivate 
comparatively better outcomes with respect to legislators’ representative foci and with 
respect to levels of substantive and descriptive representation. In this case, I consider 
“better” to mean that citizens are closer to their single member district representatives 
than to the proportional ones regarding their preferences over the role of the government 
in the economy and in terms of their ethnic characteristics. The electoral rule, specifically 
the mixed electoral system, in Bolivia offers the ideal condition to test this kind of 
hypothesis.   
Law 026 of June, 2010 describes the main features of Bolivia’s mixed-electoral 
system.
81
 In each of the nine departments, half the legislators are elected in single 
member districts and half in proportional circumscriptions. Currently, there are 130 
deputies of whom 70 are elected in single member districts, 53 in multimember districts 
and 7 in special indigenous districts. The magnitude of proportional districts varies 
according to the population of the department. It ranges from 13 in La Paz to 1 in Pando. 
Table IV. 1 shows the distribution of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies of the 
Plurinational Legislative Assembly by kind of circumscription.
82
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 Although this electoral rule was first established in 1996, the new law in 2010, taking into account the 
new constitution of 2009, introduces some new features such as the inclusion of seven special 
circumscriptions reserved for indigenous populations.  
82
 The Plurinational Legislative Assembly is composed of two chambers: the Senate and the Chamber of 
Deputies. This chapter focuses on the latter given its greater political relevance.  
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Table IV. 1. Distributions of Seats at the Chamber of Deputies in Bolivia 
Department 
Single 
Member 
Districts 
Proportional 
Representatives 
Special 
Circumscription 
Total 
La Paz 15 13 1 29 
Santa Cruz 13 11 1 25 
Cochabamba 10 8 1 19 
Potosí 8 6 1 14 
Chuquisaca 6 5 0 11 
Oruro 5 3 1 9 
Tarija 5 3 1 9 
Beni 5 3 1 9 
Pando 3 1 1 5 
TOTAL 70 53 7 130 
 
The remainder of this chapter will assess the extent to which this electoral 
arrangement generates different incentives for single member district legislators and 
proportional ones and produces comparatively better outcomes with respect to legislators’ 
representative focus and substantive and descriptive representation. The following section 
present the data used to test these hypotheses. 
 
Data 
 
In order to assess the relationship between the electoral system, the role of 
representatives and descriptive representation in Bolivia I rely on three kinds of data.  
The data for representatives come from the surveys of the Parliamentary Elites of Latin 
America (PELA) Project conducted by the University of Salamanca (Spain) in the lower 
chamber in the fall of 2010 among 97 Bolivian deputies taking into account the party 
distribution of the chamber
83
 (the distribution of the interviews by party was: 66 MAS, 26 
                                                 
83
 Table 1 in appendix shows the distribution of legislators by party and circumscription. 
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PPB and 5 Other parties). I complement these survey data with quantitative and 
qualitative data from the semi-structured interviews that I conducted in the summer of 
2011 among 45 legislators in Bolivia. Interviews were conducted face-to-face in the 
offices of the Chamber of Deputies. 28 representatives belonged to MAS, 13 to PPB-
Convergencia and 3 to UN and 1 to AS.  22 were proportional representatives and 23 
were elected in single member districts.  
 Citizens’ opinions about their representatives come from different waves of 
surveys conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt 
University between 2004 and 2008 in Bolivia. The data employed to analyze citizens’ 
descriptive and substantive representation come from the AmericasBarometer 2010, 
based on face-to-face interviews conducted in 26 countries
84
 in the Western hemisphere 
carried out in the first half of  2010. The sample for Bolivia is of 3,018 respondents, and 
is composed of nine strata representing the departments of the country. The survey was 
conducted primarily in Spanish, but also in Quechua and Aymara for monolingual 
speakers of these indigenous languages.  
 
A Close Relationship? How  Bolivian Legislators and Citizens Perceive Political 
Representation 
 
Whom do Bolivian legislators believe they represent? Do the representatives 
selected in single-member districts and those selected at the department level behave 
differently? How do citizens perceive political representation in Congress? These are 
some of the questions addressed in this section. If institutions matter in the ways 
                                                 
84
 Interviews are face-to-face with the exception of the United States and Canada where the survey 
administered via a web interface. 
133 
 
anticipated by the theories presented above, we would expect that the mixed-electoral 
system produces different incentives among legislators depending on the rule through 
which they are elected. Given that uninominal districts allow for close relationships 
between legislators and citizens (Heitshusen, Young, and Wood 2005), we could expect 
that in Bolivia representatives elected in single member districts have more of a local 
focus than parliamentarians chosen in multimember districts. Also, they might be more 
likely to take into account their constituents rather than other actors in the political 
system. Finally, and given that under single member districts legislators do not depend as 
much on the political party to which they belong, we could expect that candidate-oriented 
campaigns is what defines their electoral success. Regarding citizens’ views, we could 
expect that they consider that single member legislators represent them better than 
proportional legislators. We could also expect that citizens have more confidence in 
former than in the latter.  
In order to test these expectations I rely on elite and public opinion surveys as 
well as on qualitative data from semi-structured interviews with legislators.  The first part 
of the analysis focuses on the views that Bolivian legislators have regarding whom they 
represent while performing their job. The PELA survey asked members of congress 
whom they represent by giving them four options: the political party, all the voters in 
their district, party voters, or all Bolivians. Figure IV.2 shows the results for the current 
legislature in Bolivia taking the whole chamber as a whole.  
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Figure IV. 2. Whom Do Bolivian 
Legislators Believe They Represent? 
 
As we can observe, the majority of legislators interviewed, more than 65%, have a 
national focus, in that they consider that they represent all Bolivians. Less than 25% of 
legislators report a focus based on their district. Finally, only 10% of them say they 
represent the political party they belong to or the party supporters. However, does the 
electoral system have any impact on how legislators define the focus of their role? 
 
10% 
64% 
25.56% 
Party / Party Voters All Bolivians District
Source: PELA 2010 
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Figure IV. 3. Focus of Representation by Type of Legislator in Bolivia, 2010 
 
Figure IV.3 presents results for that same question but now taking into account 
the kind of district through which the legislator was elected. Despite the fact that the most 
popular response is “all Bolivians”, single-member district legislators are more likely to 
say that they represent their districts than the proportional ones. This relationship 
between the local focus and the electoral system is statistically significant at p<0.05.  
Nonetheless, we could wonder about the extent to which this institutional variable 
fades when taking into account other variables that the literature has pointed to in 
explaining the role of legislators. One of the most relevant variables in this regard is 
“ambition,” or the desire to be reelected. Classic works by Matthew (1974) and Fenno 
(1974) highlight how legislators’ main goal is to seek reelection which is the main force 
conditioning their behavior in office. Following this line of thought, several studies have 
shown an impact that the desire of being reelected has on the role that legislators adopt 
(Wood and Young 1997, Soule 1969). Does this ambition influence the role that Bolivian 
12.50% 
56.00% 
36.00% 
8.00% 
72.50% 
12.50% 
Party/Party Voters All Bolivians District
SMD Proportional
Source: PELA 2010 
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legislators adopt? Table IV.2 shows the result of a multinomial regression that includes 
both the kind of circumscription through which legislators were elected (Uninominal, 
meaning single member district, versus plurinominal as the baseline for that measure) and 
their personal ambition of being reelected
85
 along with other controls such as ideology, 
the party they belong to, and their department. 
  
Table IV. 2. Multinomial Logistic Regression of the Role of Representatives in 
Bolivia 
 Represent the District vs. 
Represent all Bolivians 
Represent Party or Party Voters 
vs. Represent all Bolivians 
 Coefficient  Standard 
Error 
Coefficient  Standard Error 
Uninominal 1.561** 0.705 -0.669 0.880 
Ideology 0.046 0.058 -0.850* 0.501 
Seeks Reelection 0.399 0.913 -41.046 1.170 
MAS -1.880 1.327 -2.480 1.839 
PPB
+
 -0.829 1.395 -2.015 1.879 
La Paz -0.472 1.519 18.397*** 2.540 
Santa Cruz -1.600 1.488 19.110*** 2.512 
Cochabamba -1.971 1.705 20.353*** 2.642 
Potosi -0.519 1.571 19.796*** 2.296 
Chuquisaca -0.429 1.585 -22.203 1.250 
Oruro -42.943 1.140 19.343*** 2.592 
Tarija -1.335 1.811 19.394*** 2.497 
Beni
++
 -1.335 1.811 -22.696 1.590 
Constant 0.116 1.876 -16.685*** . 
Pseudo R
2
 0.238    
N 84    
     
Source: PELA 2010. ***p < .001; **p < .05; *p < .1, two-tailed.  
+ “Other parties” is the category of 
reference. 
+ + 
Pando is the department of reference.  
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 The PELA questionnaire asks deputies if after this period they would like to continue in politics 
(question EXPP1). If they answer yes, they are asked about what position they would like to hold .The 
options they are given are: President of the Republic, mayor, and executive position in the regional 
government, in the national government, work for a public firm, legislator, or any other that they specify.   
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As the table depicts with the row highlighted in gray, this relationship between 
being elected in a single member district and adopting a local focus remains even after 
controlling for ambition.
86
 That is to say, single-member district legislators are more like 
to affirm that they represent their district than the whole nation or their party. The impact 
of this variable is larger than traditionally important variables defining representatives’ 
behavior, such as “seeking reelection”. Therefore, institutions, and the electoral rules in 
this case has an impact on how legislators conceive their role in Congress in Bolivia. 
The semi-structured interviews I conducted among legislators in Bolivia provide 
further evidence about the relevance of the electoral rule for how they conceive the focus 
of their representation. When legislators were asked who they represented, 12 out of the 
22 proportional legislators said that they represent the whole country, that they have a 
national responsibility. In contrast, 5 of them indicated that they represent their 
department whereas 3 –all from the opposition- pointed out the party as the focus of their 
presentation. Finally two of them mentioned specific interest or groups, such as disabled 
people or the youth. Taking into account those elected in single member districts, 15 out 
of 23 stated that they represent their district while the rest 8 pointed out the whole nation. 
The majority of SMD legislators, when explaining the differences between the two kinds 
of legislators, highlighted how they are more legitimate (in their words) given that they 
are elected directly whereas the proportional ones are presented under the same list of the 
President. As some of them said, they are more independent from the party, work alone, 
closer to the voters, and have more responsibilities given the direct vote from the people.  
                                                 
86
 Running a regression using the variable EXPP1 (if they would like to continue in politics) instead of 
“seeking reelection” yields similar results (see Appendix). That is to say, pursuing any kind of political 
activity is not relevant in the case of Bolivia and it does not cancel the impact of the institutional variable.  
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In brief, these interviews illuminate a clear difference in the focus of the representation 
by different kinds of legislators.  
The influence of institutions on legislators’ perceptions of their representative role 
can also be assessed through analyses of whom they take into account when they perform 
their role as representatives. The PELA project asked legislators about this issue. Among 
a list, they have to select which groups/individuals are more influential when it comes to 
their political decisions. Figure IV.4 shows the results. As we can see, the mixed-
electoral system leads to significant differences with respect to taking into account the 
opinion of the district. Legislators elected in single member districts are more likely to 
say that they listen to the citizens in their districts the most, in comparison to those 
elected in proportional districts (57.42% versus 32.43%). The kind of electoral district is 
also important regarding the role legislators give to political parties. Proportional 
legislators are more likely to say that they pay attention to party voters compared to 
uninominal representatives. In fact, no single-member district representative said they 
take their party into account, whereas 13.51% of those elected in proportional districts 
say they take their party into account first.  
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Figure IV. 4. Whom Do Legislators Report Taking into Account the Most? 
 
Finally, because of this difference in incentives across the two types of 
representatives, we might expect differences in the factors that explain their election. We 
know that proportional legislators depend more on political parties given that these 
decide candidates’ order on the ballot. On the other hand, single member district 
candidates depend more on their own abilities and charisma to be selected than 
proportional ones.  
 
2.13% 
6.38% 6.38% 
27.66% 
57.45% 
2.70% 
5.41% 5.41% 
13.51% 13.51% 
27.03% 
32.43% 
Interest
Groups
Regional
Leaders
Party
Affiliates
National
Leaders
Government Party Voters Public
Opinion
District
SMD Proportional
** 
Source:  PELA 2010, ** significant at p <0.05 
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Figure IV. 5. Factors that Explain Legislators’ Election 
 
Figure IV.5 shows the responses to a question that asked legislators to identify the 
main factor that helps explain their election. Out of seven factors mentioned in the PELA 
survey, respondents had to choose one. Although the main factor mentioned by both 
single member district and proportional legislators is their past experience, there are 
statistically significant differences on one of the factors: the electoral campaign.  
Single member district legislators are more likely to point out their own electoral 
campaign as a key factor in their electoral success. In fact, this element was frequently 
raised during the personal interviews I had with legislators in Bolivia. When asked about 
the differences between single member district and proportional legislators, almost all of 
the representatives elected in single member districts pointed out how they had to 
organize their own campaigns which involved much more resources than those spent by 
proportional legislators. “Proportional legislators go under the umbrella of the president 
2.00% 
4% 
28.00% 
2.00% 
12.00% 12.00% 
40.00% 
2.44% 2.44% 
7.32% 
12.20% 
14.63% 
21.95% 
39.01% 
Previous
Work as
Legislator
Charisma Their
Electoral
Campaign
Party
Ideology
Party
Program
Image of
Party
Leader
Past
Experience
SMD Proportional
** 
Source:  PELA 2010, ** significant at p <0.05 
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and they do not need to do a political campaign, but citizens elect us directly, they look 
for our picture on the ballot, and therefore we have to spend more time and resources on 
our own campaign if we want to be elected” said one of the legislators.87 They 
highlighted how proportional legislators took advantage of appearing on the same list as 
the presidential candidate: “in some areas where our presidential candidate had a lot of 
supporters, legislators did not even bother to campaign or to show up in electoral events 
while I had to walk to the last corner in my district seeking votes,” complained one of the 
SMD representatives. Proportional legislators were also aware of this situation, as one of 
them mentioned: “single member district deputies have more duties with citizens; I can 
go unnoticed, but they cannot.” 
However, it could be said that that there is a counter-argument, which is that 
different types simply are attracted into different rules, so it is a selection issue, and not 
an institutional one. This argument might hold; however, institutions are still important to 
the degree that they allow this type of sorting and self-selection into roles to take place. 
Also, parties know where to locate their candidates so that they can assure the seats. In 
fact, the interviews with legislators underlined differences in the process of selection for 
SMD and proportional legislators; 90% of the legislators explained how SMD candidates 
go through a bottom-up process where social organizations at the local level have great 
influence in nominating them and, in contrast, proportional legislators go through a top-
down process where the structures of the party or even the party leader has the largest 
influence selecting them. Put succinctly, on the basis of the evidence reported here and 
this logic, we cannot deny the impact of institutions on creating distinctions between 
                                                 
87
 All translations from Spanish to English are my own. 
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legislators in the ways that they conceive of their role and duties and, as well, the 
interests they serve.  
The evidence in this section demonstrates that electoral rules have an impact on 
representatives’ perceptions of their roles and behavior in Bolivia. Single member 
districts offer different incentives from proportional rules, which has an impact on who is 
more important to them and on the different strategies they have to follow in order to gain 
a seat in Congress.  
Next, I test the impact of electoral rules on how citizens perceive their 
representatives. Several rounds of the AmericasBarometer –from 1998 to 2004- asked 
Bolivians who represents them better: single-member district representatives or 
proportional ones. 
 
 
Figure IV. 6. SMD Legislators are Perceived to Represent Citizens Better 
 
58.08% 
41.29% 
67.71% 
46.29% 
9.30% 8.80% 
7.50% 
10.90% 
32.57% 
18.01% 
10.84% 
13.45% 
31.83% 
13.90% 
29.32% 
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SMD Proportional Does not know None
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP 
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As Figure IV.6 shows, the vast majority of citizens consider that single member 
district legislators represent them better. Also, as we observe in Figure 6, Bolivians also 
trust single member district legislators more than proportional ones. The difference of 
means is statistically significant at p<0.05. Therefore, the electoral rule is generating the 
perception among citizens that single member district legislators are closer to them, 
which also translates into larger confidence towards them (see Figure IV.7).  
 
 
Figure IV. 7. Citizens’ Trust in Legislators Varies by Type 
 
In sum, this section has shown how political institutions, electoral rules to be 
more specific, have an important impact on legislators’ and citizens’ perceptions about 
political representation in Bolivia. Single member district legislators devote more 
attention to their district and adapt their behavior in line with the nature of the process 
through which they are elected. Also, citizens perceive this kind of representative as 
closer to them. Do these perceptions translate into tangible differences in political 
representation under these two difficult types of electoral rules? The next section 
44.16 
40.71 
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SMD Prop
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP 
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addresses this question assessing the extent to which the impact of electoral rules holds in 
the case of substantive representation.  
 
Substantive Representation in Bolivia 
 
Two of the theoretical premises of modern democracies are, first, that politicians’ 
and voters’ interests align as representatives act as the public’s political agents (Achen 
1978,  Przeworski, Stokes and Manin 1999) and, second, that all citizens “should be 
equal to each other” in that process (Powell, 2004: 274). In other words, in ideal form, 
governments enact policies that reflect the balance of preferences among all citizens. 
However, in reality, most scholars agree that some groups - typically those with more 
resources - are able to exert greater policy influence (Gilens 2005, Bartels 2008). If 
institutions matter in shaping the incentives that vote seeking legislators face with respect 
to attending to different constituencies (Fenno 1978, Mayhew 1974), then it is possible 
that different electoral rules produce different representational outcomes for 
disadvantaged groups. Specifically, because single member districts encourage legislators 
to be particularly attentive and response to their constituents, while proportional 
representation tends to focus representatives on their party as a whole, we may find 
different patterns of representation of the poor across these types of institutions. In this 
section I assess this proposition with the case of policy representation in Bolivia.  
One of the main concerns in the study of substantive (policy) representation is the 
lack of identical questions and scales to capture citizens’ and representatives’ preferences 
(Powell, 2004). I avoid this problem by relying on elite and mass survey data that both 
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contain the same question wording for the variables of interest. Although many studies in 
Western democracies rely on an empirical measurement of the concept of ideology, 
which represents policy preferences, using the positions along a left-right or liberal-
conservative continuum, I will opt for concrete questions on policy preferences. This 
choice comes after some studies that suggest that the meaning of left-right differs from 
country to country and between citizens and legislators (Zechmeister and Corral 2010, 
Zechmeister and Corral 2012) in Latin America.  
In the ideal case of high levels of representation, it is not necessary that all the 
preferences or positions of citizens and representatives are the same on all issues, rather 
that they are similar on salient issues. In the case of Latin America, the more relevant 
issues are those preferences related to the state-market continuum, to the democratic 
regime, and to morality and religion (Luna 2007). In the specific case of Bolivia, the role 
of the state has been particularly visible in political discourse in the last years, especially 
when President Evo Morales announced the nationalization of key sectors for the 
Bolivian economy such as gas and oil industries,
88
 or more recently when the government 
took control over the electricity grid.
89
  
Given that the role of the government in the economy is a salient issue dimension 
in Latin America (see also Kitschelt et al. 2010), the positions of both citizens and 
representatives in this regard are used to test policy congruence, in a series of analyses 
that pay special attention to underprivileged groups. As a secondary dimension, I also 
take into account preferences over social values (support for gay marriage). This topic of 
same-sex marriage has also entered the political agenda in the recent years. This issue has 
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 Bolivian newspapers report extensively on the process of nationalization that took place in 2006. See for 
instance El Diario May, 3, 2006.  
89
 See The New York Times May 1, 2012. 
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been discussed in congress, notably when an opposition legislator recently forged a 
project to legalize gay civil unions.
90
 The specific questions used in the analyses, with 
shared wording across the elite and mass surveys, are as follows: 
 
ROS1. The Bolivian government, instead of the private sector, should own the most 
important enterprises and industries of the country.  How much do you agree or 
disagree with this statement? 
ROS2. The Bolivian government, more than individuals, should be primarily 
responsible for ensuring the well-being of the people. To what extent do you agree or 
disagree with this statement? 
ROS3. The Bolivian government, more than the private sector, should be primarily 
responsible for creating jobs. To what extent to do you agree or disagree with this 
statement? 
ROS4. The Bolivian government should implement strong policies to reduce income 
inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with 
this statement? 
ROS5. The Bolivian government, more than the private sector, should be primarily 
responsible for providing retirement pensions. How much do you agree or disagree 
with this statement? 
ROS6. The Bolivian government, more than the private sector should be primarily 
responsible for providing health care services. How much do you agree or disagree 
with this statement? 
D6. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of same-sex couples having the right 
to marry? 
 
Within the survey, responses to the role of the state (ROS) questions are given on 
a 1-7 scale where 1 means (strongly disagree) and 7 (totally agree). Responses to the 
same-sex marriage question are given on a 1-10 scale where 1 means strongly disapprove 
and 10 strongly approve.  
As stated above, democracies are not only theoretically premised on the idea of 
substantive representation but also on the idea of equality. On the one hand, scholars 
identify poor citizens as an underprivileged group whose policies preferences are not 
taken into account to the same degree as others (Gilens 1998, Bartels 2008). On the other 
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 See La Prensa May 24, 2012. 
147 
 
hand, indigenous populations have been traditionally excluded from the political arena in 
Latin America. This chapter focuses on these two groups. Even though much of the 
indigenous population in Bolivia is poor, the AmericasBarometer data in Table IV.3, 
shows that there are poor citizens who are not indigenous and vice versa. Most citizens 
identify themselves as mestizos (2,169 out of 2,856). Nonetheless, looking at those who 
fall into the poorest quintile, 25.29% are indigenous versus the 4.33% who identify as 
white. At the other extreme, 7.17% of those in the wealthiest end are indigenous versus 
11.58% who are white.  
 
Table IV. 3. Wealth and Self-Identification in Bolivia 
Ethnic Self-
Identification 
Wealth Quintiles 
 
 
 Poorest 2 3 4 Richest Total 
White 4.33 % 5.55 % 4.90 % 7.96 % 11.58 % 194 
Mestizo 68.89 % 72.94 % 78.95 % 79.65 % 80.15 % 2,169 
Indigenous 25.29 % 20.00 % 14.70 % 11.50 % 7.17 % 456 
Others 1.5 % 1.51 % 1.44 % 0.88 % 1.1 % 37 
Total 601 595 551 565 544 2,856 
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2010 
 
I will assess the extent to which poor and indigenous citizens in Bolivia are 
represented by their legislators. First, I will assess whether or not the policy preferences 
of those citizens in the first quintile of wealth
91
 are close or not to the preferences of the 
national representatives compared to the preferences of those in the fifth quintile of 
wealth. Then, I will take into account the difference between single member district 
                                                 
91
 I will use the variable wealth in the AmericasBarometer which takes into account household assets. See 
Córdova 2009. This measure has the advantage of not having as many missing values as income. 15% of 
respondents did not answer to the question on income, while we have 98% of respondents in the wealth 
measure.  
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legislators and proportional ones. Finally, I will repeat the same analysis considering 
indigenous versus white respondents.  
A first assumption that needs testing is the expectation that different groups have 
different policy preferences. Theories on self-interest state that economically vulnerable 
citizens, recipients or at risk of being recipients of social welfare programs are more 
likely to support a stronger presence of the government or state (Hasenfeld and Rafferty 
1989, Coleman 2001). The underlying argument is that citizens are not going to support 
government programs “where they do not think that they will benefit and where do not 
think the beneficiaries are legitimate” (Sanders 1988:323). Therefore, we could expect 
that poor citizens (versus rich) and indigenous (versus non indigenous) hold different 
attitudes towards the role of the state. Table IV.4 shows the differences between those in 
the lowest quintile of wealth and those in the highest one regarding their policy 
preferences, following the same procedure as in Chapter IV.As the difference of means 
test shows, only in two areas there are statistically significant differences: the state as 
owner of the main industries, as the main responsible for reducing income inequalities. 
Unlike in Chapter IV I opt to analyze all the items on the role of the state separately to 
study the case of Bolivia more in-depth. Although both groups prefer a strong role of the 
state, poor citizens prefer a larger involvement.  
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Table IV. 4. Differences in policy preferences between poor and rich citizens in 
Bolivia 
 Mean for Poorest Mean for Wealthiest Difference 
State as owner of 
main industries 
4.92 4.22 0.70* 
State responsible for 
ensuring the well-
being of the people 
5.23 5.28 0.05 
State being 
responsible for 
creating jobs 
5.49 5.36 0.13 
State should reduce 
income inequality 
between the rich and 
the poor 
5.42 5.07 0.34* 
State should provide 
retirement pensions 
5.46 5.41 0.047 
State responsible for 
providing health 
care services 
5.72 5.69 0.035 
Support for Gay 
Marriage 
3.34 3.38 0.04 
 Note: based on postestimation test (lincom). Differences passing a significance threshold of p<0.05 are 
marked with an asterisk. 
 
In the same way, Table IV.5 presents the differences between those self-identified 
as white as those self-identified as indigenous. In this case there are statistically 
significant differences in the state as owner of main industries, the state as responsible 
ensuring the well being of the people and the state as responsible for reducing income 
inequalities between the rich and the poor. Indigenous citizens are more likely to favor a 
strong involvement of the government in the economy.  
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Table IV. 5. Differences in policy preferences between indigenous and white citizens 
in Bolivia 
 Mean for Indigenous Mean for Whites Difference 
State as owner of 
main industries 
5.11 3.80 1.30* 
State responsible for 
ensuring the well-
being of the people 
5.43 5.15 0.28* 
State being 
responsible for 
creating jobs 
5.42 5.58 0.15 
State should reduce 
income inequality 
between the rich and 
the poor 
5.21 5.51 0.30* 
State should provide 
retirement pensions 
5.46 5.58 0.12 
State responsible for 
providing health care 
services 
5.60 5.76 0.16 
Support for Gay 
Marriage 
3.11 2.95 0.16 
Note: Differences passing a significance threshold of p<0.05 are marked with an asterisk. 
 
With this picture of policy preferences among different groups of the society in 
Bolivia, I now turn to assess the congruence between citizens and legislators in these 
same areas. Measures to assess policy congruence have varied across studies. Some 
scholars have relied on correlation coefficients (Miller and Stokes 1963), absolute 
distances between positions and regression coefficients (Achen 1978). Bartels (2008: 
254) analyzes political equality regressing roll call votes for each representative on the 
opinions of her constituents divided by the number of respondents from her 
circumscription, controlling for the party of the legislator. I start by presenting the extent 
to which citizens and legislators’ policy preferences are aligned using the Golder and 
Stramski’s (2010) many-to-many measure of congruence. The following figures show the 
distribution of preferences of citizens and legislators as a whole, following the Golder 
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and Stramski (2010) measure of congruence. This measure captures the degree to which 
the “collective body of representatives reflects the ideological preferences of the citizens” 
(p. 10). This measure of congruence compares the cumulative distribution functions 
(CDFs) of citizens and their representatives. A country has a high level of congruence 
between citizens and representatives when the CDFs of these two are similar and the 
distance between them is small. Therefore, I will compare the poor’ and the 
representatives’ cumulative distributions versus the wealthy and the representatives’ 
ones. While in Chapter IV I focused on the distance between the poor and legislators, 
here I analyze the distance between the poor, the wealthy and legislators and I expect the 
latter to be similar and closer, compared to the former. 
 
Table IV. 6. Policy congruence in Bolivia by Wealth 
 Congruence 
Poor/Legislators 
Congruence 
Rich/Legislators 
State as owner of main 
industries 
0.632 0.937 
State responsible for 
ensuring the well-being of 
the people 
0.968 0.915 
State being responsible 
for creating jobs 
0.477 0.435 
State should reduce 
income inequality 
between the rich and the 
poor 
0.882 1.205 
State should provide 
retirement pensions 
0.539 0.467 
State responsible for 
providing health care 
services 
0.483 0.453 
Support for Gay 
Marriage 
0.957 0.916 
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Looking at Table IV.6, we observe that rich citizens are closer to legislators as a 
whole, at least in five of the items considered here. Poor citizens are closer to legislators 
in two items, the state as owner of main industries and the state being the main 
responsible for reducing income inequalities, items on where there were statistically 
significant differences between poor and rich citizens.  
 
Table IV. 7. Policy congruence in Bolivia by Ethnicity 
 Congruence 
Indigenous/Legislators 
Congruence 
White/Legislators 
State as owner of main 
industries 
0.535 1.042 
State responsible for 
ensuring the well-being 
of the people 
0.739 1.076 
State being responsible 
for creating jobs 
0.479 0.451 
State should reduce 
income inequality 
between the rich and the 
poor 
1.205 1.148 
State should provide 
retirement pensions 
0.648 0.564 
State responsible for 
providing health care 
services 
0.381 0.587 
Support for Gay 
Marriage 
0.718 1.011 
 
Does the mixed electoral system have any impact on substantive representation? 
The following sets of figures represent the CDFs of rich/poor citizens and single 
member/proportional district legislators. I only present those cases where there are 
significant differences in the preferences of poor/versus rich citizens, that is to say, 
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regarding the role of the state as owner of the main industries, and as responsible for 
reducing inequalities.  
 
 
Figure IV. 8. Congruence on the Role of the State as the Owner of Industries by 
Type of Legislator and Levels of Wealth 
 
Figure IV.8 presents the CDFs of rich/poor citizens and single 
member/proportional district legislators regarding the role of the state as the owner of the 
main industries of the country. The solid lines represent the legislators (black for SMD 
and grey for proportional) and the dashed for citizens in the lowest and highest quintiles 
of wealth. Results show that the closest distributions are between those in the poorest 
quintile and proportional representatives (0.24), followed by the poorest and the SMD 
representatives (0.49). On the other hand, the preferences of those in the wealthiest 
quintile are worse represented, and they are closer to proportional legislators (0.46) than 
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to the SMD (1.197). In this case, contrary to the expectation, neither of the two groups of 
citizens is closer to the SMD. 
 
 
Figure IV. 9. Congruence on the Role of the State Reducing Inequality by Type of 
Legislator and Levels of Wealth 
 
Figure IV.9 presents the CDFs of rich/poor citizens and single 
member/proportional district legislators regarding the role of the state as the main 
responsible for reducing income inequality in the country. Again, wealthy citizens are 
less well-represented than the poor ones, and preferences of proportional representatives 
are closer to citizens than SMD’s preferences (0.60 versus 1.00 for the poorest and 0.94 
versus 1.34 for the wealthiest).  
What happens when we assess policy congruence by taking into account self-
identified ethnicity? Figures IV.10 , IV.11 and IV.12 present the CDF for the three issues 
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on which there were statistically significant differences between indigenous and white 
populations.  
 
 
Figure IV. 10. Congruence on the Role of the State as the 
Owner of Industries by Type of Legislator and Race 
 
Figure IV.10 presents the CDFs of white/indigenous citizens and single 
member/proportional district legislators regarding the role of the state as the owner of the 
main industries of the country. Again, the solid lines represent the legislators (black for 
SMD and grey for proportional) and the dashed for citizens, longer for indigenous and 
shorter for whites. Results show that the closest distributions are between those in the 
indigenous and SMD (0.21) followed by the indigenous and proportional representatives 
(0.52). The preferences of those identified as white are worse represented, especially 
considering SMD (1.29) compared to proportional ones (0.55). In this case, only 
indigenous are closer to the SMD legislators. 
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Figure IV. 11. Congruence on the Role of the State as 
Responsible for Ensuring Well-Being by Type of Legislator 
and Race 
 
Figure IV.11 presents the CDFs of rich/poor citizens and single 
member/proportional district legislators regarding the role of the state as the main 
responsible for ensuring the well-being of the people. Again, white citizens are worse 
represented than the indigenous ones, and preferences of proportional representatives are 
barely closer to both groups of citizens than the preferences of SMD legislators (0.71 
versus 0.72 for indigenous and 1.09 versus 1.08 for whites).  
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Figure IV. 12. Congruence on the Role of the State as 
Responsible for Reducing Income Inequality by Type of 
Legislator and Race 
 
Finally, Figure IV.12 presents the CDFs of rich/poor citizens and single 
member/proportional district legislators regarding the role of the state as the main 
responsible for reducing income inequality. In this case, both whites and indigenous are 
closest to the proportional representatives (0.80 and 0.94) than to the SMD legislators 
(1.27 and 1.34).   
In sum, we have seen how the electoral rule does not have a homogenous 
influence across the different policy aspects, with the outcome sometimes contrary to 
what theory would expect. Theory would suggest that SMD legislators are closest to 
citizens, but we have seen that this is not always the case. Further, we find that poor 
citizens, contrary to which much of the literature suggest are better represented that 
wealthy ones, at least in Bolivia.   
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Descriptive Representation in Bolivia 
 
The importance of institutions can also be assessed by considering descriptive 
representation. The case of Bolivia also allows me to assess this type of representation 
following the same hypotheses and using similar analyses to those discussed above. 
Descriptive representation has received an increasing amount of attention from scholars, 
especially looking at the extent to which political systems have incorporated indigenous 
sectors in recent decades (Sieder 2002, Van Cott 2005, Yashar 2005, Lucero 2008). The 
literature has identified disadvantaged groups that traditionally have played a limited role 
in politics, such as women and, in the case of Latin America, indigenous populations. 
Most of the research on these two groups has been approached from a descriptive 
perspective of representation. In Pitkin’s terms (1972), when representation is defined as 
"standing for", we are referring to descriptive representation which occurs when "a 
person or thing stands for others by being sufficiently like them" (p. 80).  The importance 
of descriptive representation emerged in the 1990s when many scholars looking at the 
United States considered that fair representation should allow social groups to define and 
defend their own interests (Young 1990, Phillips 1995, Williams 1998, Mansbridge 
1999). 
This dimension of descriptive representation is analyzed in this section of the 
chapter.  I will assess descriptive representation by taking into account the skin color of 
both legislators and citizens.  I will use a measure developed by Professor Edward Telles 
of Princeton University’s Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America (PERLA). This 
measure is based on a skin color palette that ranges from 1 to 11 with lower numbers 
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representing lighter skin tones and larger numbers corresponding to darker tones. This 
measure was used in the last round of surveys of the AmericasBarometer. Then, I used 
this same scale to create my own data set on the skin color of preventatives in Bolivia.
92
 
The use of this skin color palette allows me to have the same measure across samples. 
I assess the extent to which the mixed-electoral system has any impact on 
descriptive representation. As I stated above, we could expect that citizens are closer to 
single member district legislators than to proportional district members. I analyze this by 
calculating the absolute distance between a citizen’s skin color and the skin color of both 
of her representatives (plurinominal
93
 and uninominal). Table 4 in the appendix presents 
those results.   
The fact  that citizens are closer in skin tone to their uninominal representatives 
varies from department to department. In only five cases, i.e. La Paz, Santa Cruz, Oruro, 
Pando and Beni, citizens are closer to the SMD representative than to the mean of the 
proportional ones. Therefore, the evidence is not as strong as we would have expected.  
In Tarija, for instance, citizens are closer in skin tone to the proportional representatives 
than to the SMD representative ones.  
These analyses do not take into account parties or citizens’ partisan preferences. 
As has been addressed in previous chapters, parties to the left seem to have an impact in 
different dimensions of political inequality, especially when analyzing perceptions of 
unequal representation in Latin America. The case of Bolivia offers a great opportunity to 
                                                 
92
 In neither case respondents or legislators see the color palette. Interviewers from the AmericasBarometer 
were asked to code the skin color at the end of the interviews. I coded the skin color of legislators while the 
Secretary of the Chamber called the roll.  When we compare skin tones with self-identification, we observe 
a relationship between these two forms of measuring race (See Table 3 in Appendix.). 
93
 I calculated the mean of the proportional legislators’ skin tone.  
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test the relationship between a strong presence of a leftist party
94
 and representation of 
underprivileged groups.  We might expect that parties capture part of this descriptive 
representation. In fact, when we measure the skin tone of citizens and elites by taking 
into account the party with which they identify and they party to which they belong, I 
find both statistically significant differences among parties and a strong correlation 
between parties and skin tone. Both MAS and MAS supporters have the darkest skin tone 
(above 5) and the difference with the rest of parties is statistically significant (at p<0.05). 
Therefore, it seems that parties are capturing the ethnic divide as we would expect in 
contemporary Bolivia, and as Table IV.8 shows.  
 
Table IV. 8. Skin Tone and Political Parties in Bolivia 
 Legislators Citizens 
Party  Mean St Dev N Mean St dev N 
MAS 5.61 1.03 88 5.2 1.39 1267 
AS 4 1.41 2 4.78 1.39 46 
PPB 4.16 1.11 37 4.55 1.4 383 
UN 3.33 9.57 3 4.58 1.39 72 
Correlation  0.871      
 
 Finally, another way to assess the relevance of electoral rules is to look at the 
party dominating the legislative arena and to see where it is more successful. Figure 
IV.13 depicts a map of Bolivia divided into its nine departments with the percentage of 
both types of legislators that the MAS party has in each department. The gray 
departments are those where the majority of citizens are indigenous according to the 2001 
census. 
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 For a typology of leftist parties in Latin America see Levitsky and Roberts (2011). These authors define 
MAS as a new political movement with dispersed authority that has a strong control over natural resources 
and calls for income redistribution. 
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Figure IV. 13. MAS Success by Type of Circumscription 
 
The map shows how MAS was more successful in those departments with larger 
proportions of indigenous populations. In most of them, the party was especially 
successful wining the single member districts. In departments such as La Paz, and Oruro, 
the party won all of them. However, in the Media Luna departments, it was relatively 
more successful winning proportional seats than the majoritarian ones. Therefore, we 
could say that the electoral rules do not have uniform effects across the country. Further, 
it is clear that there is a relationship between the ethnic characteristics of the region and 
the performance of parties across different kinds of circumscriptions.   
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Conclusion 
 
The chapter addresses the extent to which different institutional arrangements 
affect political representation and more specifically the representation of historically 
under-represented groups in Bolivia. It has examined subjective perceptions of 
legislators’ roles and objective measures of policy and descriptive representation. The 
principal argument tested here is that electoral rules that incentivize a close relationship 
between the legislator and her constituency will cultivate comparatively better outcomes 
with respect to legislators’ representative focus and substantive and descriptive 
representation.  
Analyses have shown how institutions do not have a uniform impact across all the 
dimensions examined. While the electoral rules have a large impact on citizens’ and 
legislators’ perceptions, there is little evidence that institutions matter for substantive and 
descriptive representation. Measures of the congruence between legislators’ policy 
stances on economic and social issues and citizens’ stances on those same issues reveal 
that in fact that the poor and the indigenous are better represented than the rich and the 
non-indigenous. Further it is the case that citizens are not always closer to single member 
district representatives than to proportional legislators. In a similar manner, only in half 
of the cases, representatives elected in single member districts are more likely to share 
the skin tone of citizens than those elected through proportional ones. However, as the 
data shows, it seems to be that the electoral rules somehow mediate the relationship 
between the ethnic characteristics of the departments and the performance of the 
majoritarian party across different kinds of circumscriptions.  This last finding will 
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require further analysis and assessing the extent to which other institutions such as 
political parties have an impact on substantive and descriptive representation in Bolivia.  
Finally, it is worth noting that institutions, as found in Chapters II and III, have 
the strongest effects on perceptions. It seems that institutions impact the attitudes of both 
citizens and legislators, and this impact is larger than the one over substantive 
representation, at least as I have measured it in this dissertation. Also, it has been clear 
across all chapters that leftist parties matter for perceptions on representation and 
substantive representation.  The next chapter summarizes the main findings of this 
dissertation and opens new avenues of research.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Political systems in Latin America seem to have failed to fulfill citizens’ 
expectations, which has led to high and growing dissatisfaction with the main political 
institutions of representation, and to some scholars to point out to a crisis of 
representation (Hagopian 2005; Mainwaring et al 2006). This dissertation has looked at 
the issue of political representation in the region with different eyes, focusing on the 
extent to which this failure of representation is affecting all groups within the population 
equally. More specifically, this study has focused on the extent to which perceptions of 
unequal representation and substantive representation vary between those in the lower 
socioeconomic strata and those in higher one.  Furthermore, my dissertation has 
addressed the question of whether there are some institutional designs (namely with 
respect to the nature of and rules governing the electoral system) and/or cultural features 
(in particular, those of a participatory culture) that might lead to more equal 
representation outcomes than others. 
This final chapter reviews the main findings in this study, and highlights how it 
relates to different aspects of representation and proposes further analysis to complement 
what it has been presented here.  
As it has been presented through the dissertation, different theoretical approaches 
argue that poor citizens lack the means and resources to hold public officials accountable 
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and, given their lack of participation and ability to influence politics, representatives are 
under-responsive to this sub-group (Bartels 2008, Taylor-Robinson 2010). 
One of the first objectives of my dissertation was to assess the degree of this 
unequal representation by looking at both perceptions and substantive representation in 
Latin America. Chapter II focused on perceptions and found that as expected, citizens in 
ten Latin American countries do not perceive that politicians defend the interests of the 
socioeconomically advantaged and disadvantaged evenly. Interestingly, those in the 
wealthiest quintiles of wealth are less likely to consider that politicians defend their 
interests. Apart from assessing perceptions about whom public officials represent, 
Chapter II focused on the perceived gap between the actual and the ideal situation of 
political inequality.  In this case, those in the lowest quintiles of wealth were more likely 
to perceive a larger gap in their perceptions between the actual and the ideal situation. 
Chapter III started by assessing the extent to which the preferences of the poor in Latin 
America are reflected in legislators’ preferences, as the literature for advanced 
democracies has suggested. It showed that in that with the exceptions of Bolivia and 
Uruguay, in the rest of countries in Latin America, legislators’ preferences are closer to 
those of the wealthiest than to the poorest (especially regarding preferences related to the 
role of the state and attitudes towards gay marriage). 
However, apart from assessing levels of underrepresentation, the second objective 
of the dissertation was to examine the role of political institutions in these 
representational dynamics. When addressing perceptions of representation, I found that 
leftist political parties have a large impact. There is a strong correlation between the 
presence of leftist parties in the political system and lower levels of perceived political 
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inequalities. It could be argued that citizens see these kinds of parties as vehicles for 
shrinking the distance in the representation of poor versus rich constituents. Also, 
electoral institutions are key factors to have into account when addressing political 
representation. Results have shown that the level of proportionality does not have any 
impact on perceptions of political inequality. The magnitude of electoral systems appears 
as a relatively significant factor, in the sense that a large number of small electoral 
districts is related to lower gaps in political inequality. Small districts, that is to say 
districts electing 5 or less representatives, might be having the impact of generating 
tighter bonds between citizens and representatives where citizens see politicians as taking 
them into account. In smaller districts public officials have more incentives to respond to 
their constituents as control and clarity of responsibility is enhanced in contrast to large 
districts.  Finally, one institutional feature that seems to have a large impact is the 
effective number of parties. However, contrary to some expectations, large numbers of 
parties in congress does not translate into perceptions of more inclusive systems. In fact, 
in countries with low number of parties, citizens perceive low levels of political 
inequality. This finding may suggest that fragmentation has different impacts in Western 
democracies and newer ones. While evidence from older democracies suggests that 
fragmentation creates a sense of inclusion and more points of view represented in the 
system, in Latin America it might be a sign of instability. Certainly, the impact of 
fragmentation in Latin America is a topic that requires further research. Lastly, a 
participatory culture, at least in terms of turnout is strongly related to perceptions of 
political inequality.  
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Taking into account substantive representation, few institutional arrangements are 
related to higher levels of political congruence at the aggregate level. The clearest 
relationships are found when focusing on preferences over the role of the state as owner 
of the main industries of the country. The strongest relationships are found between small 
districts and the effective number of parties. On the one hand, the more small districts in 
a system the closer the distance between the poor and legislators. On the other hand, the 
larger the effective number of parties the larger the distance between them considering 
this kind of preference. Finally, there is a somehow strong relationship between levels of 
turnout and congruence regarding the role of the state as owner of the most important 
industries. In any case, the relationships are not as strong as in the case of perceptions of 
representation. 
Finally, the last part of my project was devoted to an in-depth analysis of uneven 
representation and its relationship to electoral rules, institutions and political culture with 
respect to the case of Bolivia.  This country offers a great opportunity to assess the 
impact of electoral institutions on political representation given the existence of a mixed 
electoral system which creates a congress comprised of legislators elected by two 
different sets of electoral rules. Also, Bolivia is a good example of a country with a large 
proportion of indigenous peoples, who have been historically marginalized, culturally and 
politically and have suffered economic deprivation (Van Cott 2003). Therefore, this case 
allowed me to assess the impact of political institutions the representation of traditionally 
marginalized populations. In addition to considering policy representation, I also assessed 
ascriptive representation (using skin tone).  Analyses have shown how institutions do not 
have a uniform impact across all the dimensions examined. While the electoral rules have 
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a large impact on citizens’ and legislators’ perceptions, there is little evidence that 
institutions matter for substantive and descriptive representation. Measures of the 
congruence between legislators’ policy stances on economic and social issues and 
citizens’ stances on those same issues reveal that in fact that the poor and the indigenous 
are better represented than the rich and the non-indigenous. Further it is the case that 
citizens are not always closer to single member district representatives than to 
proportional legislators. In a similar fashion, only in half of the cases, representatives 
elected in single member districts are more likely to share the skin tone of citizens than 
those elected through proportional ones. However, as the data shows, it seems to be that 
the electoral rules somehow mediate the relationship between the ethnic characteristics of 
the departments and the performance of the majoritarian party across different kinds of 
circumscriptions.  This last finding will require further analysis and assessing the extent 
to which other institutions such as political parties have an impact on substantive and 
descriptive representation in Bolivia. 
Expanding the analysis on Bolivia to the rest of my research to other Latin 
American countries constitutes one part of what I intend to accomplish in the future. 
Following the same methodology to measure descriptive representation by coding the 
skin color of legislators in the eleven countries
95
 object of my dissertation, I will be able 
to assess the extent to which representation in Latin America is based on policy or 
descriptive characteristics of the constituency (e.g., social class or skin color), or both.   
As I mentioned before, some scholars have pointed out a crisis of political 
representation in Latin America and how it may erode the quality of democracy 
(Hagopian 2005; Mainwaring et al 2006). However, this link has not been tested 
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 Congress web pages contain the pictures of legislators that will allow me to code their skin color.  
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systematically. Over the last decade several studies show growing levels of discontent 
with democracy in the region (UNDP 2004) and with the institutions through which 
representation is formally channeled, political parties (Corral 2008) and parliaments 
(Carrillo-Flórez and Petri 2009); this dissatisfaction has contributed to the so called crisis 
of representation. However, none of the studies has tested the extent to which the (lack 
of) correspondence between citizens and legislators´ policy preferences affects attitudes 
towards democracy at the individual level. Only, Luna and Zechmeister (2005) show how 
at the aggregate level, representation is positively correlated with the institutionalization 
of the party system, the strength of leftish parties and economic development, whereas it 
is negative related to perceptions of fraud and poverty.  
What I intend to assess is the relationship between differences in the way 
subgroups of the population are represented and their attitudes towards democracy and 
political institutions. I expect that citizens who have their interests aligned with their 
representatives will show higher levels of support for democracy, satisfaction with 
democracy and trust in the main institutions of political representation (namely political 
parties and parliaments).  
My dependent variables will relate to four dimensions: system support, 
satisfaction with democracy, trust in political parties and trust in parliaments. The 
dependent variables will be measure using responses to questions included in the 2010 
wave of surveys in the AmericasBarometer. Through regression analyses I will test the 
relationship between policy representation and these attitudes towards democracy. Also, I 
will test the extent to which the attitudes of marginalized citizens (poor and indigenous 
170 
 
groups) towards democracy is mediated by how well (or bad) their policy preferences are 
represented by their legislators.  
Finally, this dissertation has sidelined one of the topics that arise when talking 
about the representation of poor sectors, and that I would like to address in further 
research. Some scholars argue that those with lower income are more interested in getting 
particularistic benefits than in being represented substantively (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 
2000, Griffin and Flavin 2010). Also, others argue that some institutional arrangements 
such as open list are link to practices such as clientelism and pork barrel (Ames 1995, 
Samuels 2002).  Using the survey data from the University of Salamanca´s Latin 
American Elite Project (PELA), I would like to provide some evidence in that regards, 
assessing clientelism from the perspective of congressmen. The survey has some items 
that will allow me to assess the extent to which legislators in Latin America offer 
gifts/goods in exchange for votes, and under which circumstances this practice is more 
common. Many scholars have argued that poverty, inequality or other lower social 
indicators are strong predictors of clientelism (Brusco, Nazareno and Stokes 2004; 
Desposato 2001). By looking at the levels of poverty in each district I will be able if 
legislators representing the poorest districts are more likely to engage in clientelar 
practices. I will also be able to assess the effect of district magnitude in clientelism. 
Finally, there are other factors that may shape perceptions of political inequality 
that I would like to explore in further research, such as the role of political elites 
discourse, the style of leadership and the role of mass media. 
In sum, recent studies emphasize the need of more studies on political 
representation, especially with respect to how political actors establish their links with 
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citizens and how they accomplish their functions and satisfy citizens’ needs. In the end, 
political representation theoretically has important consequences for the quality of 
democracy (Hagopian 2005). My research agenda speaks to current levels of 
representation across key groups in Latin America; factors that increase representation; 
and, the potential consequences of representation for democratic attitudes. 
The analysis of representation is especially relevant in a region like Latin America 
where the gap between citizens and those who staff their political institutions could lead 
to increasing calls to attenuate or even end liberal, representative democracy and replace 
it with other, less democratic forms of government. In the end, I find strong evidence that 
electoral rules have important influences on perceptions of citizens and of legislators 
regarding representation, but few substantial effects on actual substantive representation 
(measured as either policy or via descriptive measures in the case of Bolivia). Other 
factors matter more than mere electoral rules.  Two of these are the electoral mobilization 
of citizens and the presence of leftist parties who place priority on matters of political 
inclusion. 
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APPENDIX 
Chapter II. Appendix 
 
Figure 1. Citizens’ Perceptions of 
Politicians Defending the Rich 
 
 
Figure 2. Determinants of the Perception that Politicians Defend the 
Rich Using Quintiles of Wealth 
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Table 1. Multinomial Regression. Who do politicians defend? 
 Rich Poor 
 Coef. Lin. Std. Error Coef. Lin. Std. Error 
Quintiles of 
Wealth 
-.0770** .0238 -.0425 .0324 
Education -.0032 .0081 -.0304** .0115 
Size of Place of 
Residence  
-.0106 .0277 -.0316 .0369 
Female -.0418 .0521 .0367 .0726 
Age -.0131 .0189 -.0161 .0240 
Mexico 1.799*** .1896 -.0525 .1952 
Guatemala 1.790*** .1683 -1.064*** .2571 
Costa Rica 1.964*** .1783 .5818** .1930 
Colombia 1.805*** .1756 -.8441*** .2107 
Peru 1.697*** .1763 -.4268** .1912 
Chile  1.429*** .1901 -.8267** .2553 
Uruguay .3199 .1841 -.5763** .1780 
Brazil 2.063*** .1747 -.5336** .2185 
Argentina .8209*** .1800 -.6321** .2071 
Constant -.7675*** .1879 -.1056 .2120 
N 7739    
F 16.69    
Note: Country of Reference: Venezuela. Category of Reference: Neutral Perception 
Significant at ***p<0.01 **p<0.05, **p<0.10 
 
Figure 3. Citizens’ Perceptions of 
Politicians Defending the Rich (Ideal 
Situation) 
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Figure 4. Distribution of Responses to Questions on 
political inequality 
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Table 2. Sociodemographic determinants of the PIRG  
 Gap 
 Coef. Lin. Std. Error 
Quintiles of Wealth -.079*** .015 
Education -.0073 .015 
Size of Place of Residence  .0127 .021 
Female -.0064 .010 
Age -.0087 .012 
Mexico .140*** .015 
Guatemala .098*** .013 
Costa Rica .147*** .016 
Colombia .1472*** .014 
Peru .1173*** .014 
Chile  .127*** .015 
Uruguay .046*** .011 
Brazil .130*** .015 
Argentina .057*** .014 
Constant -.332*** .034 
N 7751  
F 19.04  
Note: Country of Reference: Venezuela. 
Significant at ***p<0.01 **p<0.05, **p<0.10 
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Chapter III. Appendix 
Table 1. Description of Citizens and Elite Survey Samples 
 AmericasBarometer PELA 
 N Sampling 
error 
Fieldwork 
date 
N Sampling 
error 
Fieldwork 
date 
Legislature 
Argentina 1,505 ±2.5% 
March-
April 
2010 
70 
(257) 
±7,88 
 
March-July 
2010 
2009-2013 
Bolivia 3,018 
±1.8% 
 
February-
March 
2010 
97 
(130) 
±5,09 
 
September-
October 
2010 
 
2010-2014 
Brazil 2,882 
±1.8% 
 
March-
April 
2010 
129 
(513) 
±8,38 
 
April-July 
2010 
2007-2011 
Chile  1,965 
±2.5% 
 
March-
May 2010 
86 
(120) 
±6,03 
 
June-July 
2010 
2010-2014 
Colombia 1,506 
±2.5% 
 
April-
May 2010 
91(165) 
±7,32 
 
December 
2010-April 
2011 
2010-2014 
Costa Rica 1,500 
±2.5% 
 
January-
February 
2010 
56 (57) 
±0,00 
 
June-July 
2010 
2010-2014 
Dominican 
Republic 
1,500 
±2.5% 
 
February-
March 
2010 
78 
(183) 
±8,91 
 
Feb.-April 
2011 
2010-2014 
El 
Salvador 
1,497 
±2.5% 
 
April-
May 2012 
62 
(84) 
 
Summer 
2012 
2012-2015 
Guatemala 1,479 
±2.5% 
 
March-
April 
2012 
87 
(158) 
±6.79 
 
March-
April 2012 
2012-2016 
Honduras 1,596 
±2.5% 
 
January-
February 
2010 
91 
(128) 
±5.84 
 
March-
April 2010 
2010-2014 
Mexico 1,562 
±2.5% 
 
January-
February 
2010 
98 
(500) 
±9.27 
 
August-
December 
2010 
2009-2012 
Nicaragua  1,686 
±2.4% 
 
February-
March 
2012 
52 
(91) 
±7.71 
 
April-May 
2012 
2012-2017 
Peru 1,500 
±2.5% 
 
January-
February 
2010 
80 
(120) 
±4.76 
 
August-
September 
2010 
2006-2011 
Uruguay  1,500 
±2.5% 
 
March-
April 
2010 
79 
(99) 
±5.01 
 
May-June 
2010 
2010-2015 
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Table 2. Reliability Coefficients for the Role of the State Index, for citizens and 
legislators 
 Alpha for Citizens Alpha for Legislators 
Argentina 0.9053 0.778 
Bolivia 0.8834 0.726 
Brazil 0.8174 0.675 
Chile  0.8553 0.858 
Colombia 0.8143 0.861 
Costa Rica 0.8352 0.775 
Dominican Republic 0.7566 0.794 
El Salvador 0.7092 0.804 
Guatemala 0.8506 0.536 
Honduras 0.8913 0.716 
Mexico 0.7758 0.645 
Nicaragua  0.7604 0.534 
Peru 0.8705 0.792 
Uruguay  0.7828 0.791 
   
 
Table 3. Congruence between Legislators and Poor/Rich Citizens in Latin America 
 
Argentina 
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Bolivia 
 
 
Brazil 
 
Chile 
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Colombia 
 
 
Costa Rica 
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Dominican Republic 
 
 
 
El Salvador 
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Honduras 
 
Mexico 
 
 
Nicaragua 
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Peru 
 
 
Uruguay 
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Table 4. Electoral Systems in Latin America and Institutional Features 
 
Type 
of list 
Formula LSQ ENP 
Average 
District 
Magnitude 
% Small 
Districts 
Argentina 
Close 
party 
list 
d'Hondt 
 
  10.7 41.66 
Bolivia 
Close 
party 
list 
 3.76 1.85 5.88 92.6 
Brazil 
Open 
list 
Hare 3 9.32 19 0 
Chile  
Open 
list 
 6.87 5.64 2 100 
Colombia 
Limited 
open 
list 
d'Hondt 
 
7.01 4.95 4.84 72.72 
Costa Rica 
Close 
party 
list 
Hare 4.96 3.9 8.14 57.14 
Dominican 
Republic 
Open 
list 
d'Hondt 
 
6.18 2.01 5.59 78.12 
El 
Salvador 
Close 
party 
list 
Hare 3.36 3.19 6 64.28 
Guatemala 
Close 
party 
list 
d'Hondt 
 
9.33 4.14 6.58 62.5 
Honduras 
Open 
list 
Hare 2.58 2.3 7.11 44.44 
Mexico 
Close 
party 
list 
 10.46 2.75 40 65.57 
Nicaragua  
Close 
party 
list 
Hare 6.41 1.8 5 72.22 
Peru 
Open 
list 
d'Hondt 
 
13.23 3.97 4.8 88 
Uruguay  
Close 
party 
list 
Hare 1.1 2.65 5.1 89.47 
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Chapter IV. Appendix 
Table 1. Distribution of Legislators by Party 
 Proportional Representative Single Member District Special 
Circumscription 
MAS-IPSP 33 49 6 
PPB-
Convergencia 
17 19 1 
Unidad Nacional 3   
AS  2  
Total 53 70 7 
 
 
Table 2. Multinomial Logistic Regression of the Role of Representatives in Bolivia 
 Represent the District Represent Party or Party Voters 
 Coefficient  Standard 
Error 
Coefficient  Standard Error 
Uninominal 1.382** 0.690 -0.831 0.890 
Ideology 0.040 0.048 -0.792 0.485 
Seeks Political 
Position 
-0.202 0.829 -1.253 1.085 
MAS -1.732 1.344 -2.798 1.860 
PPB
+
 -0.598 1.415 -2.333 1.839 
La Paz -0.114 1.522 17.845*** 2.749 
Santa Cruz -2.222 1.535 18.588*** 2.939 
Cochabamba -2.065 1.711 19.597*** 2.942 
Potosi -0.346 1.581 19.459*** 2.650 
Chuquisaca 0.016 1.559 -12.667 1.570 
Oruro -33.998 1.270 19.217*** 3.073 
Tarija -0.799 1.612 18.913*** 2.821 
Beni
++
 -1.285 1.802 -14.197 1.880 
Constant 0.358 2.161 -15.035 . 
Pseudo R
2
 0.237    
N 85    
     
Source: PELA 2010. ***p < .001; **p < .05; *p < .1, two-tailed. Reference category: Represent All Bolivians. + “Other 
parties” is the category of reference. + + Pando is the department of reference 
 
  
187 
 
Table 3. Relationship between self-identification and skin color 
Self-identification Mean (skin color) Std. Dev. N 
White 3.30 3.30 198 
Mixed 4.91 1.33 2213 
Indigenous 5.65 1.31 463 
Black 6.56 2.44 16 
Source: AmericasBarometer 2010 
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Table 4. Are citizens closer to uninominal or plurinominal legislators? 
District Citizen's 
skin tone 
Uninominal’s  
skin tone 
Plurinominal’s  
skin tone 
Distance to Uninominal 
(absolute value) 
Distance Plurinominal  
(absolute value) 
La Paz     
1 5.75 6 4.69 0.25 1.06 
2 5.7 6 4.69 0.3 1.01 
3 4 7 4.69 3 0.69 
4 6.43 7 4.69 0.57 1.74 
5 6.3 5 4.69 1.3 1.61 
6 5.95 6 4.69 0.05 1.26 
7 4.62 6 4.69 1.38 0.07 
8 5.16 5 4.69 0.16 0.47 
9 6.38 6 4.69 0.38 1.69 
10 4.07 7 4.69 2.93 0.62 
11 3.91 4 4.69 0.09 0.78 
12 3.37 4 4.69 0.63 1.32 
13 6.75 6 4.69 0.75 2.06 
14 3.50 3 4.69 0.5 1.19 
      
Santa Cruz     
15 5.4 6 3.9 0.6 1.5 
16 6.34 7 3.9 0.66 2.44 
17 5.2 3 3.9 2.2 1.3 
18 4.35 5 3.9 0.65 0.45 
19 5.1 5 3.9 0.1 1.2 
20 5.37 6 3.9 0.63 1.47 
21 6.8 6 3.9 0.8 2.9 
22 5.25 3 3.9 2.25 1.35 
23 5.07 3 3.9 2.07 1.17 
Cochabamba     
24 3.98 5 4.62 1.02 0.64 
25 4.15 6 4.62 1.85 0.47 
26 4.32 5 4.62 0.68 0.3 
27 5.46 5 4.62 0.46 0.84 
28 5.4 6 4.62 0.6 0.78 
29 3.99 4 4.62 0.01 0.63 
30 4.24 5 4.62 0.76 0.38 
31 4.06 6 4.62 1.94 0.56 
32 3.93 6 4.62 2.07 0.69 
33 3.99 4 4.62 0.01 0.63 
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District Citizen's 
skin tone 
Uninominal’s  
skin tone 
Plurinominal’s  
skin tone 
Distance to Uninominal 
(absolute value) 
Distance Plurinominal  
(absolute value) 
Oruro     
34 5.28 6 6.33 0.72 1.05 
35 5.7 5 6.33 0.7 0.63 
36 4.85 5 6.33 0.15 1.48 
37 3.59 5 6.33 1.41 2.74 
38 4.43 5 6.33 0.57 1.9 
Chuquisaca     
39 5.2 7 5 1.8 0.2 
40 5.27 6 5 0.73 0.27 
41 5.06 6 5 0.94 0.06 
42 5.7 5 5 0.7 0.7 
43 4.98 3 5 1.98 0.02 
44 5.16 4 5 1.16 0.16 
Potosi     
45 4.81 4 5.83 0.81 1.02 
46 3.77 6 5.83 2.23 2.06 
47 4.7 6 5.83 1.3 1.13 
48 4.7 7 5.83 2.3 1.13 
49 5.16 5 5.83 0.16 0.67 
50 5.34 6 5.83 0.66 0.49 
51 5.04 7 5.83 1.96 0.79 
Pando      
52 5 5 6 0 1 
53 4.73 6 6 1.27 1.27 
54 4.65 5 6 0.35 1.35 
Tarija      
55 4.47 6 5.3 1.53 0.83 
56 3.85 6 5.3 2.15 1.45 
57 5.4 6 5.3 0.6 0.1 
58 4.68 6 5.3 1.32 0.62 
59 4 6 5.3 2 1.3 
Beni      
60 4.54 4 3.66 0.54 0.88 
61 5.33 4 3.66 1.33 1.67 
62 4.36 6 3.66 1.64 0.7 
63 6.15 5 3.66 1.15 2.49 
64 4.76 5 3.66 0.24 1.1 
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